

**BHASA-PARICCHEDA  
WITH  
SIDDHANTA-MUKTAVALI  
BY**

**VISVANATHA NYAYA-PANCANANA**

















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# BHĀṢĀ-PARICCHEDA

WITH

SIDDHĀNTA-MUKTĀVALĪ

By

VIŚVANĀTHA NYĀYA-PAÑCĀNANA

*Translated by*

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*Published by*  
Swami Tadrupananda  
President, Advaita Ashrama  
Mayavati, Pithoragarh, Himalayas

181. AA  
N 98 B  
A 6 8 8

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*Third Edition, August 1977*

*Printed in India*  
By B. D. Sen  
At the Naba Mudran (P) Ltd.  
Calcutta-700004



## PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

The *Bhāṣā-pariccheda* with its commentary, the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, by the same author, Viśvanātha Nyāya-pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya, is a manual on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy which is extensively read throughout India by all who want to get a fair knowledge of the subject within a short compass. Though intended for beginners, it is a pretty difficult book, the chief reason for which is its extreme terseness. In 1850 Dr. E. Röer published an English edition of the *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, with extracts from the *Muktāvalī*, which is long out of print. An English rendering of the work with the *Muktāvalī* was therefore overdue.

Some consider books on Navya-Nyāya untranslatable into English because of the bewildering intricacy of their language. However true of the more advanced works, it may not be true of a treatise like this. For those who are not well versed in Sanskrit, an English version of it is sure to be of great help. Really this is a task that should have been undertaken by scholars. But since no one has so far done it, I have ventured to make an attempt—with what success it is left to the readers to judge. Students of Nyāya, however, should always remember that, no matter how good a translation is, they must be ready to do hard thinking for a proper understanding of the subject.

In the preparation of this book the gloss *Dinakari* and its scholium *Rāmarudri* have of course been of inestimable aid. I have also received much help from Paṇḍita Upendracandra Tarkācārya, Kāvya-Vyākaraṇa-Purāṇa-Sāṁkhya-Vedānta-Tarka-Śaḍdarśana-tīrtha, of

the *Catuspāṭhi* at the Belur Maṭh, with whom I studied the book. I am deeply indebted to Dr. Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., PH.D., Lecturer in Sanskrit, Pāli and Philosophy in the University of Calcutta, who has kindly revised the manuscripts, added a few notes and written a scholarly Introduction. Some other friends have assisted me in different ways. I have also got substantial help from the Bengali version of the book by the late Mr. Rājendracandra Śāstrī, M.A.

The book will be of most profit to those who will go through the *Muktāvali* in the original, a small edition like the one published by the Nirṇaya-sāgara Press, Bombay, serving the purpose. But it will be quite helpful to others also. Of the different readings, the one that seemed most appropriate, has been followed. I have tried to make the rendering as literal as possible without being unintelligible. The catchwords of the text quoted in the commentary are taken from the running translation and are given in Italics. The text has been punctuated, and copious notes have been added to elucidate difficult passages. References have been given to most of the quotations. The Index and the Glossary of Sanskrit terms will, it is presumed, be found useful. It is hoped that the book will facilitate the study of Nyāya, and be widely read by the interested public both in the East and in the West.

Belur, Maṭh, Dt. Howrah,  
January, 1940

MADHAVANANDA

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# KEY TO TRANSLITERATION AND PRONUNCIATION

<i>Sounds like</i>			<i>Sounds like</i>		
अ	a	o in son	ड	ḍ	d
आ	ā	ah	ढ	ḍh	dh in godhood
इ	i	i short	ण	ṇ	n
ई	ī	ee	त	t	French t
उ	u	u in full	थ	th	th in thumb
ऊ	ū	oo in boot	द	d	th in then
ऋ	r	ri	ध	dh	theh in breathe he
ए	e	e in bed	न	n	n
ऐ	ai	y in my	प	p	p
ओ	o	oh	फ	ph	ph in loop-hole
औ	au	ow in now	ब	b	b
क	k	k	भ	bh	bh in abhor
ख	kh	ckh in blockhead	म	m	m
ग	g	g hard	य	y	y
घ	gh	gh in log-hut	र	r	r
ङ	ṅ	ng	ल	l	l
च	c	ch (not k)	व	v	w
छ	ch	ch in catch him	श	ś	sh
ज	j	j	ष	ṣ	sh (almost)
झ	jh	dgeh in hedgehog	स	s	s
ञ	ñ	n (somewhat)	ह	h	h
ट	ṭ	t	·	m	ng
ठ	ṭh	th in ant-hill	:	h	half h



## INTRODUCTION

The *Bhāṣā-pariccheda* together with the author's own gloss called the *Siddhāntamuktāvali* was written by Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana, who flourished till the early part of the seventeenth century A. D. at Nava-dvīpa. Of all the manuals of syncretic character on the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school, the present work is the most popular and most extensively studied in India. The popularity of the work is not due to simplicity or brevity, but rather to its comprehensive treatment of most of the important topics and problems that exercised the minds of the exponents of the *Navya-Nyāya* school for several centuries. It is admittedly a difficult book, being written in the later style of *Navya-Nyāya* terminology, which was developed by the school of Nadia logicians. What constitutes its chief merit and title to the celebrity it enjoys is the fact that it admirably sums up the latest results of scholastic lucubrations of this school. The author flourished after Raghunātha Śiromaṇī, Mathurānātha, and Jagadīśa, and he has naturally utilised these masters. A study of this work is thus a sure propædæutic to advanced study and makes the student fairly well-posted in *Navya-Nyāya* dialectics.

Viśvanātha follows the plan of Praśastapāda in his treatment of the *Vaiśeṣika* categories and their relations, although his exposition embodies new contributions. In the discussion of the necessity and utility of invocation of divine help called *Mangalācaraṇa*, he follows in the footsteps of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, who elaborately discusses the question at the very beginning of his *magnum opus*, the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Although

the dissertation may appear to be a jejune discourse and a scholastic survival, it does not lack philosophical interest, inasmuch as it serves to bring out the implications of the law of causation by explaining the anomalies as due to factors not patent to observation. It emerges from the discourse that there is no play of chance, and the sequence of events is rigorously governed by the law, which does not brook any lapse or exception. Then again, Viśvanātha's summing of the proofs of God's existence, although extremely brief, stimulates the curiosity of the student for fuller knowledge, which can only be satisfied by a study of the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Gaṅgeśa's *Īśvarānumāna* and advanced works of other schools.

The refutation of *śakti* (energy) and *sādrśya* (similarity) advocated as separate categories by the Mimāṃsists is effective, although the advanced student who has gone to the sources will feel that the treatment is meagre. But it should not be forgotten that the book is meant for beginners, and the student must be thankful that the author has raised all the important topics and given us the crystallized results. We may refer to the author's definition of substance by way of illustration. A study of the definitions propounded by the different philosophers of this school will show the evolution of thought that took place in the course of several centuries from the time of Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara, Udayana and Vallabha down to Viśvanātha. Praśastapāda's definition of substance as the substratum of quality, endorsed by Śrīdhara, has been severely attacked by Śrīharṣa and Citsukha. The definition fails to apply to a substance which is devoid of a quality at the



moment of its origination. The second difficulty is that we cannot distinguish a quality from a substance in the light of this definition. If the logical predication of quality is the criterion of the subject being a substance, then this criterion will apply to qualities also. Thus, in the proposition 'Qualities are twenty-four,' the number of twenty-four, a quality, is predicated of 'quality,' and the definition would make substance of it. Śrī Vallabhācārya, the author of the *Nyāyalīlāvati*, a work of the highest authority on *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy, which has been commented upon by Vardhamāna, Śāṅkara Miśra and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, to name only the prominent masters, has propounded an amendment of the definition in the following terms: 'Substance as the substratum of quality is to be understood as that which is never the substratum of the absolute non-existence of quality as such.' It does not fail to include the substance at the first moment of its origin, as, though devoid of quality, the non-existence of quality in it is not absolute. But this amendment too has been roughly handled by Citsukha and has been shown to extend to unwarranted cases, e.g., the non-existence itself, as it is not the substratum of this non-existence, since a thing cannot function as its own substratum. Moreover, the charge of unwarranted extension to qualities is not rebutted, for number is predicable of quality, as shown above. The explanation of this predication on the basis of co-existence of the subject and the predicate in the same substratum is an argument of despair. The subject and the predicate are not supposed to stand in the relation of co-existence in any other case. The predicate is affirmed of the subject



as something belonging to it, which in the ultimate analysis is found to be possible on the basis of identity of denotation. No reason is assigned for departure from this recognised mode of relationship in the proposition 'Qualities are twenty-four in number,' save and except the hypothesis that quality cannot be the substratum of another quality. But this is an assumption which requires to be established by proof. The nature of things is to be determined in consonance with experience, and experience articulated and logically determined resolves itself into a judgement. A judgement consists of two concepts bound by a relation; and when the form of judgements is identical, there is no ground for the assumption of an unwonted relationship in deference to a favourite theory. So the explanation of the subject-predicate relation as not one of denotational identity but of co-existence begs the question and as such is unacceptable. Moreover, 'the non-existence of quality' is an ambiguous expression. It may mean non-existence either of one quality or of all qualities put together. The non-existence of one particular quality is consistent with the presence of another quality, and the non-existence of all the qualities is predicable of each and every substance. So the definition proves absurd, as it would not apply to any substance whatsoever.

Viśvanātha had in view all these difficulties and formulates a definition which avoids these pitfalls. He found that the alternative definition of substance as the substratum of the substance-universal (*dravyatva*) was of no help, as the presence of the substance-universal in a mustard seed, a mountain, a liquid and a gaseous

substance, which possess such a bewildering variation of physical qualities, is not a matter of undisputed perception. It can be helpful provided an independent proof of substancehood is offered. Viśvanātha offers this proof, not by appeal to experience, which is non-comittal, but by working out the implication of causality. Although physical qualities like colour and sound are not universally predicable, conjunction or disjunction at any rate is predicable of all substances. A substance, whether a product or an eternal verity, must come into the relation of conjunction with, or disjunction from, another substance. Conjunction and disjunction, being events in time, must have a substratum in which they can inhere as their cause and support. This is called inherent cause to distinguish it from other types of causes, the difference of types of causes being determined by the relation it bears to the effects concerned.

It is the postulate of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* metaphysic that a cause cannot be a simple entity. In point of fact the *Naiyāyika* does not believe in the existence of uncharacterised simples. The very logical necessity of a real being possessed of a distinctive identity, the forfeiture of which will make it cease to be real, presupposes that this self-identity must have a definitive qualitative content in it. This definitive character must be uniform in all reals which fall into a class and behave in the same way.

To come to our immediate problem, the nature of an inherent cause of conjunction or disjunction must have a determinant content, and this determinant is nothing but the substance-universal, which is present



in all inherent causes of conjunction. The rule is that a characteristic which is of smaller or of wider extension cannot be a determinant (*avacchedaka*), and as the varying qualities are not co-extensive with the inherent causality found in all substances, and as existence (*sattā*) is of wider extension, the determinant will be the substance-universal alone (*dravyatva*). Thus, there being an independent proof of it, the definition of substance by means of substance-universal is possible, and the objections advanced against the other definitions do not lie against it.

We have purposely selected a controversial problem not with a view to pronouncing on the merits of the solution proposed, but for the purpose of giving the prospective student of *Navya-Nyāya* an insight into its methodology. The merits of *Navya-Nyāya* speculations pre-eminently lie in their method of analysis of concepts and their formulation in exact terminology. The analysis is carried to its utmost limit, and the dissection of the implications has necessitated the creation of a terminology which is extremely difficult and not infrequently bewildering. Language has been stretched to its utmost capacity, and even an ordinary concept, analysed in all its implications and expressed with meticulous precision, has required a ponderous sentence. The unusual sound of the sesquipedalian phrases, in which the *Naiyāyikas* literally revel, frightens away the neophyte from the study of *Navya-Nyāya* texts. I do not think translation into another language will remove the difficulties, as they are not purely linguistic, but logical in character. To master the terminology is a hard task. But once the



intricacies of the terminology are mastered, the reward will be an intellectual satisfaction and a habit of close thinking, so essential for the successful comprehension of any problem, theoretical or practical.

We had an occasion to allude to the *Naiyāyika's* conception of reals as complex. Nothing existent has a simple constitution. The make-up of all reals that have independent being is a combination of a *that* and a *what*. Accordingly, the content of all knowledge worth the name is a complex of an adjective (determination) and a substantive, called *prakāra* and *viśeṣya* respectively. A clear analysis of a cognition cannot but take note of these two features and also the relation which binds them together. The point at issue can be brought home if we analyse the concept even of an ordinary object, say, a jar—the favourite example of the *Naiyāyika*. The jar is a thing, a real, a fact. But that is not the whole thing about it. It is the commonest character of all reals. What makes the jar what it is and positively constitutes its individuality and negatively differentiates it from other reals is the adjectival part of the jar, which is its very essence. No conception of a jar is possible which does not seize hold of this adjectival factor as its content. The adjective and the substantive alone do not exhaust the individuality of an object, but there is a *tertium quid*, which cements the two elements into one whole. The cementing bond is the relation and is thus a component factor of the individuality of a real. To distinguish it from the adjectival element, which is also the determinant of individuality, it is called the determinant *qua* relation. A concept, which is the minimum unit

of thought, is thus capable of being defined as a cognition which takes note of a relation. A cognition which does not apprehend a relation is not psychologically felt. In other words, a cognition felt or fit to be felt is bound to be determinate. The possibility of an indeterminate cognition, however, is not denied, but it is established as a matter of logical necessity. A determinate knowledge is a judgment, implicit or explicit, and takes cognisance of the relation between the adjectival and the substantival element. But judgment is possible only if there is a previous knowledge of the adjectival factor, which is brought into relation with the substantive in a judgment. Now the previous knowledge of the adjective, which is the precondition of judgment, cannot be judgmental in character. It must be indeterminate. If it were determinate, it would require another cognition of the adjective as its condition, and that also would require another previous cognition, if each of the preceding cognitions were determinate in character. So there must be a simple indeterminate apprehension somewhere at the outset, if we are to avoid a vicious infinite series.

The reason why all knowledge fit to be perceived is determinate is this: The knowledge that a knowledge has taken place is always introspective in form, e.g., 'I know the jar' or 'I have knowledge of the jar'. Knowledge without reference to an object is regarded by the *Naiyāyika* as an impossibility. On close analysis the judgment 'I know the jar' will be found to be a complex judgment, called *Viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi-jñāna* (Knowledge of the relation of a related fact). It involves a series of judgments. In



the first place knowledge is predicated of the subject as something which has happened to him. In the second place knowledge is qualified by its object 'jar'. In the third place the jar is qualified by jariness—the jar-universal (*ghaṭatva*). Now the first judgment presupposes the second and the second the third. The content of the second judgment is the proposition 'The jar is,' and this enters into the content of the judgment 'I know the jar.' The judgment 'The jar is,' is made possible only if there is knowledge of jariness, as articulate knowledge of a thing unqualified is impossible. And the knowledge of 'jariness' as the qualifying adjective of jar, being the precondition of the judgment 'The jar is,' has been shown to be indeterminate on pain of a *regressus in infinitum*, and the contents of indeterminate knowledge are undetermined.

The *Naiyāyika* does not believe in the possibility of a felt knowledge which has for its content an undetermined object. The object, whatever it is, has a character qualifying it (*prakāra*) and must be felt as such. It may be asked, if the knowledge of an object necessarily involves the knowledge of a determination (*prakāra*), is the determination known to be determined by a further determination? The answer is that a determination felt as an element in the object is undetermined, but when independently conceived as expressed by a term, it must be felt as determined by a qualifying adjective. Thus, jariness felt as an element in the concept of jar is felt by itself without a further determination, but understood as the meaning of the word 'jariness' independently of its incidence, it is felt



as determined by 'jar-ness-ness,' which means 'the character of being jar-ness.' The determination in this context is to be understood either as a universal (*jāti*) or as an unanalysable characteristic (*akhaṇḍopādhi*).

We have seen that all knowledge of which one can be conscious is determinate according to the *Naiyāyika*. and indeterminate knowledge is only a logical presupposition. But Prabhākara, the celebrated *Mīmāṃsā* philosopher, who is the accredited founder of a school of his own and whose astounding originality of views provoked spirited criticism from rival philosophers and particularly from Gaṅgeśa, who wrote his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* to refute his views in particular, holds that all knowledge is judgmental in character and is of the form 'I know the jar.' His argument is that when the conditions of the articulated judgment 'I know the jar' are present in full, that is to say, the determination 'jar-ness,' the substantive 'jar' and their relation 'inherence' are present to consciousness, there is no reason why they should not be cognised together. The postulation of indeterminate cognition as the condition of determinate knowledge is absolutely uncalled for. The assertion that determinate cognition is felt not immediately, but two moments after the sense-object contact, is idle, as the interval of a moment or two is not distinguishable. The contention that the knowledge of the determination is the *conditio sine qua non* of all determinate knowledge has no substance. The *Naiyāyika* himself does not adhere to it in all cases. In the negative judgment 'The jar is not here,' the negation is understood as determined both by its own determination, viz, the quality of being a nega-

tion (*abhāvatva*) and by 'the jar,' its counterpositive. Negation without reference to its counterpositive is not intelligible, and as the counterpositive is neither a universal nor an unanalysable characteristic, it must also be known as determined. But as the previous knowledge of all these determinations is not at hand and is on the contrary detrimental to a negative judgment, it must be admitted that they are comprehended together in a complex judgment called *Viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭya-jñāna*. Again divine intuition being uncaused is not conditioned by a previous knowledge. So there is no reason for holding determinate knowledge to be caused by a previous knowledge.

To this contention the *Naiyāyika* replies that the opponent makes undue extension of an exceptional case and makes an exception the universal rule. Though the objective conditions of complex judgment may be present *ab initio*, they do not lead to a judgment all at once, if the knowledge of the determination or the determinant of the determination is not present in the mind of the subject. Thus in a case where redness, a garment (the substratum of redness), a jar and substancehood are apprehended together without reference to the relations governing them respectively, the resulting judgment could be 'I know the red jar,' which is never the case. This shows that knowledge of the relation, that is to say, an independent judgment, e.g., 'the jar is red,' is invariably the condition precedent of a complex judgment. Moreover, a jar may be cognised either as a jar (that is, qualified by jarhood) or as a thing possessed of a universal (*jātimān*), as both these determinations are



present in the jar. The result will be either of the judgments, viz, 'There is a jar' or 'There is a thing possessed of a universal' and not promiscuous. There must be a reason for this variation in result, and it cannot be anything else than this that the knowledge of the determination in question is the decisive condition of the judgment that will follow, whether simple (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) or complex (*viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyajñāna*).

While discoursing on knowledge of reals we had occasion to observe that all entities are felt as determined by some characteristic except the universal (*jāti*) and the unanalysable characteristic (*akhaṇḍ-opādhi*) felt as elements in reals. In other words a determination is not further determined, and the reason is simple. If a determination were further determined by another determination, there would be no end of it, and the result would be a deadlock. A question may be raised in this connexion. A determination is a fact, but why should it be a *upādhi* also as opposed to a *jāti*? Why should not *jāti* alone serve as a determination in all cases? The answer is as follows: A *upādhi* has got all the incidents of a universal (*jāti*) in so far as it functions as a synthesising principle. But the former lacks one or the other of the characteristics of the universal and so stands aloof in a different category. Besides there may be an impediment to its being considered a universal, though it may be a synthesising principle. The list of impediments to a universal are enumerated under the stanza XI of the *Bhāṣā-Pariccheda*. Of these, cross-division and the resulting infinite regression require an elucidation, the former on account of conflict of views and the latter



owing to a possible misconception. We take up the latter first. The problem arises in this way: The different universals are numerically and constitutionally distinct, and still they are called by a common name, viz, universal, and are comprehended by a common concept. Thus in relation to one another they behave like individual members of a class, and this would make the postulation of a wider universal comprising all the universals in its scope a logical necessity, as is the case with individual cows or horses. But this cannot be done. The higher universal in question may serve to synthesise all the universals under one class, but being itself a universal like those it synthesises, will require a still higher universal to synthesise itself with the other universals under a common group. But the same difficulty will arise with regard to the second higher universal also. The result will be a vicious *regressus in infinitum*, and this forbids us to posit a higher universal over and above the recognised universals. If there be a necessity for a synthesising principle, it will be a *upādhi* and not a *jāti*.

As regards cross-division there is a sharp current of opinion about its invalidating capacity, as it does not involve an absurdity, which is patent in other cases. The *Vedāntist* does not regard it as a bar, and so also a section of the *Naiyāyikas*. It is argued that when the synthetic operation is present and there does not arise an absurdity, there is no reason for denying that the attributes in question are universals. We can distinguish three types of attributes in so far as their mutual relationship varies. Firstly, attributes which

are mutually exclusive and never found to coincide, e.g., cowhood and horsehood. Secondly, between two one is found to have independent incidence while the other is not, e.g., jarhood and substancehood. Thirdly, some attributes which are partially exclusive and partially coincident, e.g., the attributes of being an element (*bhūtatva*) and of having limited dimension (*mūrtatva*). The first and second types are regarded as universals. The third type of attributes is subject to controversy. The *Naiyāyika* is of opinion that if two universals are to coincide, they must be related as higher and lower, that is to say, the extension of one must be included in that of the other. The opponent argues that when independent incidence is not insisted upon as the condition of universals on the analogy of cowhood and horsehood, and partial exclusion by one or the other is no bar against their being universals in the second type of attributes, there is no earthly reason why there should be opposition with regard to the third type on the ground of partial exclusion by one another. Udayana contends that if two mutually exclusive universals were to coincide, cowhood and horsehood could also be supposed to coincide, and this would make the distinction of a cow from a horse impossible. But the opponent points out that though absolutely exclusive universals can never coincide, there is no bar against two partially exclusive universals being coincident, as it is ratified by experience. So the analogy drawn by Udayana is not on all fours.

Though there is difference of opinion with regard to cross-division, there is unanimity with regard to the



rest of the impediments. When an impediment is present the synthesising attribute is called '*upādhi*.' *Upādhi* again admits of twofold division according as it is susceptible of analysis or not. Thus etherhood (*ākāśatva*) is a *upādhi*. But if etherhood can be equated with the character of being the inherent cause of sound (*śabda-samavāyi-kāraṇatā*), which is the definition of ether, it will be called an analysable (*sakhaṇḍa*) *upādhi*. But the concepts of adjectivehood and substantiveness, etc. are not analysable into simpler terms, and hence they are called *akhaṇḍa* (unanalysable) *upādhis*. The latter felt as determinations in reals are not further determined.

We have discussed only a few problems and have avoided a vast mass of important topics. We do not pretend to be competent, nor is it the place here, to discourse on them. The translation of works of *Navya-Nyāya* literature into a foreign language is almost an impossible task, and if possible at all, will require Herculean labour. The subtle nuances of the terminological expressions refuse to be rendered into another language. The present translation is a new enterprise, and the author of it, Swāmī Mādhavānanda, has achieved considerable success. The translation is accurate and in most places extremely happy. His task has been uphill, because the *Muktāvali* is full of discussions in which the terminology of the New School has been freely used. The special charm of the translation is the studied avoidance of all technicalities of Western philosophy, which makes it intelligible even to a person who is not a student of philosophy. But a translation, however successful, cannot altogether



avoid the difficulties of the original, and so the present translation will require as close attention as the original, at any rate in the chapter on inference. The foot-notes, although brief, are felicitous and will help the understanding of the text. It will particularly help the student if he studies the book along with the original, as translation into another language serves to a great extent the purpose of a commentary. The credit of being the pioneer-translator into English in the field of *Navya-Nyāya* will go to Swāmī Mādhavānanda, whose English translation of Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and other philosophical classics has already made his name familiar to the students of Indian philosophy and religion. I can unhesitatingly aver that his English rendering will extend the circle of readers of this important work, and thus will be instrumental in stimulating the interest of students of philosophy in *Navya-Nyāya*—a subject which has remained a sealed book to many and a scarecrow to not a few.

Regarding Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana we are happily in possession of considerable data about his time, place and family history. Viśvanātha has recorded the date of his composition of the *Nyāyasūtra Vṛtti* as the year 1556 of the Śaka era, which is equivalent to 1634 A.D. This work was written at the fag-end of his life at Vṛndāvana, where he passed his last days. His father was Kāśīnātha Vidyānivāsa, who was the son of Ratnākara Vidyāvācaspati, the youngest brother of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, the founder of *Navya-Nyāya* study at Navadvīpa and the first teacher of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi of immortal fame. The

father of Vidyāvācaspati and SārvaBhauma was Maheśvara Viśārada, celebrated for his scholarship and piety, whose father Narahari of Banerjee clan settled at Navadvīpa in the fourteenth century A. D. Viśvanātha also wrote another work called *Māṃsatattva-viveka*—an interesting treatise on *Smṛti*. The work was written as the result of a controversy with the paṇḍitas of Mahārāṣṭra with a view to vindicating the custom of meat-eating among the Brahmins of Northern India. It has been published by the Saraswatībhavana of Benares. The author shows vehemence in his advocacy of the custom, which prevails particularly in Bengal, and ridicules the South Indian paṇḍitas, who deprecate meat-eating, as the followers of the Buddhist tenets. For the details about the genealogy and the literary achievements of the ancestors of our author we refer the reader to the Introduction of the *Nyāya-paricaya*, in Bengali, by M. M. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa, whom we have the privilege and honour to have as our esteemed colleague in the University of Calcutta.

SATKARI MOOKERJEE





## INTRODUCTORY

Salutation to Śrī Gaṇeśa.

नूतनजलधररुचये गोपबधूटीदुकूलचौराय ।

तस्मै कृष्णाय नमः संसारमहीरुहस्य बीजाय ॥ १ ॥

1. Salutation to that Kṛṣṇa who has the lustre of a fresh rain-cloud, who stole<sup>1</sup> the garments of young cowherd maids, and who is the seed<sup>2</sup> of the tree of the universe.

1. May Śiva, skilled in His violent dance as a sport, who has made the crescent His crest-gem and the serpent Vāsuki His bracelet, vouchsafe well-being (unto all).

2. Out of compassion for Rājīva,<sup>3</sup> I will elucidate, purely as a diversion, the *Kārikās* (verses) that I myself have composed, with very brief sayings of the ancients.

3. May<sup>4</sup> the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, containing (an account of) substances (*dravya*), together with qualities

<sup>1</sup> The reference is to *Bhāgavata* X. xxii. 8-27. The chapter, which is considered to be an interpolation by many scholars, seeks to bring out the idea that in order to attain absolute union with the Lord we must get rid of all our fetters.

<sup>2</sup> The auxiliary cause. See verse 17.

<sup>3</sup> The author's grandson or, according to some, his pupil, for whom the book was written.

<sup>4</sup> *May, etc.*—The whole stanza bears a double meaning, one referring to the commentary, which is given above, and

(*guṇa*), telling about varieties of action (*karman*), which are real (*sat*), which treats of generic attributes (*sāmānya*), ultimate difference (*viśeṣa*) and the eternally related (*nitya-milita*, i.e. *samavāya* or inherence), and sparkles with niceties about non-existence (*abhāva*), and which is full of reasoning (*sad-yukti*), being reverently placed on the chest of Viṣṇu by the learned author Viśvanātha, long contribute to the joy of the minds of scholars.

An invocation, made for the removal of obstacles, is being inserted, by way of an example to the pupil: *Salutation, etc.*

Objection : An invocation is a cause neither of the destruction of obstacles nor of accomplishment; for even without such an invocation we notice unobstructed accomplishment with regard to books written by heretics<sup>1</sup> etc.

Reply : Not so. For an invocation, being a matter of approved custom with the cultured, must have some

the other to a necklace of pearls. The second meaning is: May this necklace of pearls, which is of good material (*sad-dravya*), well arranged (*sad-yukti*), and strung by a thread (*guṇa*) which is ever associated (*nitya-milita*) with a high class (*sat-sāmānya*) and excellence (*viśeṣa*), shines brightly (even) in darkness (*abhāva*) and is indicative of the good deeds (*sat-karman*) or the virtuous (*sukṛti*), being reverently placed, etc.

The title of the commentary, *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* literally means: a string of pearls representing conclusions.

The passage 'containing' etc. means: Dealing with the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

<sup>1</sup> Non-believers in the Vedas.

result. One may ask, what is this result? Since it is unjustifiable to imagine an unseen result where there is the possibility of a tangible one, and since accomplishment<sup>1</sup> is already known, that alone is considered to be the result. Thus, even where no invocation is noticeable, it is supposed to have been made in a previous life. And where, in spite of an invocation, no accomplishment is observed, one must understand that either there was some stronger obstacle or that too many obstacles were present ; for only a sufficient number of invocations can remove a stronger obstacle (or the like). Here the destruction of the obstacle is but the operation (*vyāpāra*<sup>2</sup>) of the invocation. So says the old school of logicians. The new school, however, maintains that the result of the invocation is just the destruction of obstacles; while the completion is due to the totality of causes such as intelligence and talent. It cannot be urged that in that case the invocation, made by a person who had naturally no obstacles to overcome, becomes futile; for such objection is welcome. The invocation there is made in apprehension of an obstacle ; for such is the practice among the cultured. Nor can it be urged that if an invocation is fruitless, the Vedas inculcating it cease to be authoritative; for the Vedas only say that if there be an obstacle, it will be removed (in that way). Hence, although an expiatory ceremony that is performed for an act wrongly apprehended to be a sin is futile, yet it does not nullify the authoritativeness of the Vedas that teach it. It should, however, be noted that for the destruction of obstacles

<sup>1</sup> As the author's object in view.

<sup>2</sup> Also translated as the intermediate cause. For its definition see footnote 1 to the commentary on verse 62.



of a particular type, an invocation is the means, while for the destruction of those of a different type, the recitation of hymns to Vināyaka (Gaṇeśa) and similar things are the means. Again, in some cases, only the absolute non-existence of obstacles is the cause of a thing being accomplished; for it is the non-existence of relationship<sup>1</sup> with regard to obstacles that produces an action. Thus, in the books written by hereitics etc. the destruction of obstacles is due either to the invocation made by them in a previous birth or to the natural absolute non-existence of obstacles. Hence there is no inconstancy.<sup>2</sup>

*The seed of the tree of the universe.* By this a proof is also adduced about the existence of God. For instance, just as effects such as a jar are caused by an agent, so also are earth, the sprout of a tree, etc.<sup>3</sup> And people like us cannot be their author; hence the existence of God is proved as being the author of them. It cannot be contended that because it is not produced with the help of a body, it is not caused by an agent, and hence the reason

<sup>1</sup> This has three varieties, viz. previous non-existence (potential existence, as of a future jar), non-existence pertaining to destruction and absolute non-existence (represented by the expression, 'There is no jar'). The first two obviously do not clash with the third. A book is finished in the absence of obstacles. This absence may be any of the above three kinds of non-existence. Hence the absolute non-existence of obstacles can by itself explain the completion. For the category of non-existence see verses 12-13.

<sup>2</sup> Of the reason above set forth, viz. that it is the non-existence of relationship with regard to obstacles that produces an action. For the fallacy called inconstancy see verse 72 and its commentary.

<sup>3</sup> That is, effects in general.

is counterbalanced<sup>1</sup>; for it has no corroborative argument. Whereas in my case the relation<sup>2</sup> of cause and effect subsisting between an agent and his handiwork is certainly a corroborative argument. One should also remember in this connection such Vedic texts as, 'One shining Being generating heaven and earth' (*Rg-Veda* X.lxxx. 3, etc.), and 'The creator of the universe, the protector of the universe' (*Mund. Up.* I. i. 1).

<sup>1</sup> The original proposition was: 'The earth has an agent, for it is produced.' This is rebutted by the counter-proposition, 'The earth has no agent, for it is not produced with the help of a body.'

<sup>2</sup> Every piece of work is invariably connected with a living being as its agent. This universally accepted causal relation is proof positive that the universe has a living creator, and this is God.

## THE CATEGORIES

द्रव्यं गुणतस्या कर्म सामान्यं सविशेषकम् ।

समवायस्तथाऽभावः पदार्थाः सप्त कीर्तिताः ॥ २ ॥

2. The categories are stated to be seven, viz. substance, quality, likewise action, generic attribute, together with ultimate difference, inherence, as also non-existence.

The categories are being divided: *The categories, etc.* Here the very mention of the seventh item as non-existence implies that the other six are positive entities; hence they have not been separately described as such. These are well-known categories of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, which are in accord with the assumptions of the logicians as well.<sup>1</sup> And this is what has been established in the Commentary.<sup>2</sup> Therefore the *Upamāna-cintāmaṇi*<sup>3</sup> has discussed from the *prima facie* standpoint whether power, similarity and so forth should also be treated as additional categories, as being distinct from the above seven.

Objection: How can these seven be the only categories, since power, similarity and so forth are additional ones? For instance, fire in the immediate vicinity of a particular kind of gem and the like<sup>4</sup> does

<sup>1</sup> The Nyāya philosophy postulates sixteen categories. These, however, can be included in the above seven.

<sup>2</sup> On the *Nyāya-Sūtras* (I. i. 9) by Vātsyāyana.

<sup>3</sup> Section II of *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya.

<sup>4</sup> Refers to sacred formulæ, particular herbs, etc.



not burn, but it does burn when it is free from that. Here it is inferred that the gem etc. destroy that power of fire which helps combustion, whereas the presence of a stimulating gem or the removal of the previous gem generates it. Likewise similarity too, is an additional category, because it cannot be identified with any of the six positive categories, being present even in a generic attribute<sup>1</sup>; for we observe this similarity, as when we say, 'As cowhood is eternal, so is horsehood.' Nor can it be identified with non-existence, for it is perceived as existence.

Reply: Not so; for it is fire dissociated from the gem etc. or the absence of the gem etc. independently, that is held to be the cause of burning and so on. When this alone satisfactorily explains the phenomena, it is unjustifiable to assume an infinite number of powers, their previous non-existence and their non-existence pertaining to destruction. It cannot be questioned how in spite of obstacles the presence of the stimulating gem initiates burning; for the cause of burning is the absence of a gem dissociated from the stimulating gem. Likewise similarity also is not a separate category, but it means the possession, by a thing which is different from some other thing, of many of the attributes of the latter. For instance, the similarity of a face to the moon consists in its being different from the moon and at the same time possessing the gladdening and other attributes of the latter.

<sup>1</sup> Since no other category abides in a generic attribute but similarity does, it is clearly distinct from all the six.

क्षित्यतेजोमरुद्रव्योमकालदिग्देहिनो मनः ।

द्रव्याण्यथ गुणा रूपं रसो गन्धस्ततः परम् ॥ ३ ॥

स्पर्शः संख्यां परिमितिः पृथक्त्वं च ततः परम् ।

संयोगश्च विभागश्च परत्वं चापरत्वकम् ॥ ४ ॥

बुद्धिः सुखं दुःखमिच्छा द्वेषो यत्नो गुरुत्वकम् ।

द्रवत्वं स्नेहसंस्कारावदृष्टं शब्द एव च ॥ ५ ॥

3-5. Earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, the soul and mind are the substances. Now the qualities: Colour, taste, then smell, touch, number, dimension, then separateness, conjunction and disjunction, distance and nearness,<sup>1</sup> knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, weight, liquidity, oiliness, tendency, the unseen result<sup>2</sup> (merit and demerit) and sound.

The substances are being divided: *Earth, etc.* That is to say, *earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, the soul and mind*—these are the nine substances.

Objection : What is the proof of substancehood being a distinct generic attribute ? Perception is no proof there; for<sup>3</sup> substancehood is not observed in clarified butter, lac, etc.

<sup>1</sup> In space or time.

<sup>2</sup> Of actions. This is to be counted as two, meaning merit and demerit, which continue when the action is dead and gone, and fructify at the right moment as pleasure and pain.

<sup>3</sup> People generally distinguish things by seeing them that is, by their form. Clarified butter etc. have no fixed form. Hence ignorant people may well doubt their being substances.

Reply: Not so. It is established as the determinant (*avacchedaka*) of the inherent causality (*samavāyi-kāraṇatā*)<sup>1</sup> of an effect, or as the determinant of the inherent causality of conjunction or disjunction.

Objection: Why has not darkness been mentioned as the tenth substance? It is apprehended by perception, and it is a substance, since it has colour and action. Being devoid of smell, it is not earth; being blue in colour, it is not water and the rest; and the eye unaided by light is the cause of its perception.

Reply: No. Since we can account for it as the absence of the required light, it is unjustifiable to consider it an additional substance. As for our perception of its possessing colour, it is an illusion. Our perception of its possessing action also is just an illusion, being conditional upon the removal of light. Moreover, if darkness be taken as an additional substance, it would involve the assumption of its possessing an infinite number of parts and so forth,<sup>2</sup> which is cumbrous. How gold comes under fire, will be stated later on.<sup>3</sup>

The qualities are being divided: *Now the qualities, etc.* These twenty-four qualities have been pointed out

<sup>1</sup> The material out of or in which something is produced] is its inherent cause. That which makes an inherent cause just what it is, is its determinant. Here substancehood is that. Since an effect necessarily presupposes a substance as its inherent cause, substancehood is a fact. Similarly conjunction or disjunction takes place in substances alone. From this also the generic attribute substancehood is inferred.

<sup>2</sup> Refers to their origin and destruction.

<sup>3</sup> In verse 42.



by Kaṇāda explicitly<sup>1</sup> as also by the word 'and.' How the generic attribute qualityhood can be proved, will be stated later on.<sup>2</sup>

उत्क्षेपणं ततोऽपक्षेपणमाकुञ्चनं तथा ।

प्रसारणं च गमनं कर्माण्येतानि पञ्च च ॥ ६ ॥

6. Throwing up and throwing down, contraction and expansion, and motion—these are the five actions.

The actions are being divided : *Throwing up, etc.* The generic attribute actionhood is proved by perception.<sup>3</sup> So with regard to the generic attributes such as that underlying throwing up (*utkṣepaṇatva*).

भ्रमणं रेचनं स्यन्दनोर्ध्वज्वलनमेव च ।

तिर्यग्गमनमप्यत्र गमनादेव लभ्यते ॥ ७ ॥

7. Roaming, flowing, dripping, blazing upwards and zigzag motion are all understood here from the word 'motion.'

It may be objected why actions like roaming etc. which are distinct from the above, are not mentioned as additional actions. This is being answered: *Roaming, etc.*

<sup>1</sup> He has actually enumerated seventeen (from colour up to effort), and his use of the conjunction 'and', which among other things connotes addition of things understood, implies the remaining seven.

<sup>2</sup> In the commentary on verse 86.

<sup>3</sup> It is perceived as movement, which is the common characteristic of all of them.

सामान्यं द्विविधं प्रोक्तं परं चापरमेव च ।

द्रव्यादित्रिकवृत्तिस्तु सत्ता परतयोच्यते ॥ ८ ॥

8. Generic attribute (*jāti*) is said to be of two kinds—superior and inferior. Existence, which abides in the triad<sup>1</sup> beginning with substance, is designated as superior.

Generic attribute is being described : *Generic attribute, etc.* The definition of a generic attribute is—eternity coupled with inherence in many things. Inherence in many things belongs to conjunction etc. as well; hence the epithet 'eternity.' Eternity together with inherence in something belongs also to the dimension of ether etc.; hence the adjective 'many.' Eternity coupled with presence in many things belongs to absolute non-existence as well; hence the word 'inherence' instead of mere presence. What abides only in a single individual, however, is not a generic attribute. So it has been said, 'Unity of the substratum,<sup>2</sup> equality of extension,<sup>3</sup> cross-division<sup>4</sup> regres-

<sup>1</sup> That is, substance, attribute and action.

<sup>2</sup> e.g. etherhood is no generic attribute, because its substratum, ether, is a single individual.

<sup>3</sup> e.g. *ghaṭatva* and *kalaśatva* cannot be separate generic attributes, as both connote the same thing, the essence of a jar.

<sup>4</sup> Being partly exclusive of each other and partly co-existent. For example, materiality and limitedness thwart each other's being a generic attribute, because materiality is in earth, water, fire, air and ether, while limitedness is in the first four and mind. The new school of logicians does not consider this a bar against a generic attribute.

*sus in infinitum*,<sup>1</sup> abandonment of nature<sup>2</sup> and non-inherence<sup>3</sup>—these, in short, are the things that frustrate a generic attribute.<sup>4</sup>

*Existence, etc.*—Superiority is the covering of a wider area, inferiority is the covering of a narrower area. Existence is superior, because it covers a wider area than all other generic attributes; the latter are inferior in comparison with it.

परभिन्ना तु या जातिः सैवापरतयोच्यते ।

द्रव्यत्वादिकजातिस्तु परापरतयोच्यते ॥ ९ ॥

9. Any generic attribute other than the superior is designated as inferior. The generic attributes abiding in substance etc. are called both superior and inferior.

व्यापकत्वात्परापि स्यात्, व्याप्यत्वादपरापि च ।

अन्त्यो नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तिर्विशेषः परिकीर्तितः ॥ १० ॥

10. Being of wider extension than some things, they are superior, and being of narrower

<sup>1</sup> If it is held that a generic attribute, e.g. *ghaṭatva*, has another generic attribute, *ghaṭatvatva*, abiding in it, then there will be no end to such assumptions.

<sup>2</sup> Ultimate difference (*viśeṣa*) cannot have a generic attribute *viśeṣatva*, since by itself it differentiates one atom from another. If it has, it will cease to be ultimate difference. It is things possessing a generic attribute that are differentiated by it from one another.

<sup>3</sup> Inherence (*samavāya*) and non-existence (*abhāva*) cannot be generic attributes, because they are never related to anything through inherence.

<sup>4</sup> Verse in Section I of *Kiraṇāvalī*, a gloss on Praśastapāda's commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras*, by Udayanācārya.



extension than some others, they are inferior. That difference which is ultimate and belongs to the eternal substances is called ultimate difference.

As substancehood occupies a wider area than earthhood etc. it is inclusive (*vyāpaka*), and therefore superior; while occupying a narrower area than existence, it is a concomitant (*vyāpka*), and therefore inferior. So, being possessed of both attributes, the two are not incompatible.

Ultimate difference is being described : *That difference, etc.* Ultimate, that is, occurring at the end or extreme limit; in other words, beyond which there is no further differentiation. All things such as a jar down to the *dyad* are differentiated from one another by differences in their parts; it is ultimate difference that differentiates the atoms from one another.<sup>1</sup> This, however, is differentiated by itself. Hence it does not require any other differentiating medium. This is the idea.

घटादीनां कपालादौ, द्रव्येषु गुणकर्मणोः ।

तेषु जातेश्च संबन्धः समवायः प्रकीर्तितः ॥ ११ ॥

11. The relation of a jar etc. to its two halves and so on, that of qualities and actions to substances, and that of generic attributes to these three (substance, attribute and action)<sup>2</sup> are called inherence (*samavāya*).

<sup>1</sup> The new school does not recognise ultimate difference as a category. It says that the eternal substances are differentiated from one another by themselves.

<sup>2</sup> As also the relation of ultimate difference to the eternal substances.

Inherence is being shown: *The relation, etc.* The relation between the whole and parts, generic attributes and individuals, qualities and the substances possessing them, actions and the substances in which they take place, and between ultimate difference and the eternal substances is called inherence (*samavāya*). Inherence is (defined as) an eternal relation. Its proof is the following inference: The notion that a thing is possessed of qualities, actions, etc.<sup>1</sup> is based on three things—something that is qualified (*viśeṣya*), a qualifying adjunct (*viśeṣaṇa*), and a relation between the two, because it is the notion of a qualified entity, as in the case of the notion of the qualified entity, 'a man holding a staff.'<sup>2</sup> Now, since the above relation cannot be conjunction<sup>3</sup> etc. we have to accept inherence. It cannot be urged that this is virtually the relation of selfsameness (*svatūpā*),<sup>4</sup> and so it is merely proving something already established or something different from what was proposed (viz. inherence).<sup>5</sup> For it is cumbrous to assume an infinite number of selfsamenesses,<sup>6</sup> as the relation in question. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity,<sup>7</sup> inherence, which is one, is to be admitted.

<sup>1</sup> Refers to generic attributes.

<sup>2</sup> Here the man, the staff and conjunction stand for the three things respectively.

<sup>3</sup> Because conjunction takes place between two substances only; but here one is a substance and the other a quality. The 'etc.' refers to the relation of selfsameness.

<sup>4</sup> Constituted by what is denoted by the two terms themselves, without reference to a further relation.

<sup>5</sup> Both of which are defects.

<sup>6</sup> Varying with each object.

<sup>7</sup> *Lāghava*: explaining things by the minimum number of assumptions.

It cannot be contended that since inherence is one, it will give rise to the notion that air has colour; for although there is the inherence<sup>1</sup> of colour in air, yet there is no colour<sup>2</sup> in it.<sup>3</sup> Nor can it be urged that in that case the qualification<sup>4</sup> of a thing by non-existence would be a different relation (from selfsameness); for if this qualification be eternal, then, even when a jar has been brought, the ground will be regarded as without it, because the non-existence of the jar is there, as it is eternal<sup>5</sup>—otherwise<sup>6</sup> it will not be perceived<sup>7</sup> even elsewhere<sup>8</sup>—and the particular qualification is there. According to my view, however, when an unbaked jar has become red by being burnt, the dark colour has disappeared, and therefore we no longer have the notion that the jar has it still. If, on the other hand,<sup>9</sup> the qualification in question<sup>10</sup> be transitory, you will

<sup>1</sup> The relation.

<sup>2</sup> The qualifying adjunct.

<sup>3</sup> Because in the notion of a qualified thing, the knowledge of the relation as well as of the qualifying adjunct is necessary. And this relation is not mere inherence, but the inherence of colour, which is absent in air. According to the new school, inherence is manifold.

<sup>4</sup> For example, in the sentence, 'The ground is without a jar,' the ground is qualified by the non-existence of the jar. Qualification is also a relation.

<sup>5</sup> Being absolute non-existence.

<sup>6</sup> If the non-existence be transitory.

<sup>7</sup> When a jar is brought to a place, the non-existence of the jar in that place vanishes, and since this (absolute) non-existence of the jar is just one as a class, it must be taken to have vanished simultaneously in other places too.

<sup>8</sup> Where there is no jar.

<sup>9</sup> The first alternative, viz. the eternity of the qualification, has been discussed above.

<sup>10</sup> As a relation other than selfsameness.



have to assume an infinite number of such qualifications, and thereby lay yourself open to the charge of cumbrousness. Thus the relation of the non-existence in question is the particular ground,<sup>1</sup> as associated<sup>2</sup> with the particular time.<sup>3</sup>

अभावस्तु द्विधा संसर्गान्योन्याभावभेदतः ।

प्रागभावस्तथा ध्वंसोऽप्यत्यन्ताभाव एव च ॥ १२ ॥

एवं त्रैविध्यमापन्नः संसर्गाभाव इष्यते ।

12-13. Non-existence is of two kinds according as it is the non-existence of relationship or mutual non-existence. The non-existence of relationship is considered to be of these three forms: previous non-existence, non-existence pertaining to destruction and absolute non-existence.

Non-existence is being divided: *Non-existence, etc.* Non-existence is that which is possessed of mutual non-existence (i.e. difference) in respect of the six categories beginning with substance. The word 'relationship' in the text is to be compounded with 'non-existence.' Since mutual non-existence is of one kind only, it has no sub-division; hence the non-existence of relationship is being divided : *Previous non-existence, etc.* The non-existence of relationship is that non-existence which is different from mutual non-existence. The latter is the

<sup>1</sup> About which one has the notion that it is without a jar.

<sup>2</sup> Hence the relation is not mere selfsameness, but particular kind of it.

<sup>3</sup> When one has this notion.

non-existence, the counterpositiveness<sup>1</sup> of which is determined by the relation<sup>2</sup> of identity. Previous non-existence<sup>3</sup> is that non-existence which is destructible.<sup>4</sup> Non-existence pertaining to destruction<sup>5</sup> is that non-existence which is caused. Absolute non-existence is that non-existence of relationship which is eternal. When a jar or some other thing is removed from the ground etc. and brought back, then the time when the jar is present is not a factor (*ghaṭaka*) of the relation<sup>6</sup> (of the previous absence of the jar), and therefore, although absolute non-existence is eternal, one does not, during the presence of the jar, have the notion that there is no jar. According to some this non-existence is a fourth kind of non-existence which has both origin and destruction.

The old school holds that in the substratum (*adhi-*

<sup>1</sup> *Pratīyogitā*, the characteristic of a *pratīyogin* (lit. an adversary). That whose existence is denied is the counterpositive. When we speak of the non-existence of a jar, the jar is the counterpositive of its non-existence.

<sup>2</sup> A denial may be made in respect of different relations. When we say, 'A cloth is not a jar,' we deny the identity of the jar with the cloth. Again, when we say, 'The ground is without a jar,' we deny the conjunction of the jar with the ground, and so on. The relation in respect of which one thing is denied of another determines, limits or stamps (*avacchid*) the character of the counterpositive of that negation. In mutual non-existence or difference the relation is identity.

<sup>3</sup> That is, potential existence. Obviously it is without a beginning.

<sup>4</sup> When a thing comes into being.

<sup>5</sup> It has a beginning, but no end.

<sup>6</sup> This relation, as stated at the end of the commentary on verse 11, must be selfsameness associated with this particular time.

*karāṇa*) of the non-existence pertaining to destruction or of previous non-existence, there is no absolute non-existence. The notion that there is no red colour in the dark (unbaked) jar, and the notion that there is no dark colour in the red jar, mean respectively previous non-existence (of the red colour) and non-existence pertaining to destruction (of the dark colour), but not absolute non-existence (of the red and dark colours respectively); for they are contradictory to the latter. The new school, however, maintains that since there is no proof of this contradiction, absolute non-existence is present even at the moment of destruction etc.

Objection : Why not admit for the sake of simplicity that the non-existences are identical with their substratums?

Reply : No. It is certainly simpler to regard them as a separate category than to assume their identity with an infinite number of substratums. This also explains the relation of container and content.<sup>1</sup> Further, it accounts for the perception of non-existence of sound, smell, taste and the like in particular things. Otherwise, the respective substratums of these non-existences would be imperceptible, because they cannot be apprehended by their corresponding organs.<sup>2</sup> This refutes the statement that absolute non-existence is

<sup>1</sup> Between a non-existence and its substratum, as in the sentence, 'There is no jar on the ground.'

<sup>2</sup> The general rule is that an organ which perceives something, also perceives its absence as well as its generic attribute. The tongue, for instance, perceives the sweetness of sugar, as well as the absence of bitterness in it. Now if this absence were identical with the sugar, it would not be perceived by the tongue, which has no power to perceive a substance.



identical with a particular notion<sup>1</sup> or a particular time, and so on, because in that case it would be imperceptible.<sup>2</sup>

### SIMILARITIES AND DIVERGENCES AMONG THE CATEGORIES

सत्तानामपि साधर्म्यं ज्ञेयत्वादिकमुच्यते ॥ १३ ॥

13 (contd.). The common features of all the seven categories are knowableness etc.

Now the common features and divergences among the categories are being taken up: *The common features, etc.* *Sādharmya* is the property of those that have the same features, in other words, the common features. Similarly *vaidharmya* is the property of those that have divergent features, in other words, divergences. Knowableness is being an object of knowledge, and it is present in everything, because the state of being an object of God's knowledge is universally present<sup>3</sup> So also are namableness, the capacity of being an object of valid knowledge, and so on.

द्रव्यादयः पञ्च भावा अनेके समवायिनः ।

सत्तावन्तस्त्रयस्त्वाद्याः, गुणादिर्निर्गुणक्रियः ॥ १४ ॥

14. The five categories beginning with substance are positive entities, many and connected with inherence. The first three have

<sup>1</sup> Conveyed by a proposition like, 'Now there is no jar on the ground.' So about time also.

<sup>2</sup> Since a notion is imperceptible to the eye and other external organs.

<sup>3</sup> Everything is known to God.

existence, while quality and the rest are devoid of quality and action.

*The five, etc.*—The common features (*dharma*) of substance, quality, action, generic attribute and ultimate difference are manifoldness and connection with inherence. Although non-existence too has manifoldness, yet this, coupled with the property of being a positive entity (*bhāvatva*), is the common feature of the five. To be more explicit, it is the possession of that characteristic<sup>1</sup> (*upādhi*) differentiating one category from another which abides in more positive entities than one. Hence individual jars etc. and ether etc. are not excluded. Being connected with inherence (*samavāyitva*) means being related<sup>2</sup> in terms of inherence, not having the latter as an attribute, since it is absent in generic attributes etc. *The first three have existence*, that is to say, substance, quality and action possess existence. *Quality and the rest are devoid of quality and action*. Although being devoid of quality and action applies to a jar etc. at the first moment of its existence,<sup>3</sup> and being devoid of action applies to

<sup>1</sup> Other than a generic attribute, which always goes with a class. All generic attributes are also *upādhis*, but not vice versa. The *upādhis* here are the attributes of substance, quality (*dravyatva*, *guṇatva*), etc.

<sup>2</sup> When two entities are related, one may be conceived resting on the other. The former is called *pratiyogin* and the latter *anyogin*. These five categories inhere in other things the latter, but not everyone of them (e.g. generic attribute) is *anyogin* with regard to something inhering in it.

<sup>3</sup> Since a substance is the cause of the qualities and actions that abide in it, and the cause must precede its effect it follows that everything that is produced is free from qualities and actions at the moment of its origin.

ether etc.—both of which are beyond the scope of the definition—yet the meaning of the two terms respectively is: having those attributes that are absent in things possessing qualities, and having those characteristics differentiating one category from another that are absent in things possessing action. Neither jarhood nor substancehood is absent in things possessing qualities or actions, but qualityhood<sup>1</sup> is so. As to etherhood etc. they are not characteristics that differentiate one category from another.

सामान्यपरिहीनास्तु सर्वे जात्यादयो मताः ।

पारिमाण्डल्यभिन्नानां कारणत्वमुदाहृतम् ॥ १५ ॥

15. All the categories beginning with generic attributes are devoid of generic attributes. Everything except atomicity has been spoken of as a cause.

*All the categories, etc.*—In other words, generic attributes and the rest<sup>2</sup> are not the substratum of generic attributes. *Everything, etc.*—Atomicity is the dimension of an atom. Everything except that becomes a cause, but the dimension of an atom is never the cause of anything. Because it would be the originator of the dimension of the substance<sup>3</sup> that is formed in its substratum (*āśraya*),<sup>4</sup> and that is not possible; for on account of the general rule that dimension gives rise to a superior dimension of its own kind, that produced by

<sup>1</sup> It abides in qualities, not substances.

<sup>2</sup> That is, ultimate difference, inherence and non-existence.

<sup>3</sup> That is, a *dyad*.

<sup>4</sup> Viz. the atom.



an atomic dimension would, like the increased dimension produced by a medium one, be minuter than itself. The case of superlative dimension,<sup>1</sup> generic attribute that transcends the senses<sup>2</sup> and ultimate difference is also to be understood as such.<sup>3</sup> The above statement<sup>4</sup> has been made with this idea in view that in the perception of things by a *yogin* the objects are not the cause<sup>5</sup>; that a generic attribute that is being perceived is not the connection<sup>6</sup>; and that a sign (reason) that is being perceived is not the instrument of inference.<sup>7</sup> Since in the mental perception of the soul, the superlative dimension of the soul is one of the causes, the superlative dimension referred to above should be understood as belonging to ether etc. Some say that in the opinion of the Ācārya (Udayana) even that too is not a cause. It is not so; for the Ācārya has

<sup>1</sup> That of three of the all-pervading substances, viz. ether, time and space.

<sup>2</sup> The generic attribute of things that are perceptible to the senses is also perceptible. In other cases it is not.

<sup>3</sup> They are not the cause of anything.

<sup>4</sup> That everything except atomicity has been spoken of as the cause.

<sup>5</sup> So, although he can perceive the atomicity, it does not play the part of a cause in that perception.

<sup>6</sup> Between the organ and object, necessary for super-normal perception; but it is the knowledge of the generic attribute that is so. The reference here is to what is called *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*, by which on seeing one individual of a class, we have a general knowledge of all the individuals included in it. It will be dealt with in verses 63-64.

<sup>7</sup> But the knowledge of the invariable concomitance of one thing with another (*vyāpti*).

spoken<sup>1</sup> of the absence of causal character (of atomicity etc.) only with reference to things other than knowledge.

### CAUSALITY AND THE THREE KINDS OF CAUSES

अन्यथासिद्धिशून्यस्य नियता पूर्ववर्तिता ।

कारणत्वं भवेत् ; तस्य त्रैविध्यं परिकीर्तितम् ॥ १६ ॥

16. Causality is the invariable (immediate) antecedence<sup>2</sup> of what is not superfluity (*anyathā-siddha*).<sup>3</sup> It has been described as being of three kinds.

It may be asked, what is causality? Hence it is being stated: *Causality, etc. It*—i.e. causality.

समवायिकारणत्वं ज्ञेयमथाप्यसमवायिहेतुत्वम् ।

एवं न्यायनयज्ञैस्तृतीयमुक्तं निमित्तहेतुत्वम् ॥ १७ ॥

17. Inherent causality should be known (as the first), next is non-inherent causality, and the third, as has been stated by adepts in the system of logic, is auxiliary causality.

<sup>1</sup> In Section I of *Kiraṇāvali*.

<sup>2</sup> The cause must abide in (i.e. be directly or indirectly related to) the substance in which the effect is produced, at the moment immediately preceding that of its origin.

<sup>3</sup> Whatever is not strictly necessary to explain a phenomenon is a superfluity, e.g. the donkey that carries the earth for making a jar; for the earth could be carried otherwise.

यत्समवेतं कार्यं भवति ज्ञेयं तु समवायिजनकं तत् ।

तत्रासन्नं जनकं द्वितीयमाभ्यां परं तृतीयं स्यात् ॥ १८ ॥

18. An inherent (*samavāyin*) cause is that, inhering<sup>1</sup> in which an effect is produced. The cause which is connected with that is the second; what is other than these is the third.

*The cause which is connected with that is the second, that is, non-inherent cause. Although under this definition, the conjunction of the shuttle and thread may be<sup>2</sup> the non-inherent cause of cloth, likewise impulse etc.<sup>3</sup> may be the non-inherent cause of impact etc.<sup>4</sup> and knowledge etc.<sup>5</sup> may also be such a cause of desire etc.<sup>6</sup> yet this can be avoided by adding to the definition of the non-inherent cause of a cloth the qualifying phrase, 'other than the conjunction of the shuttle and thread.' The conjunction of the shuttle and thread, however, is certainly a non-inherent cause of the conjunction of the shuttle and cloth. In like manner, impulse (*vega*) etc. are certainly the non-inherent cause of (another) impulse,<sup>7</sup> movement, etc.*

<sup>1</sup> Inhering in—Being indissolubly connected with. The inherent cause is the material substratum of the effect.

<sup>2</sup> Because the conjunction abides in the thread, which is the inherent cause of the cloth. But it is not; for with its destruction the cloth is not destroyed. So with the other two examples. Hence they must be excluded by qualifying the definition.

<sup>3</sup> Refers to touch.

<sup>4</sup> Refers to pushing.

<sup>5</sup> Refers to desire etc.

<sup>6</sup> Refers to inclination.

<sup>7</sup> Set in by the previous one.



Hence the definition of the non-inherent cause of those particular effects should be qualified by the words, 'other than such and such things.' The special qualities of the soul,<sup>1</sup> however, never become the non-inherent cause of anything.<sup>2</sup> Hence the general definition of that cause must be qualified so as to exclude them.

Now the non-inherent cause may be connected with the inherent cause in two ways—by being connected with the same object as the effect is, or by being connected with the same object as the cause is. An example of the first is this: The conjunction of the two halves of a jar is the non-inherent cause of the jar, and so on. Here the cause, viz. the conjunction of the two halves, is connected with the same object, viz. the two halves, as the effect, the jar, is. An instance of the second: The colour of the two halves of a jar is the non-inherent cause of the colour of the jar. Here the jar is the inherent cause of the colour etc. belonging to it; and this colour is connected with the same object, viz. the two halves, as the jar is. In other words, (the non-inherent cause is connected with the inherent cause) sometimes (directly) through the relation of inherence,

<sup>1</sup> Enumerated in verses 32-33.

<sup>2</sup> Because the conjunction of the mind with the soul is the universally admitted non-inherent cause of all special qualities of the soul, and the postulation of another non-inherent cause is redundant. The reason that the destruction of the non-inherent cause entails the destruction of the effect—which would make the succeeding special qualities of the soul momentary—does not hold good, because the destruction of the non-inherent cause destroys not effects in general, but only those effects that are substances.

and sometimes (indirectly) through the relation of inherence in that<sup>1</sup> in which it itself<sup>2</sup> inheres (*sva-samavāyī-samavāya*). Thus the general definition is reduced to this: A non-inherent cause is that cause which is other than knowledge etc. and is connected with the inherent cause in either of these two ways—by being connected with the same object as the effect is, or by being connected with the same object as the cause is. *What is other than these*, that is, is different from the inherent and the non-inherent cause, *is the third*, that is to say, the auxiliary cause.

### SUPERFLUITY AND ITS FIVE VARIETIES

येन सह पूर्वभावः, कारणमादाय वा यस्य ।

अन्यं प्रति पूर्वभावे ज्ञाते यत्पूर्वभावविज्ञानम् ॥ १९ ॥

19. That, together with which (a cause) is antecedent (to the effect); that (which is antecedent to the effect) as bound up with the cause; that which is known to be antecedent (to the effect) after it is known to be antecedent to something else.

Now, which are the things that are superfluous? This is being answered: *That together with, etc.* That is to say, the particular aspect in which a cause is known to be antecedent to its effect is a superfluity with regard to that effect; as the characteristic attribute of

<sup>1</sup> E.g. the two halves of a jar.

<sup>2</sup> The cause, viz. the colour of the two halves.

a staff (*daṇḍatva*) is with regard to a jar.<sup>1</sup> The second superfluity is being described: *That (which is antecedent), etc.* That which has no independent agreement and difference (*anvaya-vyatireka*)<sup>3</sup> (with the effect), but whose agreement and difference with the latter are known only through those of the cause, is a superfluity; as, the colour of the staff.<sup>3</sup> The third is being described: *That which is known, etc.* That which must be known to be antecedent to something before it is known to be antecedent to a particular effect, is a superfluity with regard to that effect; as ether is to a jar etc. It is a cause of the jar etc. only as ether. And ether is that which is the inherent cause of sound. Hence it can be known as a cause of the jar etc. only after it is known to be a cause of sound. Therefore it is a superfluity. It may be asked, which superfluity will it be if it is considered to be a cause as being the substratum of sound? The answer is : Know it to be a superfluity of the fifth<sup>4</sup> class. Should it be asked what will be the determinant (of the causality)

<sup>1</sup> A staff is the (auxiliary) cause of a jar, and it is so by virtue of its being a staff, and not as a substance or one of the categories, or anything else. That particular aspect in respect of which it is a cause—in logical language, the determinant of its causality—is the first superfluity.

<sup>2</sup> In simpler language, that which has no independent bearing on the existence or non-existence (of the effect). If there is a staff, a jar is produced. This is agreement. And if there is no staff, no jar is produced. This is difference.

<sup>3</sup> The staff being the cause of the jar, the existence or non-existence of the latter depends directly on that of the staff. But since every staff has a colour, the latter goes automatically with that, and has no independent connection with jar. Hence it is superfluous.

<sup>4</sup> Instead of the third.



if ether be the cause of sound, the answer is : It will be the possession of the letter-sounds *ka* etc.<sup>1</sup> or it will be the category known as ultimate difference.

जनकं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तितामपरिज्ञाय न यस्य गृह्यते ।

अतिरिक्तमथापि यद्भवेन्नियतावश्यकपूर्वभाविनः ॥ २० ॥

20. That which cannot be known to be antecedent (to the effect) without knowing its antecedence to the cause; or that which is other than the necessary invariable antecedent.

The fourth superfluity is being described: *That which cannot, etc.* That which is known to be antecedent to a particular effect only after it is known to be antecedent to its cause, is a superfluity with regard to that effect; as the potter's father is with regard to a jar. He is superfluous if he is considered to be the cause of the jar only as the father of the potter (who made the jar). But the instance will be quite in order if he is considered the cause of the jar as a *potter*; for all potters as a class are the cause of a jar.

The fifth kind of superfluity is being described: *Or that, etc.* That is to say, since an effect is possible only from what is indispensable and invariably antecedent, whatever is other than that is a superfluity. Therefore in perception, medium dimension is a cause, and the having more than one substance (*aneka-dravyatva*)<sup>2</sup> is a superfluity. For there medium dimen-

<sup>1</sup> Ether has the articulate sounds *ka*, *kha*, etc. Hence these are the determinant of its causality.

<sup>2</sup> According to the gloss *Dinakarī*, the word means 'being any substance other than an atom.' Otherwise a *dyad* also would be visible.

sion is a necessary condition ; hence the having more than one substance is a superfluity. It cannot be urged, what conclusive reasoning is there in favour of this opposite view?<sup>1</sup> For it is simpler to regard the generic attribute 'mediumness of dimension' (*mahattvatva*) as the determinant of the causality.

एते पञ्चान्यथासिद्धाः ; दण्डत्वादिकमादिमम् ।

घटादौ दण्डरूपादि द्वितीयमपि दर्शितम् ॥ २१ ॥

21. These five are superfluities. The attribute of a staff (*daṇḍatva*), for instance, is a superfluity of the first kind. The colour of the staff and so on, with regard to a jar, may be pointed out as the second.

तृतीयं तु भवेदन्योम, कुलालजनकोऽपरः ।

पञ्चमो रासभादिः स्यात् ; एतेष्ववश्यकत्वसौ ॥ २२ ॥

22. The third is ether. The fourth is a potter's father. And the fifth is a donkey etc. Of these, however, the last is the one that is essential.

*A donkey, etc.*—Although with regard to a particular jar a donkey may be an invariable antecedent, yet, since with regard to jars in general the staff and the rest have been universally accepted to be the cause, and can therefore produce that particular jar as well, the donkey is a superfluity. This is the idea. *Of these five superfluities, the fifth superfluity is essential; for that alone serves the purpose of the rest. For instance,*

<sup>1</sup> Instead of putting it the other way, why put it thus?

since the effect can be produced by the staff etc. alone, which are necessary invariable antecedents, staffhood (*daṇḍatva*) etc. are (obviously) superfluous. It cannot be urged—what conclusive reasoning is there for this opposite view? Because if staffhood be the cause, a series of which the staff is a *factor* has to be regarded as the (causal) relation, and that is cumbrous.<sup>1</sup> Similarly the fifth one alone serves the purpose of the rest as well.

### SIMILARITIES AND DIVERGENCES MAINLY AMONG THE SUBSTANCES

समवायिकारणत्वं द्रव्यस्यैवेति विज्ञेयम् ।

गुणकर्ममात्रवृत्तिं ज्ञेयमथाप्यसमवायिहेतुत्वम् ॥ २३ ॥

23. Only a substance should be known as being the inherent cause, while the fact of being a non-inherent cause should be known as belonging only to qualities and actions.

*Only a substance, etc.*—The meaning is quite clear. *While, etc.*—Being a non-inherent cause is a feature that is absent in things other than qualities and actions. It does not mean that it is the common feature of all qualities and actions. Or non-inherent causality may be taken to mean: the possession<sup>2</sup> of a generic attribute

<sup>1</sup> Both the staff and staffhood are *indirectly* connected with the jar, but the connection of staffhood is remoter. Hence the cumbrousness.

<sup>2</sup> *Possession, etc.*—From which we get qualityhood (*guṇatva*) or actionhood (*karmatva*).



other than existence,<sup>1</sup> that abides in a non-inherent cause.<sup>2</sup> Thus, although knowledge etc. never become non-inherent causes, they are not excluded.

अन्यत्र नित्यद्रव्येभ्य आश्रितत्वमिहोच्यते ।

क्षित्यादीनां नवानां तु द्रव्यत्वं गुणयोगिता ॥ २४ ॥

24. Abiding in something is mentioned here<sup>3</sup> (as the common feature) of things other than the eternal substances. All the nine substances beginning with earth possess qualities as well as substancehood.

*Abiding, etc.*—That is to say, excepting the eternal substances such as the atoms and ether, abiding (in something) is the common feature of all other things. 'Abiding' is existing through a relation of inherence etc.<sup>4</sup>; for even the eternal substances exist in time in a temporal relation.

क्षितिर्जलं तथा तेजः पवनो मन एव च ।

परापरत्वमूर्तत्वक्रियावेगाश्रया अमी ॥ २५ ॥

25. Earth, water, fire, air and mind—these possess distance or nearness, limitedness, activity and impulse.

<sup>1</sup> This is added to exclude substances, which have existence.

<sup>2</sup> This also is for excluding substances, which have substancehood (*dravyatva*), and this is other than existence.

<sup>3</sup> In this system.

<sup>4</sup> But not temporal relation. The 'etc.' refers to conjunction, selfsameness (in the case of non-existence) or the like. Since everything including the eternal substances abides in time, the abiding or forming the content of something should exclude this temporal relation.

Now the text proceeds to describe specifically the common features of different substances: *Earth, etc.* Possessing distance or nearness, limitedness, action and impulse are the common features of earth, water, fire, air and mind. It cannot be contended that the definition is too narrow to include a jar etc.<sup>1</sup> in which nearness or distance has not originated; for what is meant is that they possess in common those generic attributes<sup>2</sup> concomitant with<sup>3</sup> substancehood which are co-existent with distance etc. 'Limitedness' is having an inferior dimension. That also belongs to them<sup>4</sup> alone; for the dimension of ether etc. is inferior to none. As before, it should be understood that possessing action means having those generic attributes concomitant with substancehood that are co-existent with action, and possessing impulse means having those generic attributes concomitant with substancehood that abide in things having impulse.

कालखात्मदिशां सर्वगतत्वं परमं महत् ।

क्षित्यादि पञ्च भूतानि, चत्वारि स्पर्शवन्ति हि ॥ २६ ॥

26. Time, ether, the soul and space have omnipresence and superlative dimension. The five substances beginning with earth are elements. (The first) four have touch.

*Time, ether, the soul and space have omnipresence or conjunction with all limited things, and superlative dimension. Being of superlative dimension (parama*

<sup>1</sup> At the moment of their origin.

<sup>2</sup> That is, subordinate to. So also elsewhere.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. jarhood.

<sup>4</sup> The five substances enumerated above.

*mahattvatva*) is a particular generic attribute, or it is being that dimension which is never the substratum of inferiority.<sup>1</sup> *The five substances, etc.*—Earth, water, fire, air and ether possess the state of being an element (*bhūtatva*), and that is having some special quality which is perceptible to an external organ. Perceptibility here is to be understood as the capacity of being perceived under normal circumstances.<sup>2</sup> Hence in a perception like, '(It is) a known jar,' knowledge being the object that has been spontaneously presented,<sup>3</sup> the definition is not too wide so as to include the soul, which has that knowledge. Nor is the definition too narrow to include the atoms, for instance, which have colour etc. that are not perceptible; for they too have the capacity of being perceived. And the reason why they are not perceived is because there is the absence of another cause, viz. medium dimension. Or (the state of being an element consists in) possessing some

<sup>1</sup> That is, which never possesses any inferiority.

<sup>2</sup> Through the connection of the organ with the object.

<sup>3</sup> In the case of a jar that has been known before and is again perceived, the content of this perception may assume the form, '(It is) a known jar.' This is not an unusual occurrence, as we speak of seeing a 'known face.' In such cases, the 'knownness' or 'knowledge' also forms a part of the content of the perception by an external organ, and so the definition of 'element' may extend to the soul. This is guarded against by the exclusion of perception through supernormal connection. And as the connection of the sense-organ with the 'knownness,' i.e. knowledge, pertaining to the jar is formed by the knowledge (*anuvayasāya*) of this knowledge, a variety of the supernormal connection, it is automatically removed from the purview of the definition. This question of supernormal perception called *upanīta-bhāna* will be dealt with in verse 65.



special quality that is absent in the soul. *Four*, i.e. earth, water, fire and air, *have touch*.

द्रव्यारम्भश्चतुर्षु स्यात् ; अथाकाशशरीरिणाम् ।

अन्यप्यवृत्तिः क्षणिको विशेषगुण इष्यते ॥ २७ ॥

27. (The first) four (substances) originate substances. Ether and souls are considered to have special qualities that are non-pervading and transitory.

*Four, etc.*—Earth, water, fire and air—these four have<sup>1</sup> the property of originating substances. The definition is not too narrow to include a jar etc. which do not produce any substance; for the meaning only is that the above four possess those generic attributes concomitant with substancehood that abide in the inherent causes<sup>2</sup> of substances. *Ether and souls, etc.*—That is to say, the common feature of ether and souls is that they possess special qualities that are non-pervading and transitory. The special quality of ether is sound, which is non-pervading ; for when it is produced (in ether) within the limits of a particular part, it is at the same time absent within the limits of other parts. The transitoriness mentioned above is being<sup>3</sup> the counterpositive of destruction occurring at the third moment. Since the perceptible special qualities of the omnipresent substances are destroyed by the quality that immediately follows them,<sup>4</sup> the first sound is

<sup>1</sup> That is, they are the inherent causes of substances that are produced, such as a jar.

<sup>2</sup> Earth, water, fire and air.

<sup>3</sup> That is, the attribute of what is destroyed at the third moment.

<sup>4</sup> The qualities.

destroyed by the second sound. So also with knowledge etc. When these are produced in the omnipresent soul within the limits of the body etc. they are at the same time certainly absent within the limits of a jar etc. Likewise knowledge etc. also last for a couple of moments only. Thus the definition means that ether and souls possess special qualities that are non-pervading, or that they possess special qualities that are transitory. Earth etc. have special qualities such as colour; hence the epithet 'non-pervading' (to exclude them). Again earth etc. have non-pervading qualities such as conjunction; hence the epithet 'special attributes.' It cannot be urged that since colour etc. too may sometimes be destroyed at the third moment, the state of having transitory special qualities is too wide so as to include earth etc.; for the term only connotes the possession of special qualities<sup>1</sup> having that generic attribute<sup>2</sup> which does not abide in products<sup>3</sup> lasting for four moments. Notions of addition (*apekṣā-buddhi*)<sup>4</sup> last for three moments; but no knowledge etc. that are produced last for four moments. While colourhood etc. *abide*<sup>5</sup> in colour etc. although these last for four moments; hence they are excluded. God's knowledge lasts for four moments,<sup>6</sup> and knowledgehood (*jñānatva*) abides in that; hence the qualify-

<sup>1</sup> Such as knowledge.

<sup>2</sup> Knowledgehood (*jñānatva*).

<sup>3</sup> Such as a jar.

<sup>4</sup> Which regulate our notions of duality etc. See verse 109.

<sup>5</sup> Whereas the definition speaks of a generic attribute that does not abide.

<sup>6</sup> And more, for it is eternal.

ing word 'products.' If the common features of ether and the *individual* soul<sup>1</sup> be considered, then the word 'product' may be omitted; for the definition will be applicable if we take aversionhood (*dveṣatva*) etc.<sup>2</sup> as examples. Since superlative dimension is a quality of the type under discussion,<sup>3</sup> and since duality (*dvitva*) etc. being also regarded as subject to destruction at the fourth moment, answer to that description, the word 'special' is added to exclude them. Or (the last part of the above definition) may be put as 'lasting for three moments, in which case it may be applicable to the soul if we take desirehood (*icchātva*) etc.<sup>4</sup> as examples.

रूपद्रवत्वप्रत्यक्षयोगिनः प्रथमास्त्रयः ।

गुरुणी द्वे रसवती, द्वयोर्नैमित्तिको द्रवः ॥ २८ ॥

28. The first three (substances) are endowed with colour, liquidity and perceptibility. (The first) two have weight and taste. Two (earth and fire) have artificial liquidity.

*The first three, etc.*—That is to say, earth, water and fire have colour, liquidity and the capacity of being objects of perception. It cannot be urged, what proof is there that the eyes etc. the fire that is in (heated) earthen frying pans, and (hot) vapour have

<sup>1</sup> As the word *śarīrin* (the embodied one) in the text literally means.

<sup>2</sup> Aversion etc. are absent in God. The 'etc.' refers to soundhood.

<sup>3</sup> That is, special qualities having that generic attribute which does not abide in products lasting for four moments.

<sup>4</sup> Because desirehood is a generic attribute that abides only in desire, which, though a product, lasts for two moments only, and is a special quality of the soul. Similarly with pleasurehood etc.



colour? For even there we can infer colour from their firehood (*tejastva*). Similarly, we must understand that colour can be inferred also in the particles of earth, water and fire carried by the wind, from their earthhood etc. it cannot be urged that liquidity does not extend to jars etc. or to fire other than molten gold; for possessing liquidity means possessing those generic attributes concomitant with substancehood that abide in liquids. Since there is liquidity in earth represented by clarified butter, lac, etc. in water, and in fire represented by molten gold etc. and there is also earthhood or the like<sup>1</sup> in those things, the definition can be made to cover all cases by a reference to that. It cannot be urged that (the statement about) perceptibility does not extend to atoms etc. as it should, and wrongly extends to colour etc.<sup>2</sup> for 'perceptibility' means their possession of those generic attributes<sup>3</sup> concomitant with substancehood which abide in things<sup>4</sup> that are objects of normal<sup>5</sup> ocular perception. The qualification 'ocular' is for precluding the extension (of the statement about perceptibility) to the soul.<sup>6</sup> *Two have weight, etc.*—That is to say, weight and taste belong to earth and water. It cannot be questioned, what proof is there

<sup>1</sup> That is, waterhood or firehood, as the case may be.

<sup>2</sup> Which are not the substances under discussion.

<sup>3</sup> Earthhood, waterhood, etc. Colourhood is not one of these. So it is excluded.

<sup>4</sup> That is, earth, water and fire.

<sup>5</sup> This word is added to exclude cases of spontaneous ocular perception, as when we say, 'The jar is full of air.'

<sup>6</sup> Which is other than the three substances under discussion and yet is an object of normal (mental) perception. Being an object of mental (not ocular) perception, it is excluded.

that the nose etc. as also the particles of earth etc. carried by the wind, possess taste etc.? For there too we can infer them from their earthhood etc. *Two*, i.e. earth and fire, *have artificial liquidity*. It cannot be urged that artificial liquidity does not extend to jars etc. and to fire etc. as it should; for the term 'artificial liquidity' means those generic attributes concomitant with substancehood that co-exist with artificial liquidity.

आत्मानो भूतवर्गाश्च विशेषगुणयोगिनः ।

यदुक्तं यस्य साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यमितरस्य तत् ॥ २९ ॥

29. The souls and the elements are endowed with special qualities. What has been stated to be the common features of particular things are the features that are lacking in common in other things.

*The souls, etc.*—That is to say, earth, water, fire, air, ether and the souls possess special qualities. *What has, etc.*—That is to say, excepting knowability etc.<sup>1</sup> these are features that are never lacking in anything, since they are universally present.

स्पर्शादयोऽष्टौ वेगाख्यः संस्कारो मरुतो गुणाः ।

स्पर्शाद्यष्टौ रूपवेगौ द्रवत्वं तेजसो गुणाः ॥ ३० ॥

30. The eight<sup>2</sup> (qualities) beginning with touch and the tendency called impulse are the qualities of air. The eight beginning with touch,

<sup>1</sup> Refers to namability etc.

<sup>2</sup> Touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, distance and nearness.

colour, impulse and liquidity are the qualities of fire.

*The eight, etc.*

स्पर्शादयोऽष्टौ वेगश्च गुरुत्वं च द्रवत्वकम् ।

रूपं रसस्तथा स्नेहो वारिण्येते चर्दतुश ॥ ३१ ॥

31. The eight beginning with touch, impulse, weight, liquidity, colour, taste, oiliness—these fourteen qualities are in water.

स्नेहहीना गन्धयुताः क्षितावेते चतुर्दश ।

बुद्ध्यादिषट्कं संख्यादिपञ्चकं भावना तथा ॥ ३२ ॥

धर्माधर्मौ गुणा एत आत्मनः स्युश्चतुर्दश ।

संख्यादिपञ्चकं कालदिशोः, शब्दश्च ते च खे ॥ ३३ ॥

32-33. The above fourteen excluding oiliness but including smell abide in earth. The six<sup>1</sup> beginning with knowledge, the five<sup>2</sup> beginning with number, impression, merit and demerit—these fourteen are the qualities of the soul. The five beginning with number abide in time and space. These as well as sound abide in ether.

The word *kha* means ether.

संख्यादयः पञ्च बुद्धिरिच्छा यत्नोऽपि चेश्वरे ।

परापरत्वे संख्याद्याः पञ्च वेगश्च मानसे ॥ ३४ ॥

34. The five beginning with number, knowledge, desire and effort are the qualities of God. Distance and nearness, the five beginning with number, and impulse belong to the mind.

<sup>1</sup> Knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort.

<sup>2</sup> Number, dimension, separateness, conjunction and disjunction.



## THE SUBSTANCES

### EARTH

तत्र क्षितिर्गन्धहेतुर्नानारूपवती मता ।

षड्विधस्तु रसस्तत्र, गन्धस्तु द्विविधो मतः ॥ ३५ ॥

35. Of these, earth is the cause of smell and is considered to be multi-coloured. There are (all the) six kinds of taste in it (only), and it is considered to have two kinds of smell.

Having described the common features and features that are lacking in common, the text now takes up earth and the other substances one by one in the words: *Of these, earth, etc. The cause of smell*—That is to say, the inherent cause of smell. Although its merely being possessed of smell should be the definition, yet, in order to furnish a proof for the generic attribute earthhood, it is mentioned as the cause (of smell). To explain: Earthhood is established as the determinant of the inherent causality of smell. Otherwise every smell becomes something produced by chance. It cannot be urged that since stones etc. have no smell, (the definition of earth as) odorousness does not extend to them; for there too odours (can be inferred to) exist. The non-perception of smell can as well be explained by the fact that it is not strong enough. Otherwise how can smell be perceived in their ashes? Since the ashes are the result of the destruction of the stones, it is proved that they are the effect of the material<sup>1</sup> forming the

<sup>1</sup> Earth in general.

stones; for we have the rule (*vyāpti*) that a thing that is produced by the destruction of another is the effect of the material forming the latter. This is observed in the case of a rag that is produced by the destruction (tearing off) of an entire piece. Thus, since the atoms of stone are earth, the stone that is made up of them is also earth. That being the case, there is nothing to disprove its having smell.

*Multi-coloured:* Colours of various species such as white and blue exist in earth alone, and not in water etc. for they have only whiteness. In the domain of earth, however, a single entity (*dharmin*)<sup>1</sup> may have different colours through the action of heat. It cannot be urged that the definition does not apply to the earth in which different colours have not been produced; for it means the possession of those generic attributes concomitant with substancehood that abide in things<sup>2</sup> having two colours; or the possession of those generic attributes concomitant with substancehood that abide in things subject to destruction of colour. Since according to the Vaiśeṣika system, atoms of earth undergo destruction and change of colour, and since according to the Nyāya system jars etc. can also have that, the definition is applicable to all cases.

*Six kinds, etc.*—The six kinds of taste, sweet and the rest, that we know of abide in earth alone. In water there is only the sweet taste. Here also,<sup>3</sup> as before, the definition<sup>4</sup> should be understood to mean

<sup>1</sup> E.g. a jar.

<sup>2</sup> Water etc. have only one colour. Hence they are excluded.

<sup>3</sup> To cover cases where multiple taste has not originated.

<sup>4</sup> Viz. the possession of six kinds of taste.

the possession of those generic attributes concomitant with substancehood that abide in things having two kinds of taste. Two *kinds of smell*: This is merely a statement of fact, not that the possession of two kinds of smell constitutes a definition (of earthhood); for in that case the mention of two kinds would be redundant. These two kinds should be understood as good and bad smell.

स्पर्शस्तस्यास्तु विज्ञेयो ह्यानुष्णाशीतपाकजः ।

नित्यानित्या च सा द्वेधा, नित्या स्यादणुलक्षणा ॥ ३६ ॥

36. Its touch should be understood as neither hot nor cold and generated by the action of fire. It is of two kinds—eternal and transitory. That in the form of an atom is eternal.

*Its*—of earth. Air also possesses touch that is neither hot nor cold. Hence the words: *Generated by the action of fire*.<sup>1</sup> Thus the above statement is for intimating that the touch of earth is neither hot nor cold. Strictly speaking, its definition is that it possesses touch that is generated by the action of heat—the rest being redundant. Although touch that is generated by the action of heat is absent in cloth etc. yet the definition only means the possession of those generic attributes concomitant with substancehood that abide in things having touch that is generated by the action of heat.

*It is, etc.*—It, i.e. earth, is of two kinds, that is to say, eternal and transitory. That, i.e. earth, in the form of an atom is eternal.

<sup>1</sup> Unlike the touch of the atoms of water, fire and air, which is eternal.



अनित्या तु तदन्या स्यात्, सैवावयवयोगिनी ।

सा च त्रिधा भवेदेहमिन्द्रियं विषयस्तथा ॥ ३७ ॥

37. What is other than that is transitory. This alone is possessed of parts. And it has three forms—bodies, organ and objects.

*What is other than that, i.e. earth which is different from the atom, in other words, everything beginning with the dyad, is transitory. This, i.e. the transitory earth, alone is possessed of parts.*

Objection (by the Buddhist): What is the proof of the existence of a whole, as things can be explained by an assemblage of atoms? It cannot be urged that since atoms are beyond the senses, jars etc. will not be perceptible. Because, although a single atom is beyond the senses, a collection of atoms is perceptible; just as a single hair may be invisible from a distance, but a collection of them is visible. Nor can it be urged that one's notion of a single big jar will be inexplicable; it will be accounted for just like the notion of a single great heap of paddy.

Reply: Not so. Since an atom is beyond the senses, a collection of them must also be imperceptible. As for the hair at a distance, it is not beyond the senses; for near at hand, the same hair is perceptible. It cannot be urged that since the visible collection of atoms is produced<sup>1</sup> at the moment,<sup>2</sup> there is no contradiction as regards its perceptibility; for an invisible thing cannot be the material of a visible thing. Otherwise the eye as also a stream of vapour etc. may some-

<sup>1</sup> From the invisible collection of atoms.

<sup>2</sup> Of perceiving the jar etc.

times be visible. Nor can it be questioned how, in extremely heated oil, etc. visible fire is produced from an invisible stream of fire; for we can well understand that the visible fire has been produced from the visible particles of fire within the oil etc. Nor can it be questioned how the visible triad is produced from the invisible dyad; for we do not maintain the visibility or otherwise of anything by nature, but that a thing is visible only when the totality of causes such as medium dimension and manifested colour is present, and in the absence of that it is invisible. So the triad is visible on account of its medium dimension; but since the dyad etc. lack it, they are not visible. According to you also, it is not possible (to perceive atoms); for atoms have no medium dimension. Thus the existence of a whole is proved, and since the origin and destruction of wholes are facts of perception, they are transitory. If they have an endless series of parts, Mt. Meru and a mustard seed would be equal.<sup>1</sup> Hence the process of division must be stated to stop somewhere. Now if that limit where the process stops be transitory, it would mean that an effect<sup>2</sup> may be produced without an inherent cause. Therefore it must be eternal. Just as the gradations of medium dimension have their limit

<sup>1</sup> If each whole has parts, these again further parts, and so on *ad infinitum*, then, there being no final unit of a definite size, we cannot add these up to make different sizes. Hence the biggest and the smallest thing would be equal; as, in mathematics, anything multiplied by zero.

<sup>2</sup> That is, an effect that is a positive entity. If the limit be not eternal, it must be an effect, and as such inhere in its parts. But it has no parts. Hence we are presented with an instance of a positive effect having no parts, which is inadmissible.

in ether etc. so those of the atomic dimension must have their limit somewhere. Therefore that is the atom. It cannot be urged that the process should stop just with the triad; for it can be proved to have parts by the following reasoning: A triad has parts, because it is a visible substance, as is the case with a jar; and each of these parts can be proved to have further parts by the following reasoning: The parts of a triad (i.e. dyads) have parts, because they originate things of medium dimension, as is the case with the two halves of a jar. Nor is this without a corroborative argument; for the possession of more than one substance<sup>1</sup> (by a thing) is a proof of its inferior<sup>2</sup> (medium) dimension.<sup>3</sup> It cannot be urged that in this process the parts of a dyad also may have parts, and so on; for it is untenable, since it leads to a *regressus in infinitum*.

And it, i.e. earth that is produced, had three forms, that is to say, according to its division into *bodies, organ and objects*.

योनिजादिर्भवेदेह इन्द्रियं घ्राणलक्षणम् ।

विषयो द्रवणुकादिश्च ब्रह्माण्डान्त उदाहृतः ॥ ३८ ॥

38. The (earthy) bodies are those born of the mother and so on, the organ is the nose, and the objects are said to be—everything from the dyad to the universe.

Of these three, the earthy bodies are being described: *The bodies, etc.*—i.e. those born of the mother and

<sup>1</sup> By some form of inherence.

<sup>2</sup> To the superlative or infinite dimension.

<sup>3</sup> Hence, if a thing has medium dimension, it must have component parts. And so is a dyad.



those not so born. The former again are of two kinds: those born of the uterus, as of men etc. and those born of the egg, as of snakes etc. Bodies not born of the mother are those springing from moisture, those shooting out of the earth, and so on. The former are represented by worms, gnats, etc.; the latter by plants, shrubs, etc. The bodies of the denizens of hell are also not born of the mother. It cannot be questioned, what is the proof that the human and other bodies are earthy? For the proof lies in their possessing smell etc.<sup>1</sup> Nor can it be urged that since we notice moisture, heat, etc. in them, they must also be watery and so on<sup>2</sup>; for then there would be a cross-division<sup>3</sup> between waterhood, earthhood, etc. Nor can it be said that in that case they should only be watery or the like, but nor earthy; for from the perception of smell etc. in them, and from the fact that even after the elimination of moisture etc. they are recognised to be bodies, they are proved to be earthy. So water etc. should be understood to be present in earthy and other bodies as auxiliary causes only.

Bodyhood (*śarīratva*) is not a generic attribute; for it would involve a cross-division<sup>4</sup> with earthhood etc.; but it is being the substratum of effort. Since trees etc. also have effort, the definition does not exclude them. It cannot be urged, what is the proof of trees etc.

<sup>1</sup> Refers to colour other than white.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. fiery.

<sup>3</sup> Waterhood exists only in water, and earthhood only in earth, while both co-exist in the body.

<sup>4</sup> The aqueous body, for instance, is a body, but not earthy; jars etc. are earthy, but not bodies; while the human and other bodies are both earthy and bodies.

being bodies? For the proof lies in their possessing the vital force (*vāyu*) pertaining to the body. Should it be urged, what is the proof of that event?—the reply is that it is to be inferred from their broken or injured limbs sprouting again, for instance. If the word 'body' is inapplicable to the hand etc. then the definition has to be qualified by the epithet 'the *ultimate* whole.'<sup>1</sup> It cannot be urged that the definition does not include the body in which no effort has arisen; for there is no proof of such a body. Or the expression in question may mean the possession of those generic attributes<sup>2</sup> concomitant with substancehood that abide in the ultimate wholes endowed with effort, or the possession of those generic attributes<sup>3</sup> abiding in things endowed with effort that are present only in ultimate wholes. The definition will be applicable to all cases concerned if we take a generic attribute such as humanity or Caitrahood.<sup>4</sup> It cannot be questioned how the definition includes the body of Nṛsimha,<sup>5</sup> since Nṛsimhahood, abiding in a single individual, cannot be a generic attribute; nor can divinity (abiding in Nṛsimha) also be regarded as a generic attribute, as it belongs to aqueous and fiery bodies.<sup>6</sup> For the bodies

<sup>1</sup> That which does not generate any other whole. The hand is a component part of the body; hence it is not an ultimate whole.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. earthhood, which abides in a jar etc. Hence the alternative definition.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. humanity or treehood.

<sup>4</sup> Since there may be many of that name.

<sup>5</sup> An Incarnation of Viṣṇu, who was half man and half lion.

<sup>6</sup> Thus involving a cross-division.

of Nṛsimha vary according to cycles; hence the generic attribute Nṛsimhahood being possible, the definition is applicable to them.

*The organ, i. e. the earthy organ, is the nose.* If it be asked, how is it earthy?—the answer is, in the following manner: The organ of smell is earthy, because among colour and the rest it reveals only smell, as it is with the clarified butter produced from cow's milk, which reveals the perfume of saffron. It cannot be urged that in the example cited (the reason) is unfounded,<sup>1</sup> since the thing reveals its own colour etc.; because the word 'only' indicates that the colour etc. of other things are not revealed. Nor can it be urged that (the reason) is inconstant<sup>2</sup> with regard to water, which reveals the smell of a new (baked) earthen saucer; for it also reveals the taste of fried barley dust. Or the qualifying term 'of other things' need not be added; for the particle of fragrance wafted by the wind may be cited as an example. It cannot be urged that since the connection<sup>3</sup> of the nose also reveals only smell, (the reason) is inconstant with regard to it; for the qualifying words 'being a substance' should be added.

*The objects, etc.*—Whatever contributes to pleasure or pain is an object. Everything of the nature of an effect is the outcome of merit and demerit. An effect which is the outcome of somebody's merit and demerit cannot but contribute to his pleasure or pain, either directly or

<sup>1</sup> For the fallacy called unfoundedness of nature, see verse 76.

<sup>2</sup> Being present without the thing to be inferred. For the inconstancy designated as common, see commentary on verse 72.

<sup>3</sup> Which is not earthy.



indirectly. No effect is produced that is not related to a cause and a purpose (result). Hence everything beginning with the dyad and ending with the universe is an object. Although the bodies and the organ are also objects, they are presented as additional forms for the clear understanding of the pupil.

## WATER

वर्णः शुक्लः, रसस्पर्शौ जले मधुरशीतौ ।

स्नेहतत्र, द्रवत्वं तु सांसिद्धिकमुदाहृतम् ॥ ३९ ॥

39. Water has white colour, sweet taste and cold touch, as also oiliness (*sneha*). Its liquidity is said to be natural.

Water is being described: *Water, etc.* The generic attribute waterhood is established as the determinant of the inherent causality of oiliness. Although oiliness, being present in both eternal<sup>1</sup> and transitory things, cannot be the determinant of the effecthood, yet the being oiliness that is produced (*janya-snehatva*) should be understood as such.

Objection: There cannot be any waterhood in atoms (of water), since they have no oiliness that is produced; and because they are eternal, it necessarily follows that if they have potential causality, the result<sup>2</sup> is bound to be<sup>3</sup> produced some time.

Reply: Not so. For the generic attribute, viz. being water that is produced, is established as the determinant

<sup>1</sup> E.g. atoms of water.

<sup>2</sup> Oiliness that is produced.

<sup>3</sup> But it never is. Hence an atom of water has no potential causality.

of the inherent causality of oiliness that is produced; and the generic attribute waterhood is established as the determinant of the inherent causality of what<sup>1</sup> is characterised by that.<sup>2</sup>

To show that water possesses only white colour, the text says: *Water has, etc.* not that the possession of white colour is the definition of water. Or it (having white colour) means the possession of those generic attributes<sup>3</sup> directly concomitant with substancehood that abide in things<sup>4</sup> possessing colour and are absent in things<sup>5</sup> having artificial liquidity; or the possession of those generic attributes directly concomitant with substancehood that abide in things possessing colour and are not co-existent with<sup>6</sup> colours other than dull white.<sup>7</sup> Hence crystals etc. are not wrongly included.

*Sweet taste, etc.*—Water has only sweet taste and cold touch. The having of sweet taste means the possession of those generic attributes directly concomitant with substancehood that abide in things having sweet taste and are absent in things<sup>8</sup> having

<sup>1</sup> *What, etc.*—i.e. water that is produced.

<sup>2</sup> The generic attribute, viz. being water that is produced.

<sup>3</sup> Viz. earthhood, waterhood, etc.

<sup>4</sup> That is, earth, water and fire. Crystalhood is not a generic attribute directly concomitant with substancehood.

<sup>5</sup> Earth and fire.

<sup>6</sup> *Not co-existent with*—same as 'absent in things having' above.

<sup>7</sup> *Other than dull white*—i.e. dazzling white (the colour of fire) and blue and other colours except white (those of earth). Blue and those other colours of earth co-exist with earthhood. Hence earth is excluded from the scope of the definition.

<sup>8</sup> Refers to earth.

bitter taste. Hence sugar etc.<sup>1</sup> are not wrongly included. The having of cold touch means the possession of those generic attributes directly concomitant with substancehood that abide in things having touch and are absent in things<sup>2</sup> having touch other than cold.

Objection: Why say only white colour, since we observe blue colour in the waters of the Jumna, for instance?

Reply: Not so; for blue colour is impossible in water, as it lacks the generic attribute earthhood, which is the determinant of the causality of blue colour. The perception of blue colour in the waters of the Jumna is only superimposed by (the conjunction<sup>3</sup> of) its substratum.<sup>4</sup> Hence when water is thrown up against the sky, we perceive its whiteness.

Objection: Well, what is the proof of sweetness in water? For no taste whatsoever is experienced in it through perception. It cannot be urged that in coconut water, for instance, sweetness is perceived; for it is only superimposed by (the conjunction of) its substratum. Otherwise, since sour and other tastes are perceived in lime-juice etc. water may as well have sour taste etc.

Reply: Not so; for the eating of the myrobalan etc. only reveals the taste of water. It cannot be urged that only in the myrobalan a new taste is produced through the conjunction of water and heat;

<sup>1</sup> Not possessing generic attributes directly concomitant with substancehood.

<sup>2</sup> Refers to earth and air.

<sup>3</sup> Which is the defect that leads to the error.

<sup>4</sup> Particles of earth.



for such an assumption would be cumbrous. And since earthhood is the determinant of the causality of sour taste etc. these tastes are not in water. The perception of those tastes in lime-juice etc. is only superimposed by (the conjunction of) its substratum. Similarly we must understand that being water that is produced (*janya-jalatva*) is the determinant of the causality of the cold touch that is produced, and waterhood is the determinant of the causality of what is characterised by that.<sup>1</sup> The cold that is perceived in sandal rubbed into a paste and so on belongs only to the colder water that is in the sandal-paste. That the perception of warmth in water is only due to something that is superimposed,<sup>2</sup> is quite patent; for heat cannot alter the properties of water.<sup>3</sup>

*As also oiliness:* In clarified butter etc. also, the oiliness is that of the water which is in it; for water is the inherent cause of oiliness. Hence we must understand that oiliness is in water alone. *Its liquidity, etc.*—Being natural liquidity (*dravatvatva*) is a generic attribute that is established by perception; and the determinant of the causality of what is characterised by it<sup>4</sup> is waterhood alone. In oil etc. also the liquidity is that of water. It will be stated later on<sup>5</sup> that oil helps combustion owing to its profusion of oiliness.

<sup>1</sup> Here is an additional proof of the generic attribute waterhood.

<sup>2</sup> Viz. the conjunction of earth, the substratum of the heat.

<sup>3</sup> This is possible only in earth, as will be stated in verse 105.

<sup>4</sup> Being natural liquidity.

<sup>5</sup> In verse 157.

नित्यतादि प्रथमवत्, किंतु देहमयोनिजम् ।

इंद्रियं रसनं, सिन्धुहिमादिर्विषयो मतः ॥ ४० ॥

40. Its eternity etc. are like those of the first (substance). The (watery) body, however, is (only) what is not born of the mother. The (watery) organ is the tongue, and the sea, snow, etc. are considered to be the objects (of water).

*Like those for the first, i.e. earth. For instance, water is of two kinds—eternal and transitory. That in the form of atoms is eternal, and everything beginning with the dyad is transitory and consists of parts. Transitory water is also of three kinds, according to its division into bodies, organ and objects. What constitutes its difference from earth is being stated: The body, however, etc. That is to say, the bodies are only of the kind not born of the mother. The aqueous body is well known in the world of Varuṇa (rain-god). The organ, i.e. watery organ. To explain: The tongue is aqueous, since it reveals taste without revealing smell etc. analogously to the water that reveals the taste of fried barley dust. To preclude the inclusion of the connection of the organ of taste with its objects, the definition must be qualified by the epithet, 'while being a substance.' The objects are being pointed out: The sea, snow, etc. The word 'etc.' suggests the inclusion of all such objects as rivers, tanks and hailstones. It cannot be urged that since snow and hailstones are solid, they must be earthy; for when they melt under heat, it is proved by perception that they are water. And from the*

universal principle<sup>1</sup> regarding a substance that is produced by the destruction of another, they are proved to be effects of the same stuff of which water is composed. Since the liquidity of hailstones etc. is counteracted by a particular kind of demerit<sup>2</sup>, the perception of solidity with regard to them is illusory.

### FIRE, AIR AND ETHER

उष्णस्पर्शस्तेजसस्तु, स्याद्रूपं शुक्लभास्वरम् ।

नैमित्तिकं द्रवत्वं तु, नित्यतादि च पूर्ववत् ॥ ४१ ॥

41. The touch of fire is hot, its colour dazzling white, and it has artificial liquidity, while its eternity etc. are like those of the preceding one.

Fire is being described in the words: *The touch of fire, etc.* Hotness is a particular generic attribute abiding in touch, the existence of which is established by perception. Hence firehood, being the determinant of the inherent causality of the hot touch that is produced, is also a particular generic attribute. Its presence in atoms is to be understood as in the case of waterhood. It cannot be urged that (this definition of firehood as) the possession of hot touch does not extend to moonlight, for instance, as it should; for there also hotness is present; only it is not perceived, as it is overcome by the touch of the water that is in it. Similarly hotness is not perceived in the rays of a gem etc. on account of its being overcome by the earthy touch, and in the eyes etc. on account of its not being manifested.

<sup>1</sup> See commentary on verse 35.

<sup>2</sup> Of those who perceive them as solid.



*Its colour, etc.*—The white colour that is in fire and in the rays of an emerald etc. is not perceived, as it is overcome by the earthy colour.

Objection: If that colour be not perceived, things that possess it as an attribute would not also be visible.

Reply: Not so; for it is possible to perceive a thing by means of colour belonging to some other thing,<sup>1</sup> as in the case of a conch by means of the yellow colour that is in bile.<sup>2</sup> Some, however, say that in the case of fire, it is not the white colour that is overcome, but the whiteness of it.

*It has artificial liquidity*—being present<sup>3</sup> in the fire that is in the form of gold etc. It cannot be urged that the (definition of firehood as)—artificial liquidity does not extend to ordinary fire, and extends wrongly to clarified butter etc.; for artificial liquidity really means the possession of those generic attributes directly concomitant with substancehood which are absent in earth, but are present in things having artificial liquidity. *Like those of the preceding one*, i.e. water. That is to say, it is of two kinds—eternal and transitory. The eternal kind is represented by the (fiery) atoms, and what is other than these is transitory and consists of parts. The transitory fire is of three forms, according to its division into body, organ and objects. The body is only of the kind not born of the mother. And it is well-known in the world of the sun etc.

<sup>1</sup> Viz. earth.

<sup>2</sup> A jaundiced man perceives the conch, although owing to an excess of bile he sees it yellow.

<sup>3</sup> So it is not a fantastic statement.

इन्द्रियं नयनं, वह्निवर्णादिविषयो मतः ।

अपाकजोऽनुष्णाशीतः स्पर्शस्तु पवने मतः ॥ ४२ ॥

42. Its organ is the eye, and objects fire, gold, etc. Air is considered to have touch which is not changed through the action of fire, and which is neither hot nor cold.

Where it differs (from water) is being stated:  
*Its organ, etc.*

Objection: What is the proof of the eye being fiery?

Reply: The eye is fiery, since it reveals the colour of others, without revealing the touch etc.<sup>1</sup> of others, as we see in the case of a lamp. Since a lamp reveals its *own* touch, the words 'of others' have been first used to guard against the definition not extending to the example cited. And since a jar etc. reveal their own *colour*, the words 'of others' have been used for the second time to preclude its wrongly extending to them. Or, since reflected light (*prabhā*) may serve as an example, the words 'of others' first used may be omitted. To prevent the definition from extending to the connection of the eye with its objects, the words 'while being a substance' are to be added.

The objects of fire are being stated: *Fire, etc.*

Objection: What proof is there that gold is a form of fire?

Reply: The objection is not valid. Gold is a form of fire, since when there is no obstacle, its liquidity cannot be destroyed even by the intense

<sup>1</sup> Refers to smell etc.

application of fire. That which is not so is not a form of fire, as is the case with earth. Nor is the above inference without a corroborative argument, because the liquidity of earth and of water that is produced can be destroyed by the intense application of fire.

Objection: Since the earthy portion (in gold) which is the substratum of the yellow colour and weight, also melts<sup>1</sup> at the time, (the reason) is inconstant on account of it.

Reply: No; it does not melt, like ink-powder put in water.

Others, however, say that in view of the fact that the substratum of yellow colour does not change its former colour even on the intense application of fire, one is to assume the presence in it of some liquid substance of a different kind, which acts as an obstacle. To be explicit: The substratum of yellow colour and weight which is in intense contact with fire, must be conjoined with some liquid substance which acts as an obstacle to colours of a different kind, because even on the intense application of fire it never has any other colour than its former one, just as we find in the case of a yellow cloth immersed in water; and that foreign substance, being different from earth and water, must necessarily be fire.<sup>2</sup>

Air is being described: *Air is, etc.* Since touch that is neither hot nor cold is also present in earth, the text says: *Which is not changed through the action of fire.* Since this kind of touch is also present in water etc. the text

<sup>1</sup> And remains in a liquid state in spite of the application of fire.

<sup>2</sup> According to the new school gold is an *earthy* substance.



adds: *Which is neither hot nor cold.* Thus it is pointed out that the touch of air is of a special kind.<sup>1</sup> The determinant of the causality of that is airhood (*vāyutva*). This is the idea.

तिर्यग्गमनवानेष ज्ञेयः स्पर्शादिलिङ्गकः ।

पूर्ववन्नित्यतायुक्तं, देहव्यापि त्वग्निन्द्रियम् ॥ ४३ ॥

43. It has a zigzag motion and is to be known as indicated by touch etc. Its eternity etc. are stated to be like those of the preceding one. Its organ is the skin, which covers the whole body.

*It, i.e. air, is indicated by touch, etc.* Because air is inferred from touch, sound, holding aloft, shaking, etc. we infer its existence from its special touch, its special sound, its holding aloft of grass etc. and its shaking of branches etc. That air is not perceptible<sup>2</sup> will be stated later on.<sup>3</sup>

*Like those of the preceding one:* That is, air is of two kinds—eternal and transitory. That in the form of atoms is eternal; what is other than that is transitory and consists of parts. The latter kind, again, has three forms, according as it is divided into body, organ and objects. Of these, the (airy) body is not born of the mother; it belongs to ghouls etc. It should be noted that the aqueous, fiery and airy bodies become fit for

<sup>1</sup> That is, different from that of other substances.

<sup>2</sup> This is the view of the old school.

<sup>3</sup> In the commentary on verse 57, where colour is made a necessary condition of the perception of substances by the external organs. Since air has no colour, it is not so perceptible.

contributing to the pleasure or pain of beings on account of their containing portions of earth, and it is only in accordance with the preponderance of water etc. that they are designated as aqueous and so on.

Where air differs from the rest is being stated: *Which covers, etc.* The skin is the organ of perceiving touch; it covers the whole body. And it is aerial, since among colour and the rest it reveals only touch, as in the case of the breeze set in by a fan, which reveals the cold touch of water<sup>1</sup> that clings to the body.

प्राणादिस्तु महावायुपर्यन्तो विषयो मतः ।

आकाशस्य तु विज्ञेयः शब्दो वैशेषिको गुणः ॥ ४४ ॥

44. Its objects are (things) beginning with the *prāṇa*<sup>2</sup> and ending with the atmosphere. Sound should be regarded as the (only) special quality of ether.

The objects of air are being pointed out: *Its objects, etc.* Although it has been stated in the authoritative books<sup>3</sup> that transitory air is of four kinds, and its fourth variety is the *prāṇa* etc. yet for the sake of brevity it is here stated to be of three kinds.<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that the *prāṇa* is a single entity, but it receives various names in accordance with its different places such as the heart, and with its different activities such as issuing through the mouth.

<sup>1</sup> Perspiration.

<sup>2</sup> Strictly speaking, it means the vital force; but it is often applied, as here, to the air which is in the body.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. *Praśastapāda's Commentary on the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras.*

<sup>4</sup> According to its division into body, organ and objects.

Ether is being described: *Sound, etc.* Since ether, time and space are single individuals, etherhood etc. are not generic attributes. But etherhood is being the substratum of sound. Here the use of the word 'special' is intended to shut out all other special qualities. By this a proof also is adduced (for the existence of ether). To be explicit: Sound is a special quality, since it possesses a generic attribute which is not perceptible to the eye, but is perceptible to some external organ, as is the case with touch. Now sound, being a quality, is inherent in a substance, as is conjunction. This inference proves that sound inheres in a substance. Next we see that sound is not a special quality of things<sup>1</sup> possessing touch, because, while not having the conjunction of fire as its non-inherent cause, it is produced independently of the qualities of its cause, and is perceptible, as is the case with pleasure. The expression 'while not having' etc. is used in order to prevent the definition from extending, for instance, to the colour that is produced through the action of fire. The words 'independently of the qualities of the cause' have been inserted to preclude its extending to the colour of a cloth, and so on. The word 'perceptible' has been used to guard against the definition extending to the colour<sup>2</sup> of the atoms of water, and so on. Thirdly, sound is not a quality of space, time and mind, because it is a special quality, like colour. Nor is it a special quality of the soul, since it is perceptible to external organs, just like

<sup>1</sup> Earth, water, fire and air.

<sup>2</sup> Which is eternal.



colour. Thus a ninth substance called ether, which is the substratum of sound, is established. It cannot be urged that, first of all, subtle sound is produced in the component parts of air, and then (gross) sound is produced in air, just depending upon the quality of the cause; for sound, being a quality that does not last as long as the substance to which it belongs, cannot be a special quality of air.<sup>1</sup>

इन्द्रियं तु भवेच्छ्रोत्रम्, एकः सन्नप्युपाधितः ।

45. Its organ is the ear. Although it is one, (it becomes different) owing to its limiting adjunct (*upādhi*).

Since ether has no body and no object, its organ only is being pointed out: *Its organ, etc.* It may be objected: Ether, for the sake of simplicity (*lāghava*), is held to be one; but the ear is different according to different individuals. So how can it be ether? This is being answered: *Although, etc.* Though ether is a single entity, yet owing to differences in its limiting adjunct, viz. the outer ear, it becomes different, that is, takes the form of the ear.

## TIME AND SPACE

जन्यानां जनकः कालो जगतामाश्रयो मतः ॥ ४५ ॥

45 (contd.). Time is the cause of things that are produced, and is considered to be the substratum of the universe.

<sup>1</sup> The special qualities of which last as long as it lasts.

Time is being described: *Time, etc.* To adduce a proof of its existence the text says: *Is considered, etc.* To be explicit: A perception such as, 'Now there is the jar,' takes into consideration the motion of the sun<sup>1</sup> and so on. When this happens, one has to admit that there is some relation between the jar etc. and the motion of the sun and so forth. Now that relation cannot be conjunction etc. So time alone is assumed to be what brings about the relation. Thus also is it rightly considered to be the substratum (of the universe).

परापरत्वधीहेतुः, क्षणादिः स्यादुपाधितः ।

दूरान्तिकादिधीहेतुरेका नित्या दिगुच्यते ॥ ३६ ॥

46. It is the cause of the notion of priority and posteriority. It is converted into a moment etc. owing to its limiting adjuncts. The cause of the notion of distance, nearness, etc. is called space. It is one and eternal.

Another proof is being adduced: *It is etc.* The extraordinary cause of the notion of priority and posteriority is time alone. That is to say, as the substratum of conjunction, which is the non-inherent<sup>2</sup> cause of priority and posteriority, time alone is

<sup>1</sup> When we say 'now,' we automatically refer to the (apparent) motion of the sun above or below the horizon by so many degrees. This motion is in the sun, and the jar is on earth. What connects the two? The answer is, it must be time.

<sup>2</sup> The inherent cause of priority or posteriority is the substance regarding which we have such a notion. The non-inherent cause conjunction, always abides in two things. One of them is the inherent cause. The other must be time.

assumed, for the sake of simplicity, as an additional substance. It may be urged that if time is proved to be one, there will not be such varieties of it as a moment, a day, a month, or a year. This is being answered: *It is converted, etc.* Time, though one, gives rise to the application of terms such as a moment owing to its different limiting adjuncts. These may either<sup>1</sup> be an action determined by the previous non-existence of the disjunction produced by that action, or disjunction determined by the antecedent conjunction, or previous non-existence of the subsequent conjunction determined by the cessation of the antecedent conjunction, or an action determined by the subsequent conjunction. It cannot be urged that terms such as a moment would not be used after the subsequent conjunction; for there would be

<sup>1</sup> Our conception of a moment etc. depends on some action. Suppose disjunction takes place in something through action. Now, since a cause precedes its effect, there must be an interval, however infinitesimal, between the action and the resulting disjunction. In other words, there is the previous non-existence of the disjunction produced by that action. The time associated with that is called the first moment. This disjunction, again, is the cause of the cessation of the antecedent conjunction. As such, there must be an interval between the disjunction and the cessation of the conjunction. This is called the second moment. That is to say, the disjunction determined by the antecedent conjunction is the second limiting adjunct. Next, when this conjunction ceases, that cessation is the cause of the subsequent conjunction. As such, there must be an interval between the two. So there is the previous non-existence of that conjunction, and this is called the third moment, which is the third limiting adjunct. Then subsequent conjunction takes place, and the action determined by the time associated with that is the fourth moment or fourth limiting adjunct.



other actions still. Should the use of terms such as a moment persist at the time of cosmic dissolution, it has to be explained, for want of any other alternative, by a reference to destruction.<sup>1</sup> The use of terms such as a day is to be accounted for by the totality of particular groups of moments.

Space is being described: *The cause, etc.* Distance and nearness are to be understood here in a spatial sense. The extraordinary cause of the notion of them is space alone. The idea is that one undivided space is established, for the sake of simplicity, as the substratum of conjunction,<sup>2</sup> which is the non-inherent cause of spatial distance and nearness.

उपाधिभेदादेकापि प्राच्यादिव्यपदेशभाक् ।

47. Although one, it is spoken of as the east etc. owing to its different limiting adjuncts.

It may be urged, if space is one, how is our use of the terms 'east,' 'west,' etc. to be explained? This is being answered: *Although, etc.* The space that is nearest to Mount Udaya (Sunrise) in respect of a particular person is the east with regard to him. Similarly the space that is farthest from Mount Udaya is the west. Likewise the space that is nearest to Mount Sumeru in respect of a particular person is the north, while that which is farthest is the south; for it is specifically laid down,

<sup>1</sup> The substratum of the dissolution of the entire universe is considered to be a moment.

<sup>2</sup> Of space and anything that limits it.

'Mount Meru is situated to the north of all divisions of the world.'<sup>1</sup>

## THE SOUL

आत्मेन्द्रियाद्यधिष्ठाता, करणं हि सकर्तृकम् ॥ ४७ ॥

47 (contd.). The soul is the inspirer of the organs etc. for an instrument requires an agent.

The soul is being described: *The soul, etc.* The generic attribute soulhood is inferred as the determinant of the inherent causality of pleasure, pain, etc. That generic attribute does abide in God also; but owing to the absence of causes such as<sup>2</sup> merit and demerit, pleasure, pain, etc. are not produced in Him. There is no corroborative argument in favour of the proposition that an eternal substance which is a potential cause must produce an effect.<sup>3</sup> Others, however, say: The generic attribute in question does not certainly exist in God, for it has no proof. It cannot be urged that in that case God becomes a tenth substance; for a division<sup>4</sup> can be made on the basis of sentiency.

<sup>1</sup> Raghunātha Śīromaṇi, the most brilliant exponent of the new school of logic, does not admit time and space to be different from God.

<sup>2</sup> Includes the body.

<sup>3</sup> For instance, oiliness, which is a special quality of water, is not produced in the watery atom.

<sup>4</sup> Of both God and the individual souls from the other substances.

*The inspirer of the organs, etc.*—That which indirectly<sup>1</sup> imparts sentiency to the organs and body. Although the soul is undoubtedly an object of such perceptions as, 'I know,' and 'I am happy,' yet to one who has doubts about it, it cannot be brought home from the very first that the soul which is the object of the above perceptions, is distinct from the body etc. Hence another proof is being adduced: *An instrument, etc.* It is observed that cutting instruments such as an axe cannot produce any result without an agent. Similarly, the eyes and other instruments of knowledge cannot be presumed to produce any result without an agent. Hence an agent over and above them is inferred.

शरीरस्य न चैतन्यं, मृतेषु व्यभिचारतः ।

तथात्वं चेदिन्द्रियाणामुपघाते कथं स्मृतिः ॥ ४८ ॥

48. The body has no sentiency, for it is not found in dead bodies. If the organs have that (sentiency), how can recollection take place when there is loss (of any organ) ?

It may be urged, why not regard the body itself as the agent? This is being answered: *The body, etc.*

Objection (by the materialist): Sentiency is but knowledge etc. So what harm is there in denying it to dead bodies, just as you maintain with regard to liberated souls? For the absence of knowledge follows from the absence of life.

<sup>1</sup> The sentiency is primarily in the soul. But it is manifested through the organs in the body.



Reply: Not so. If the body has sentiency, one cannot account for the recollection in old age of things that have been seen in childhood; for bodies, on account of the accession and loss of their parts, are (continually) subject to birth and death.<sup>1</sup> It cannot be urged that the impressions produced in the previous body generate impressions in the next body; for it is cumbrous to presume an infinite number of impressions. Similarly, if the body has sentiency, an infant will not have the inclination to suck; for this is caused by the notion of its conduciveness to what is desirable, and there is nothing at the time to awaken that notion. In my view, however, the inclination is due simply to the recollection, at the time, of its conduciveness to what is desirable, which was experienced in a previous birth. It cannot be urged that other things experienced in a previous birth should also be recalled; for there is no awakener of those impressions. Here,<sup>2</sup> however, in the absence of any other explanation, the merits and demerits that have led to the present birth are alone presumed to be that awakener. Thus, since the impressions<sup>3</sup> have no beginning, the soul is also proved to be without a beginning; and since positive entities that have no beginning cannot be destroyed, we should understand that it is eternal.

<sup>1</sup> Whenever the body loses any of its component parts, it is theoretically destroyed, and whenever it has an additional part, it is produced anew. So the body of an old man is entirely different from the one he had in childhood.

<sup>2</sup> In the case of sucking.

<sup>3</sup> Some editions read *saṃsāra* (the chain of birth and death) for *saṃskāra* (impression).

It may be urged that the eyes and other organs themselves may well be both agents and instruments of knowledge; for there is nothing to show that these two are contradictory. This is being answered: *If the organs have that etc.* 'That' refers to sentiency. *How can recollection take place when there is loss, i.e. of the eyes etc.* There will be no recollection of things already experienced through the eyes, when the latter are gone, because then there would be no perceiver; for it is impossible for one person to recollect what another person has seen. The idea is that experience and recollection stand to each other as cause and effect through having a common substratum.

मनोऽपि न तथा, ज्ञानाद्यनध्यक्षं तदा भवेत् ।

49. The mind too is not such (sentient); for then there would be no perception of knowledge etc.

It may be urged: Granted that the eyes etc. have no sentiency, but the mind, which is eternal,<sup>1</sup> may well have it. This is being answered : *The mind too is etc. Not such, i.e. not sentient. For then there would be no perception of knowledge etc.* Since the mind is atomic, and since medium dimension is a necessary factor of perception, when knowledge, pleasure, etc. arise in the mind, it will be impossible to perceive them. This is the idea. The reason why the mind is to be treated as atomic, will be stated later on.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Being atomic.

<sup>2</sup> In verse 85.

## DIFFERENT VIEWS ABOUT THE SOUL CRITICISED

Objection (by the Buddhist Idealist): Why not say that consciousness (*viññāna*) alone is the soul? Being self-effulgent it is sentient; knowledge, pleasure, etc. are but its various forms. Again, just because it is a positive entity, it is momentary.<sup>1</sup> Since each preceding consciousness is the cause of the succeeding consciousness, the stream of ego-consciousness<sup>2</sup> is absolutely unobstructed even in profound sleep. Recollection etc. are not inexplicable, because the impressions produced by each preceding consciousness are transmitted to the succeeding consciousness, as in the case of a cloth<sup>3</sup> rendered fragrant with the perfume of musk.

Reply: No. If consciousness has for its object the whole universe, then every soul would be omniscient—which is wrong. And if it has for its object some particular thing, there is no conclusive reasoning in favour of this.<sup>4</sup> Further, objects would flash even in profound sleep; for knowledge implies objects.

<sup>1</sup> According to the Buddhists, whatever exists is momentary.

<sup>2</sup> *Ālaya-viññāna* : Lit. consciousness that persists till death (*ālaya*). In Buddhistic philosophy it is the abiding notion of self-identity, as distinguished from *pravātti-viññāna* or the notion of external objects.

<sup>3</sup> The perfume moves from part to part till the whole cloth is charged with it.

<sup>4</sup> How should one determine which is that particular thing?



Objection: Suppose a stream of formless<sup>1</sup> consciousness persists at the time?

Reply: No; for there is no proof that such a thing would be knowledge. In that case a jar etc. would also be knowledge. You cannot say that it is a proposition you would readily accept, since there is nothing in the world besides consciousness; for you cannot deny the existence of a jar etc. when these are actually perceived.

Objection: These are just particular forms of consciousness.

Reply: Are these forms something apart from consciousness? In that case you have to admit that there are things besides consciousness. And if they are not apart from consciousness, then in a collective perception<sup>2</sup> a blue form would also appear as a yellow form: for there is no difference in consciousness *per se*.

Objection: Blueness etc. as negation (of the opposite) (*apoha*<sup>3</sup>) are attributes<sup>4</sup> of consciousness.

Reply: No; for blueness etc. being contradictory, cannot co-exist in the same consciousness. Otherwise it would be impossible to establish any difference between things. Then again, the transmission of impressions is an impossibility; for then impressions

<sup>1</sup> That is, bereft of objects. It is objects that give consciousness a form.

<sup>2</sup> In which several things are comprehended together, as a blue and yellow surface.

<sup>3</sup> Lit. what is distinct from things other than itself.

<sup>4</sup> Which, being subjective, are unreal and therefore cannot be identical with consciousness.

could be transmitted from the mother to the child.<sup>1</sup> Nor can it be said that this is determined by the relation of independent cause and effect<sup>2</sup>; for impressions cannot at all be transmitted.<sup>3</sup>

Objection: Suppose it is said that the transmission is but origination in a succeeding consciousness.

Reply: No; for there is nothing to produce the impressions. If the states of consciousness themselves produce them, there would be an endless number of impressions.<sup>4</sup>

Objection: Let us assume that there is some peculiar power in (some of the) momentary states of consciousness.<sup>5</sup>

Reply: No; for there is no evidence to prove this, and the assumption is cumbrous. This also refutes the view that consciousness abides only in momentary bodies;<sup>6</sup> because it is cumbrous, and there is no evidence in support of the peculiar power (which is claimed). In seeds etc. also we need not assume

<sup>1</sup> That is, a foetus would recollect what its mother experienced.

<sup>2</sup> There is no recollection, because there is not this relation between the two.

<sup>3</sup> Because impressions are a kind of quality, and qualities are never the seat of any action.

<sup>4</sup> Since there are an infinite number of such momentary states of consciousness.

<sup>5</sup> So only those states of consciousness that have it will cause recollection, and not others.

<sup>6</sup> The view of the two realistic schools of Buddhism, viz. *Vaibhāsika* and *Sautrāntika*. Both believe in the existence of the objective universe; but while the former maintains that it is perceived, the latter holds that it is inferred.

any kinetic activity,<sup>1</sup> since we can explain (the phenomena of sprouting) by the presence or absence of auxiliaries.<sup>2</sup>

Objection (by the Vedāntist): Well then, since momentary consciousness involves cumbrousness, let us say that eternal consciousness alone is the soul; for we have such Śruti texts as, 'This self, my dear, is indeed immutable' (*Bṛ-Ār. Up.* IV. v. 14), and 'Brahman is Truth, Knowledge and Infinitude' (*Tait. Up.* II. i. 1).

Reply: No; for it has already<sup>3</sup> been shown that the soul cannot be possessed of objects, while there is no evidence to show that it is knowledge at all if it is bereft of objects, and we do not experience it as possessed of objects.<sup>4</sup> Hence it is proved that the eternal soul is different from consciousness etc. Moreover, the statement 'Truth, Knowledge,' etc. refers to Brahman, but it is not applicable to the individual soul. Since these souls, on account of their (varying) knowledge or ignorance, happiness or misery, etc. are proved to be different from one another, they are all the more palpably different from God.<sup>5</sup> Otherwise separation between bondage and

<sup>1</sup> *Kurvadrūpatva*: Seeds sown in the ground sprout, but those in the granary do not. So one may suppose that the former have some peculiar power, viz. the kinetic activity. The successive transmission of impressions from one momentary body to another may be assumed to be due to a similar power in each preceding body. This is refuted.

<sup>2</sup> Such as soil and water.

<sup>3</sup> On p. 69. last paragraph.

<sup>4</sup> When we perceive the soul, we do not perceive any object connected with it.

<sup>5</sup> Who is one.



liberation would be impossible. Even the Vedic passages that teach the oneness of the individual souls with God merely eulogise them by this mention of their oneness with Him—showing thereby that they only belong to Him. They also say that a man must strive for realisation just by thinking of himself as identical with God. Hence does the Śruti say, 'All (these) souls are fixed (in the Self)' (*Bṛ.-Ār. Up. II. v. 15*).

It is also not a fact that the identity takes place on the cessation of ignorance in the state of liberation; for difference, being eternal, cannot be destroyed. Supposing it was destroyed, there would still certainly remain two individual entities (God and the soul). It cannot be urged that the duality also would vanish. For according to you Brahman is without any attributes, and as such, although Truth does not abide in It, It *is* Truth. Similarly, although there is no duality<sup>1</sup> (in the state of liberation), it is quite easy to say that God and the soul constitute the two individual entities. If you say that the truth that is in Brahman, being the negation of untruth, is identical with its substratum,<sup>2</sup> we reply, why not say that duality also, being the negation of unity, is identical with the two individual entities?<sup>3</sup> For although each (of two things) is a single entity, yet everybody admits that the two *together* are

<sup>1</sup> Duality (*dvaita*) according to the Vaiśeṣika is generated by the notion of addition (*apekṣā-buddhi*), and as all notions are absent in the state of liberation, the duality in question cannot remain.

<sup>2</sup> Brahman.

<sup>3</sup> Which are the substratum of the negation of unity.

not one, just as we say that earth and water *together* do not possess smell. As for the Vedic passages that teach oneness in the state of liberation, they only speak of similarity (of the soul with Brāhman) on account of (its) being free from pain etc. as when a priest has accumulated great wealth, we say that he has become a prince. Hence it is that the Śrutis say, 'Being free from taint, (the soul) attains absolute sameness (with Brahman)' (*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. i. 3).

God also is not Knowledge and Bliss, but the substratum of knowledge etc. In texts such as, 'Brahman is eternal, Consciousness and Bliss' (*Br. Up.* III. ix. 28), the word 'consciousness' only means the substratum of consciousness; for we have to take account of texts such as, 'He who is omniscient and all-knowing'<sup>1</sup> (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. ii. 9, II. ii. 7). The word *ānandam* (bliss) also means 'possessed of bliss'; for it has the suffix *ac*, denoting possession, coming as it does under the group beginning with the word *arśas*.<sup>2</sup> Otherwise it would be masculine (*ānandaḥ*.) Even the absence of pain can be figuratively spoken of as bliss<sup>3</sup>; for in the absence of pain one feels pleasure, just as one says, 'I feel happy,' when a load etc. have been taken away from him. Or let there be bliss in God, but He is not bliss; for the Śruti says, 'Not bliss.'

Objection: Why not take it in the sense of 'one who has no bliss'?

<sup>1</sup> Knows things in a general way as also particularly.

<sup>2</sup> Pāṇini V. ii. 127. Hence it is neuter.

<sup>3</sup> The logicians do not admit the existence of bliss in God.

Reply: No; for the assumption would be far-fetched,<sup>1</sup> and it would clash with the context as well as with the use of the suffix *ac*, denoting possession. This is our view in brief.

This<sup>2</sup> also refutes the following (Sāṃkhya) view: Nature (*Prakṛti*) is the agent, and the soul (*Puruṣa*) is unattached like the lotus leaf, but sentient. Since cause and effect are identical, with the destruction of the effect the cause, as being another form of that, may also be destroyed; hence the soul is not considered to be a cause. Since the feeling of sentiency noticeable in the intellect (*buddhi*) cannot otherwise be explained, the existence of the soul is assumed. The intellect is a modification of Nature; it is also called cosmic intelligence (*mahat*) and the internal organ (*antaḥ-karāṇa*). Through the existence or non-existence of that the soul attains transmigration or liberation. It is its modification, through the channel of the organs, as knowledge that is its connection with a jar etc. The feeling of agency in the soul and that of sentiency in the intellect are due to a non-comprehension of their difference.<sup>3</sup> In the judgment, 'This should be done by me,' the 'me' is the relation of the soul, (produced by) the image of the sentient soul owing to the transparency of the intellect. It is unreal, like the relation of the face to a mirror. 'This' is the relation of the object; it is a

<sup>1</sup> Because the compound known as *Nañ-tatpuruṣa* gives a more direct meaning than *Bahuvrīhi*, which by implication refers to something other than what is denoted by its component words.

<sup>2</sup> The conclusion that the soul is possessed of knowledge.

<sup>3</sup> The difference between the soul and the intellect.



a modification of the intellect through the channel of the organs, and is real, like the film (of mist) on a mirror on which somebody has breathed. 'Should be done' represents the relation of activity. Thus the intellect has three parts. The unreal relation of the soul to knowledge, which is a modification of the intellect, corresponding to the relation of the face to the mist on the mirror, is called experience. Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit and demerit also belong, like knowledge, to the intellect; for they are perceived as co-existing in the same substratum with effort. And the intellect is not sentient ; for it is subject to change.

The reason is that like effort, merit and demerit, and pleasure and pain,<sup>1</sup> sentiency also is perceived to abide in the same substratum, and there is no evidence that there is any other sentient principle besides the agent (soul). If you say that the judgement, 'I who am sentient am doing,' is an illusion in respect of the portion relating to sentiency, why don't you admit the same in respect of the portion relating to effort also? Otherwise,<sup>2</sup> if the intellect be eternal, there will be no liberation, and if it be transitory, there will be no transmigration prior to its appearance.

Objection: Since the intellect is the effect of insentient Nature, it is insentient; for cause and effect are identical.

<sup>1</sup> All these things co-exist. A person feels that he does an act, acquires merit or demerit thereby, and is happy or miserable in consequence. Similarly he also feels that he is sentient.

<sup>2</sup> If the agent and the sentient principle be different.

Reply: No, for this<sup>1</sup> is unfounded.<sup>2</sup> Since there is no evidence to show that an agent is produced,<sup>3</sup> and since those who are free from attachment are not observed to have any birth,<sup>4</sup> the agent must be without a beginning.<sup>5</sup> And since a positive entity that has no beginning cannot be destroyed, it is eternal. So why assume the existence of Nature and the rest? Nor can it be urged that it clashes with the text, 'Actions are always being done by the *guṇas*<sup>6</sup> of *Prakṛti*.<sup>7</sup> He whose mind is bewildered by egotism thinks that he is the agent' (*Gītā*, III. 27). For the passage means: By the *guṇas* or qualities of *Prakṛti* or the unseen result (*adr̥ṣṭa*), that is, by desire etc. which are produced by the unseen result';

<sup>1</sup> The sentiency of the intellect.

<sup>2</sup> That is to say, because the intellect is not an effect of Nature.

<sup>3</sup> One may argue: The intellect is produced, since it is an agent. This is refuted as above.

<sup>4</sup> The reference is to Gautama's *Nyāya-Sūtras* III, i. 24. The meaning of the clause is: Since those alone who have attachment are observed to be born.

<sup>5</sup> A new-born child shows a tendency to suck, which indicates that it has attachment. Attachment is due to the knowledge that something is conducive to what is desirable. And since this knowledge is impossible in the present birth, a previous birth is inferred. That again, by a parity of reasoning, implies a still earlier birth, and so on. Hence is concluded that the agent is without a beginning.

<sup>6</sup> Lit. attributes. In *Sāṃkhya*, the three constituents of Nature — *sattva* (purity or balance), *rajas* (activity) and *tamas* (dullness or inertia).

<sup>7</sup> According to *Sāṃkhya*, the insentient yet independent Nature.

and 'I alone am the agent.'<sup>1</sup> The Lord Himself has expressed the above purport later on by saying, 'Such being the case, he who in this matter (of actions) sees the self alone<sup>2</sup> as the agent' (*Gītā*, XVIII. 16), etc.<sup>3</sup> This is our view in a nutshell.

## HOW THE SOUL IS APPREHENDED:

### VARIETIES OF KNOWLEDGE

धर्माधर्माश्रयोऽध्यक्षो विशेषगुणयोगतः ॥ ४९ ॥

49 (contd.). (The soul is) the substratum of merit and demerit. It is perceived on account of its possessing special qualities.

*The substratum of merit and demerit:* The word 'soul' is to be supplied. (It is the substratum), because if the body be the substratum of these, then the results of actions done by a particular body cannot be experienced by another body. *On account of its possessing special qualities:* The perception of the soul is possible through the relation (inherence) of knowledge, pleasure, etc. which are perceptible special qualities (of a substance), and in no other way; for we only have such perceptions as, 'I know,' 'I do.'

प्रवृत्त्याद्यनुमेयोऽयं रथगत्येव सारथिः ।

अहंकारस्याश्रयोऽयं मनोमात्रस्य गोचरः ॥ ५० ॥

<sup>1</sup> The Naiyāyikas interpret 'Prakṛti,' in these texts, as unseen merit and demerit. Cf. the concluding stanza of *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* of Udayana, Ch. I.

<sup>2</sup> *Kevala:* Śaṅkara and other Vedāntic commentators interpret this word as 'unattached.'

<sup>3</sup> The concluding part of the stanza is: 'Owing to immature intellect—that foolish man does not see it properly.'



50. It is to be inferred from its voluntary movements etc. as a charioteer is from the motion of a chariot. It is the substratum of egoism, and is known only through the mind.

*It is to be inferred, etc.*—The existence of this soul in another's body and the like is inferred from its voluntary movements etc. *Pravṛtti* (inclination) here means voluntary movement (*ceṣṭā*). Since it has in a way been already stated that knowledge, desire, effort (*prayatna*), etc., do not abide in the body, and since voluntary movement is the outcome of effort, the soul, which is possessed of effort, is inferred from its voluntary movements. This is the idea. An illustration is being given on this point: *As a charioteer etc.* That is to say, although the motion of a chariot is not voluntary movement, yet the presence of a charioteer is inferred from it; similarly the soul of another is inferred from actions of the nature of voluntary movement. *Substratum of egoism*: Egoism is the feeling of 'I'. Its substratum or object is the soul, not the body etc. *Known, etc.*—Not an object of perception by any organ other than the mind, but the object of mental perception; for not having colour etc. it is incapable of being perceived by any other organ.

विभुर्वृद्धादिगुणवान्, बुद्धिस्तु द्विविधा मता ।

अनुभूतिः स्मृतिश्च स्यात् ; अनुभूतिश्चतुर्विधा ॥ ५१ ॥

51. It is all-pervading and possesses knowledge and other qualities. Knowledge has two forms—experience and recollection. Experience has four forms.

*All-pervading:* All-pervadingness is superlative vastness, which, although mentioned before,<sup>1</sup> is restated for clarification. *Knowledge, etc.*—The fourteen qualities, viz. knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, etc. already<sup>2</sup> mentioned, are meant. Incidentally, certain varieties of knowledge are being pointed out here itself. *Knowledge has, etc.* The twofoldness is being explained: *Experience, etc.*

<sup>1</sup> In verse 26.

In verses 32-33.

## PERCEPTION

प्रत्यक्षमप्यनुमितिस्तथोपमितिशब्दजे ।

घ्राणजादिप्रभेदेन प्रत्यक्षं षड्विधं मतम् ॥ ५२ ॥

52. Perception, inference, comparison and that due to the (spoken) word. Perception is considered to be of six kinds according as it is due to the nose etc.

*Perception, etc.* The instruments of these four (kinds of knowledge) are to be understood as the four mentioned in the aphorism, 'Perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony are the means.'<sup>1</sup> Perception is knowledge produced by the organs. Although all knowledge whatsoever is produced by the organ called mind, yet the aphorism means that perception is that knowledge to which the organs *as* organs are the instruments. God's perception<sup>2</sup> does not come within the purview of the definition; for so it has been stated in the aphorism, 'Perception is that knowledge which is produced by the connection between organs and objects and is infallible. It is indescribable as well as definite.'<sup>3</sup> Or perception is that knowledge, of which knowledge is not the instrument. Since inference is based on the knowledge of invariable concomitance, comparison on the knowledge of similarity, verbal comprehension on the knowledge of

<sup>1</sup> Gautama's *Nyāya-Sūtras* I. i. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Which is eternal, not produced.

<sup>3</sup> *Nyāya-Sūtras* I. i. 4.



words, and recollection on experience, the definition is not too wide so as to include them. This definition covers God's perception as well. Inference is that knowledge which is produced by consideration (*parā-marśa*).<sup>1</sup> Although the perception<sup>2</sup> etc.<sup>3</sup> of consideration are also based on consideration, yet inference should be taken as that knowledge only which is based on consideration, but of which a reason (*hetu*) is not the object. It cannot be urged that the definition does not include that form of inference in which an occasional reason<sup>4</sup> occurs; for by inference is meant the possession of that generic attribute<sup>5</sup> concomitant with experiencehood which is present in the knowledge above referred to.<sup>6</sup> Or inference is knowledge based on the knowledge of invariable concomitance (of the reason with the thing to be inferred). Similarly comparison is knowledge based on that of similarity; and verbal comprehension is knowledge based on that of words. Strictly speaking, we can take up any particular inference and say that being an inference consists in the possession of that

<sup>1</sup> Or synthetic judgement: the knowledge that a concomitant (*vyāptya*) of the thing to be inferred (*sādhya*) is present in the subject of the inference (*pakṣa*: that in which the presence of something is to be inferred). It will be dealt with in verse 68.

<sup>2</sup> As in apperception (*anuvyavasāya*).

<sup>3</sup> Refers to recollection.

<sup>4</sup> In the inference, 'The smoky hill has fire, because it has light,' smoke, which is often a reason for inferring fire, is not known as a reason, but as the determinant of the subjecthood. So the inference is excluded.

<sup>5</sup> Viz. the state of being an inference.

<sup>6</sup> That is, knowledge which is based on consideration, but of which a reason is not the object.

generic attribute which abides in that particular inference, but not in perception. Similarly, taking up any particular perception and so forth, we can say that being a perception or the like consists in the possession of that generic attribute which abides in that particular perception, or whatever it is, but not in inference.

Perception that is produced is being divided: *It is due, etc.* Perception has six forms, viz. that due to the nose, the tongue, the eye, the skin, the ear and the mind. It is not a deficiency that God's perception is not divided here; for in accordance with the above-mentioned aphorism, only perception that is produced is to be described.

### THE SIX INSTRUMENTS OF PERCEPTION AND THEIR OBJECTS

ब्राणस्य गोचरो गन्धो गन्धत्वादिरपि स्मृतः ।

तथा रसो रसज्ञायाः, तथा शब्दोऽपि च श्रुतेः ॥ ५३ ॥

53. The object of the nose is smell, as also smellhood etc. Similarly the object of the tongue is taste (etc.); likewise that of the ear is sound (etc.).

*The object, etc.*—'Object' (*gocara*) means what is cognised. *Smellhood, etc.*—The word 'etc.' denotes fragrancehood etc.<sup>1</sup> Since smell is perceptible, the generic attribute abiding in it is also perceptible. But it must be understood that the nose has not the capacity of perceiving the substratum of smell.<sup>2</sup> *Similarly, etc.*—

<sup>1</sup> Refers to stenchhood.

<sup>2</sup> Objects possessing it.

That is, together with tastehood etc. *Likewise, etc.*—  
Sound together with soundhood etc. Smell and taste  
must be understood as manifested.

उद्भूतरूपं नयनस्य गोचरो

द्रव्याणि तद्वन्ति पृथक्त्वसंख्ये ।

विभागसंयोगपरापरत्व-

स्नेहद्रवत्वं परिमाणयुक्तम् ॥ ५४ ॥

54. The objects of the eye are manifested colour, substances possessing it, separateness, number, disjunction, conjunction, distance, nearness, oiliness, liquidity, together with dimension;

क्रिया जातियोग्यवृत्तिः समवायश्च तादृशः ।

गृह्णाति चक्षुः संबन्धादालोकोद्भूतरूपयोः ॥ ५५ ॥

55. Actions and generic attributes that abide in visible things, as also such inherence. The eye perceives (objects) through the relation of light and manifested colour.

*Manifested colour*: Summer heat etc. are not visible, since they do not possess manifested colour. *Possessing it*—i.e. possessing manifested colour. *That abide, etc.*—It is to be understood that separateness etc. must also abide in visible individuals (in order to be visible).<sup>1</sup> *Such*, i.e. abiding in visible individuals.

But how do they at all come to be perceived by the eye? This is being explained: *The eye perceives, etc.* Manifested colour and the conjunction of light are the

<sup>1</sup> That is, this clause is to be connected with all the items from separateness downwards.



causes of ocular perception. It is to be noted that in the ocular perception of a substance, the above two are causes by the relation of inherence; in the perception of colour or the like abiding in a substance, by the relation of inherence in their substratum; in the perception of colourhood or the like which inheres in what<sup>1</sup> is inherent in a substance, by the relation of inherence in what in its turn inheres in their substratum.

उद्भूतस्पर्शवद्द्रव्यं गोचरः सोऽपि च त्वचः ।  
 रूपान्यच्चक्षुषो योग्यं ; रूपमत्रापि कारणम् ॥ ५६ ॥  
 द्रव्याध्यक्षे ; त्वचो योगो मनसा ज्ञानकारणम् ।  
 मनोग्राह्यं सुखं दुःखमिच्छा द्वेषो मतिः कृतिः ॥ ५७ ॥

56-57. The objects of the skin are substances possessing manifested touch as also the latter—in fact, whatever is perceptible to the eye, except colour (etc.). Colour is a cause even in this (tactual) perception of substances. The contact of the skin (*tvac*) with the mind is the cause of knowledge. The objects cognised by the mind are pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, knowledge and effort.

*The objects, etc.*—The objects of the skin are substances having manifested touch, as also the latter, i.e. manifested touch together with touchhood etc. Whatever, etc.—Whatever is perceptible to the eye, except colour and colourhood etc. is also perceptible to the skin. In other words, visible qualities like separateness and number which have been mentioned above,<sup>2</sup> as also actions and

<sup>1</sup> That is, colour etc.

<sup>2</sup> In verse 54.

generic attributes that abide in visible things, are likewise perceptible to the skin. *Colour is a cause even in this perception of substances* due to the skin. Thus, in the perception of substances through the external organs colour is a cause.

The new school, however, holds that colour is not a cause in all perceptions of substances through the external organs, since there is no such evidence; but by the method<sup>1</sup> of agreement (*anvaya*) and difference (*vyatireka*), in ocular perceptions colour is a cause, in tactual perception touch (and so on).

Objection: What is the cause in all perceptions through the external organs?

Reply: Nothing in particular. Or the possession of special<sup>2</sup> qualities that are absent<sup>3</sup> in the soul, except sound,<sup>4</sup> may be the cause.

Objection: If colour is considered to be the cause, it will be simpler.

Reply: Not so; for then air cannot be perceived by the skin.

Object: This is a proposition we accept.

Reply: In that case, for the sake of simplicity let manifested touch be the cause. And if this should render reflected light (*prabhā*) invisible, why don't you

<sup>1</sup> Or the method of affirmation and negation, in which the presence or absence of something determines the presence or absence, respectively, of another thing.

<sup>2</sup> This word is added to exclude the perception of time etc. through the external organs.

<sup>3</sup> This clause is for excluding such a perception of the soul.

<sup>4</sup> This is to exclude such a perception of ether.

take it also a welcome objection? Therefore, since the judgment, 'I touch air', is possible, like the judgment, 'I see reflected light', the perception of air also is undoubtedly possible. Neither colour nor touch is a cause in all perceptions of substances through the external organs. The unity of air as also of reflected light is indeed perceptible. Sometimes duality etc.<sup>1</sup> also. Sometimes, however, their number, dimension, etc. are not perceived on account of some defect.<sup>2</sup>

*The contact, etc.*—That is to say, the conjunction of the skin<sup>3</sup> and mind is the cause of knowledge in general. What is the proof of it? Because when the mind, during deep sleep, leaves the skin and rests in the pericardium (*puritat*),<sup>4</sup> it produces no knowledge.

Objection: But what kind of knowledge can there be during deep sleep? Is it experience or recollection? It cannot be the former; for there are not the conditions<sup>5</sup> of experience. To explain: Since in ocular and other perceptions the conjunction of the mind and the eye etc. is the cause, owing to their very absence there cannot be ocular or any other perception. Again, just because knowledge etc. are absent, there cannot be any mental perception, and in the absence of knowledge there cannot be any perception of the soul either. Similarly, because the knowledge of the invariable con-

<sup>1</sup> Refers to dimension.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. the failure to distinguish two individuals of the same class, such as two jets of air.

<sup>3</sup> This, as the organ of touch, is considered to be a modification of air and pervades the whole body.

<sup>4</sup> Which is supposed to be beyond the reach of air. Hence there is not the organ of touch.

<sup>5</sup> The totality of causes.



comitance (of the reason with the thing to be inferred) is absent, there cannot be any inference; because of the absence of a notion of similarity there cannot be any comparison; and owing to the absence of a knowledge of words there cannot be any verbal comprehension. Thus, because of the absence of the conditions of experience, there cannot be any experience. Nor can it be recollection, for there is no stimulating agent.<sup>1</sup>

Reply: Not so; for individual desire etc. produced immediately before deep sleep can be perceived, and through them the soul also, since there is nothing to prove that the knowledge in question is beyond the senses, or that just before deep sleep only indeterminate knowledge arises invariably. If, however, the conjunction of the skin and mind be considered to be the cause of all knowledge, then during palatal, ocular, or any other perception there would be tactual perception of a substance, since there is the conjunction of the object and skin, as also that of the skin and mind; or owing to their obstructing one another there would be no perception at all. Regarding this some maintain that since by the above reasoning the conjunction of the skin and mind is proved to be the cause of knowledge, it is inferred, on the evidence of experience, that the conditions of ocular or any other perception obstruct tactual and other perceptions. Others, however, say

<sup>1</sup> Recollection is possible only if the impression (*saṁskāra*) is stimulated; and as there is no knowledge of similarity etc. the impression cannot be roused from the subconscious region. For a list of the stimuli that rouse a subconscious memory-impression into a recollection, the reader is referred to *Nyāya-Sūtra* III. ii. 41.

that in deference<sup>1</sup> to deep sleep the conjunction of the derm (*carman*) and mind is inferred to be the cause of knowledge, and that since during ocular or any other perception there is no conjunction of the skin and mind, there is no tactual perception.<sup>2</sup>

*The objects cognised by the mind:* Objects of perception through the mind (alone). *Mati* means knowledge, *kyti* effort. Similarly pleasurehood, painhood, etc. are also objects of the mind. Likewise the soul is also an object cognised by the mind, but it is not mentioned here, as it has already been stated in the passage, 'Is known only through the mind' (verse 50).

ज्ञानं यन्निर्विकल्पाख्यं तदतीन्द्रियमिष्यते ।

महत्त्वं षड्विधे हेतुः, इन्द्रियं करणं मतम् ॥ ५८ ॥

58. The knowledge that is called indeterminate is considered to be beyond the senses. Medium dimension is a cause of the six kinds (of perception). The organs are considered to be the instruments.

*The knowledge, etc.*—Immediately after the conjunction of the eye etc. it is impossible to have a knowledge like, 'It is a jar,' about something qualified<sup>3</sup> by jarhood etc. because the knowledge of the qualification 'jarhood' etc. is absent before it;<sup>4</sup> and with regard to a qualified knowledge the knowledge of the qualification is a cause. So at first there arises a knowledge

<sup>1</sup> To account for the absence of knowledge in deep sleep.

<sup>2</sup> Although there is the conjunction of the derm and mind.

<sup>3</sup> Specified, marked or distinguished.

<sup>4</sup> Conjunction of the eye and the jar etc.

which does not comprehend the relation between a jar and jarhood. That is indeterminate knowledge. And it is not perceptible.<sup>1</sup> To be explicit: The perception of knowledge is never without a comprehension of the relation (between the object and its qualification); for (regarding it) we have the experience, 'I know the jar.' Here knowledge is presented in the soul as a feature (*prakāra*), as is the jar in respect of the knowledge, and jarhood in respect of the jar. The feature itself is designated as a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*). That which specifies a qualification<sup>2</sup> is called the determinant (*avacchedaka*) of the qualificationhood. The knowledge<sup>3</sup> which is cognisant of this determinant of the qualificationhood as a feature is the cause of the knowledge that a qualified thing is related (to another). In indeterminate knowledge jarhood etc. are not cognised as features; hence it is not possible for the relation of a jar or the like, which is qualified by jarhood etc. to be cognised in knowledge. Nor can there be qualified knowledge of a jar or the like, in which jarhood etc. are not (cognised as) features; for it is the rule that the knowledge of all categories other than the generic attribute<sup>4</sup> and the unanalysable characteristic (*akhaṇḍopādhi*) must have some attribute as its features.

<sup>1</sup> To the mind.

<sup>2</sup> As jarhood does a jar.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. the knowledge of a jar which is possessed of jarhood.

<sup>4</sup> A generic attribute is perceived by itself; for if it were perceived through some other attribute abiding in it, it would lead to a *regressus ad infinitum*. So with the unanalysable characteristic, e.g. etherhood.



# MODES OF PERCEPTION IN DIFFERENT CASES

*Medium dimension, etc.*—In the perception of substances medium dimension is a cause by the relation of inherence. In the perception of qualities, actions and the generic attributes, which inhere in substances, it is a cause by the relation of their inherence in its substratum. In the perception of qualityhood, actionhood, etc. which inhere in what is inherent in substances, by the relation of their inherence in what in its turn inheres in its substratum.<sup>1</sup>

*The organs, etc.*—Here also the words 'of the six kinds' are understood.<sup>2</sup> Organhood is not a generic attribute because it would make a cross-division<sup>3</sup> with earthhood etc.; but it is being the substratum of that conjunction of the mind which is the cause of knowledge, without being the substratum of any manifested special quality<sup>4</sup> other than sound. The last portion—'without being' etc.—is inserted in order to exclude the soul<sup>5</sup> etc. Since the manifested special quality sound is present in the ear, the epithet 'other than sound' is added (to include it). Special qualities like colour are also present in the eye etc.; hence the word 'manifested.' Manifestedness is not a generic attribute,

<sup>1</sup> And so on. See commentary on verse 55.

<sup>2</sup> That is to say, the organs are the instruments of the six kinds of perception.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. footnote 4 to the commentary on verse 8.

<sup>4</sup> Such as pleasure.

<sup>5</sup> The soul is the substratum of pleasure etc. So it is excluded from the scope of the definition by the words 'without being' etc. The 'etc.' refers to dērm (see last part of the commentary on verse 57).

since it would make a cross-division with white-colourhood etc. It cannot be urged that manifestedness is indeed various, being the concomitant of white-colourhood and so on; for then as manifested colour etc. it cannot be the cause of ocular and other perceptions.<sup>1</sup> But the non-manifestedness that is the concomitant of white-colourhood and so on is indeed various,<sup>2</sup> and manifestedness is the aggregate of the negations of that,<sup>3</sup> and it is also present in conjunction etc. According to this definition, manifested qualities like conjunction are also present in the eye etc.; hence the epithet 'special.' The first portion of the sentence ('Being the substratum,' etc.) is for excluding time etc.<sup>4</sup> Since according to the old school the conjunction of the parts of organs with the objects is also a cause of perception, the word 'mind' is put to exclude the parts<sup>5</sup> of organs; and since according to the new school the conjunction of the eye is a cause of the perception of the non-existence of colour in time etc. because it produces connection, the word 'mind'

<sup>1</sup> If the manifestedness that is the concomitant of white-colourhood be the determinant of the causality of ocular perception, then it cannot apply to the manifestedness that is the concomitant of blue-colourhood, for instance. If, on the other hand, the aggregate of the different forms of manifestedness which are the concomitants of white-colourhood, black-colourhood, etc. be the cause, then, since such an aggregate cannot exist anywhere, it can never be the determinant of the causality in question.

<sup>2</sup> Because white-colourhood, blue-colourhood, etc. have each a non-manifestedness as its concomitant attribute.

<sup>3</sup> As such, it can be presented as a common characteristic and serve as the determinant of the causality.

<sup>4</sup> Refers to space, for instance.

<sup>5</sup> Otherwise they too would be organs.

is put also to exclude time etc. which are the substratum of this conjunction. The clause, 'which is the cause of knowledge,' is also for excluding time etc. *The instruments:* An instrument is an extraordinary cause. The extraordinariness lies in its having an operation (*vyāpāra*).

विषयेन्द्रियसंबन्धो व्यापारः, सोऽपि षड्विधः ।

द्रव्यग्रहस्तु संयोगात् ; संयुक्तसमवायतः ॥ ५९ ॥

द्रव्येषु समवेतानां ; तथा तत्समवायतः ।

तत्रापि समवेतानां ; शब्दस्य समवायतः ॥ ६० ॥

59-60. The operation is the connection between the organ and the object. It is of six kinds. The perception of substances arises from conjunction (of the organ and object); that of things inherent in substances from inherence in what is conjoined (with the organ); that of things inherent in those from inherence in what in its turn inheres in things conjoined (with the organ); that of sound from inherence (in the hollow of the ear).

तद्गृत्तीनां समवेतसमवायेन तु ग्रहः ।

प्रत्यक्षं समवायस्य विशेषणतश्च भवेत् ॥ ६१ ॥

61. The perception of things that abide in sound arises from inherence in what in its turn inheres (in the ear). The perception of inherence is due to the relation of attributiveness (*viśeṣanā*).



विशेषणतया तद्वदभावानां ग्रहो भवेत् ।

यदि स्यादुपलभ्येतेत्येवं यत्र प्रसज्यते ॥ ६२ ॥

62. Similarly the perception of non-existence in its various forms is also due to the relation of attributiveness. It occurs where one would urge, 'If it were, it would be perceived.'

*The operation, etc.*—'Operation' here means connection (*sannikarṣa*).<sup>1</sup> The six kinds of connection are being pointed out through examples: *The perception of substances, etc.* The perception of substances is due to the conjunction of the organ (with them); the perception of things<sup>2</sup> inherent in substances is due to the inherence in what<sup>3</sup> is conjoined with the organ. Similarly with the rest. Strictly speaking, the cause of the ocular perception of substances is a conjunction of the eye; the cause of the ocular perception of things inherent in substances is inherence in what is conjoined with the eye; the cause of the ocular perception of things<sup>4</sup> inherent in what<sup>5</sup> inheres in substances, is inherence in what in its turn inheres in things conjoined with the eye. Similarly in other cases also there exists a purely individual causal

<sup>1</sup> *Vyāpāra* (translated here as 'operation') is defined as that which is the effect of something, but helps to produce the thing that is caused by that something. Obviously, therefore, it is transitory, and as such it cannot apply to the perception of sound; for this takes place by the relation of inherence, which is eternal. Hence the word, though used in the *Kārikā* for metrical exigencies, is explained differently, as connection. So also in verses 63 and 65.

<sup>2</sup> Viz. qualities, actions, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Viz. substances.

<sup>4</sup> Viz. qualityhood, actionhood, etc.

<sup>5</sup> Viz. qualities, actions, etc.

relation. But why is the blue-colourhood of the blue colour that is in an atom of earth as well as the earthhood of an atom of earth not visible, although there also the relation of manifested colour and of medium dimension exists indirectly? To be explicit: The generic attribute blue-colourhood that is in blue colour is but one, and exists in the blue colour of a jar as well as in that of an atom. Hence the relation of medium dimension exists (in blue-colourhood) through the medium of the blue colour of a jar, while the relation of manifested colour exists (in the atom) only through the medium of both (atom and jar). Similarly the relation of medium dimension is to be understood to exist in earthhood (of an atom of earth) through the medium of a jar etc. Likewise existence in air and in its touch etc. should be visible. Therefore we must say that the cause of the ocular perception of things inhering in substances is inherence in what has that conjunction of the eye which is co-existent with manifested colour and medium dimension; and the cause of the ocular perception of things inherent in what inheres in substances is inherence in what<sup>1</sup> in its turn inheres in things<sup>2</sup> having such a conjunction of the eye. Thus the blue-colourhood etc. of the blue and other colours of an atom are not perceived, because the conjunction of the eye with an atom is not co-existent with medium dimension. Similarly there is no ocular perception of existence etc. in air and the like, because there the conjunction of the eye is not co-existent with colour. Likewise, where a jar has the conjunction of light at its back, but the

<sup>1</sup> That is, colour.

<sup>2</sup> That is, substances.

conjunction of the eye is at its front, there is no perception of the jar; hence the conjunction of the eye must be qualified by the epithet 'co-existent with the conjunction of light.'

Similarly the cause of the tactual perception of substances is the conjunction of the skin; that of the tactual perception of what is inherent in substances is inherence in what is conjoined with the skin; the cause of the tactual perception of things inhering in what in its turn inheres in substances, is inherence in what again inheres in things conjoined with the skin. Here also, as before, the qualifying epithet 'co-existent with medium dimension and manifested touch' is understood. Similarly the cause of the perception of smell is inherence in what is conjoined with the nose; and that of the nasal perception of things inhering in smell is inherence in what in its turn inheres in things conjoined with the nose. Likewise the cause of the perception of taste is inherence in what is conjoined with the tongue; that of the palatal perception of things inhering in taste is inherence in what in its turn inheres in things conjoined with the tongue. The cause of the perception of sound is inherence (in the ether) circumscribed by the ear; that of the auricular perception of what inheres in sound is inherence in what in its turn inheres in (the ether) circumscribed by the ear. Here in every case the perception is to be understood as normal (or relative.) Supernormal perception, which will be dealt with (in the next verse), takes place even without the conjunction of the organ, etc. Similarly the cause of the perception of the soul is the conjunction of the mind; that of the mental perception of



what<sup>1</sup> inheres in the soul is inherence in what is conjoined with the mind; the cause of the mental perception of things<sup>2</sup> inhering in what is inherent in the soul, is inherence in what in its turn inheres in things conjoined with the mind.

The cause of the perception of non-existence as well as of inherence is the attributiveness (*viśeṣanā*)<sup>3</sup> of what is related to the organ. According to the Vaiśeṣika system, however, inherence is not perceptible.<sup>4</sup> Here, although attributiveness is of different kinds—e.g. the non-existence of a jar etc. in the ground and the like is perceived as the attributiveness of what is conjoined (with the eye); the non-existence of colour etc. in number and so forth, as the attributiveness of things inhering in what<sup>5</sup> is conjoined. (with the eye); that of sound, as simply the attributiveness of (the ether) circumscribed by the ear; that of B-hood in A<sup>6</sup> and the like, as the attributiveness of what inheres in (the ether) circumscribed by the ear; similarly the non-existence of C-hood etc. in the non-existence specified by A-hood and so on, as the attributiveness of what in its turn is the attributiveness of (the ether) circumscribed by the ear; likewise the non-existence of a

<sup>1</sup> Viz. knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Viz. knowledgehood, pleasurehood, etc.

<sup>3</sup> For example, when we perceive the non-existence of a jar on the ground, as expressed in the sentence, 'The ground has the non-existence of a jar,' the ground is connected with the eye, and the non-existence abides in the ground as on attributive.

<sup>4</sup> Because the perception of the relation depends on the simultaneous perception of all the individual substratums—past, present and future—of that relation, which is impossible.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. a number of jars.

<sup>6</sup> A, B, etc. are to be taken as articulate sounds.

cloth etc. in that of a jar and the like, as the attributiveness of things that are the attributiveness of what is conjoined with the eye; and so with the rest— yet as attributiveness it is to be regarded as one. Otherwise the tradition of the old school that relation is of six kinds, would be contradicted.

*If it were, it would be perceived:* The cause of this perception of non-existence is a non-perception that is possessed of capacity. For instance, when we have the (wrong) notion that a jar is on the ground, and so on, the non-existence of the jar and so forth cannot be perceived. Therefore the cause of the perception of non-existence is the non-perception of its counterpositive.<sup>1</sup> In this,<sup>2</sup> capacity is also a necessary condition. It is that (sort of non-perception) whose counterpositive has to be assumed on the assumption of the existence of the counterpositive of the non-existence. It means: That (kind of non-perception) whose counterpositive, viz. perception, has to be assumed if we assume the existence of the counterpositive, viz. a jar etc. is the cause of the perception of non-existence. To explain: Where the conjunction of light and other conditions exist, we can assume that if there had been a jar, it would have been perceived; here the non-existence of the jar etc. is perceived. But in darkness the above assumption cannot be made; hence there is no ocular perception of the non-existence of the jar etc. in darkness. Tactual perception, however, can indeed take place; for even without the conjunction of light, tactual perception can

<sup>1</sup> That whose non-existence or absence is being perceived, e.g. a jar.

<sup>2</sup> Non-perception of the counterpositive (the jar).

be assumed. Things like weight are incapable of being perceived; so their non-existence also is not perceptible, because there the perception of weight and the like is impossible to assume. The non-existence of manifested colour in air, of perfume in stone, of bitter taste in molasses, of coldness in fire, of sound in the ear, of pleasure in the soul, and so on, is perceived through the respective organs, since it is possible to assume those perceptions. In the perception of the non-existence of relationship<sup>1</sup> the counterpositive must be perceptible; in the perception of mutual non-existence the substratum must be perceptible. Hence the difference from ghouls etc. that exists in a pillar and so forth is also indeed perceived by the eye.

### SUPERNORMAL PERCEPTION

अलौकिकस्तु व्यापारस्त्रिविधः परिकीर्तितः ।

सामान्यलक्षणो ज्ञानलक्षणो योगजस्तथा ॥ ६३ ॥

63. Supernormal operation (connection) is said to be of three kinds: That based on a common feature, that based on knowledge and that due to *yoga* (concentration).

Thus perception is of two kinds according as it is normal or supernormal. Of these, the six kinds of connection pertaining to normal perception have been described; now supernormal connection is being dealt with: *Supernormal operation, etc.* 'Operation' (*Vyāpāra*) here means connection.<sup>2</sup> *Based on a common feature*—lit.

<sup>1</sup> See verse 12.

<sup>2</sup> Between the organ and the object.



of which a common feature is a characteristic. Now if the word 'characteristic' is used in the sense of identity, then we get the meaning: a connection (*pratyāsatti*) identical with the common feature itself. And that common feature should be understood as a feature (*prakāra*) in the knowledge relating to the substantive which is connected with the organ. For instance, where smoke or the like is connected with the organ, and the knowledge that it is smoke has arisen, with smoke as its substantive, in that knowledge smokehood is a feature. And through that smokehood as the connection, there arises the knowledge 'cases of smoke' comprising all smoke. Here if we simply say that (the common feature is) a feature in what is connected with the organ, then after one has mistaken a mass of dust as smoke, one cannot have a knowledge of all smoke, since there is no connection of the organ with smokehood. According to my view, however, it is the mass of dust that is connected with the organ, and there is the knowledge that it is smoke, which has the dust as its substantive; smokehood which is a feature in that knowledge is the connection. The connection with the organ must be taken as normal (*laukika*).<sup>1</sup> This<sup>2</sup> is with regard to external organs. Regarding mental (supernormal) perception, however, the common feature which is a feature in the knowledge is the connection.

<sup>1</sup> Otherwise there will be a series of sensuous cognitions of all cases of smoke on the basis of smokehood previously cognised. For the same reason the connection must also be actual.

<sup>2</sup> That is, the common feature being a feature in the knowledge relating to the object which is connected with the organ.

आसत्तिराश्रयाणां तु सामान्यज्ञानमिष्यते ।  
तदिन्द्रियजतद्धर्मबोधसामग्र्येक्ष्यते ॥ ६४ ॥

64. The *Knowledge* of the common feature is considered to be the connection (in the supernormal perception) of the substratums. The sum total of causes of the perception of that common feature by the corresponding organ is to be present as the necessary condition (of supernormal perception through the common feature).

It should be borne in mind that *sāmānya* literally means a feature of things that are similar. This is sometimes eternal, as for instance smokehood, and sometimes transitory, as a jar etc. Where a jar has been known to be on the ground through conjunction, or in its two halves through inherence, and just after that there arises the knowledge of all grounds or all halves having that jar, there we must understand the latter.<sup>1</sup> But the common feature is the connection (in the supernormal perception) of the substratums through that particular relation<sup>2</sup> by which it is known. Thus where, after the jar has been destroyed, one recollects the substratum having that jar, there would be no knowledge of all such substratums of the jar through the connection based on a common feature, because the common feature (the jar) is absent at the time. Further, where one has got the knowledge 'a jar', the object of which is connected with the organ,

<sup>1</sup> That the known transitory common feature is the connection.

<sup>2</sup> In the case of the jar standing on the ground, it is conjunction, and in the case of smokehood, it is inherence.

why does not such knowledge arise on the next day, when, although there is no connection with the organ, there is the common feature (jarhood) which is a feature (*prakāra*) in such knowledge? Therefore it is the knowledge of the common feature which is the connection, and not the common feature itself. This is being stated: *The knowledge, etc. Āsatti* is the same as *pratyāsatti* (connection). So in the word *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, *lakṣaṇa* means an object (of knowledge). Hence we get the meaning: The knowledge of the common feature is the connection.

It may be urged that where,<sup>1</sup> even without the conjunction of the eye etc. there is the knowledge of the common feature, there might be ocular or any other perception of all jars and so forth. To preclude this the text says: *The sum total, etc.* It means: When we want to have perception through an external organ by means of (the connection of) a common feature, there must be present the sum total of causes of the perception of that common feature by the corresponding organ, in some object possessing that feature. The sum total in question is the conjunction of the eye, that of light, and so on. Hence there is no such perception by the eye etc. in darkness, for instance.

विषयी यस्य तस्यैव व्यापारो ज्ञानलक्षणः ।

योगजो द्विविधः प्रोक्तो युक्तयुञ्जानभेदतः ॥ ६५ ॥

65. The connection based on knowledge is with regard to that alone which is the object of cognition. (Supernormal connection) due to *yoga* (concentration) is stated to be of two kinds according to the division (of *yogins*) into

<sup>1</sup> As in inference etc.



those who have attained concentration and those who are striving for it.

It may be urged that if the connection based on knowledge be a form of knowledge, and that based on a common feature be also a form of knowledge, then there would be no distinction between the two. Hence the text says: *The connection, etc.* The connection based on a common feature produces the knowledge of its substratum, whereas that based on knowledge is the connection of the thing itself that we know. The idea is this: In perception, knowledge is not possible without connection.<sup>1</sup> So how can there be knowledge of all smoke as smoke and of all fire as fire, without the help of the connection based on a common feature? For this purpose the connection based on a common feature is admitted. It cannot be urged: What harm is there if all fire and all smoke are not perceived? For since the relation of fire to the smoke that is being perceived is already known, and no other smoke is known (at the time), the doubt whether smoke is the concomitant of fire or not is inexplicable. According to my view, however, since all smoke is (supernormally) known by the connection based on a common feature, there can be a doubt whether smoke relating to some other time or place is the concomitant of fire. It cannot be urged that if the connection based on a common feature be admitted, all objects of knowledge as such objects would be known, and therefore one would be omniscient; for even if all objects of knowledge as such be known, they would not be known in detail, and hence one would not be omniscient. Besides, if the connection based on know-

<sup>1</sup> Between the organ and the object.

ledge is not admitted, how can there be the knowledge of fragrance when one has the (ocular) perception, 'The sandalwood is fragrant.'<sup>1</sup> Although there may be the knowledge of fragrance through the connection based on a common feature, yet the knowledge of fragrancehood arises through the connection based on knowledge. Thus, where a mass of dust is known as smoke, the knowledge of the mass of dust (as smoke) in apperception arises through the connection based on knowledge.

(*Supernormal connection*) due to *yoga*, etc.—That is to say, a particular virtue arising from the practice of *yoga*, of which the Vedas, the Purāṇas, etc. speak. According to, etc.—Since the *yogins* belong to two classes according as they have attained concentration or are striving for it, the resulting virtue also is of two kinds. This is the idea.

युक्तस्य सर्वदा भानं, चिन्तासहकृतोऽपरः ।

66. A *yogin* who has attained concentration always has knowledge (of everything). while the other type is aided by meditation.

A *yogin*, etc.—The *yogin* who has attained concentration can always, through his mind supported by the virtue arising from concentration, have knowledge of everything (in the universe) including ether, atoms, etc. One of the second class, however, needs the help of particular meditations.

<sup>1</sup> A man who already knows that sandalwood is fragrant, perceives immediately on seeing a piece of it that it is fragrant. Here his previous knowledge is the connection that enables him to do so. But since the eye is not connected with the fragrance, he perceives it only by the connection based on knowledge. This is also the case with all illusions.

## INFERENCE

व्यापारस्तु परामर्शः, करणं व्याप्तिधीर्भवेत् ॥ ६६ ॥  
 अनुमायां ; ज्ञायमानं लिङ्गं तु करणं नहि ।  
 अनागतादिलिङ्गेन न स्यादनुमितिस्तदा ॥ ६७ ॥

66 (contd.)-67. In inference consideration is the operation, and the knowledge of invariable concomitance is the instrument. The sign (reason) that is being known is not the instrument; for then there would be no inference from a sign that is yet to be and so on.

Inference is being explained: *In inference, etc. In inference the knowledge of invariable concomitance is the instrument. Consideration is the operation.* To explain: A man who has noticed in a kitchen etc. that smoke is a concomitant (*vyāpya*) of fire, happens to see afterwards, on a hill or the like, a trail of smoke connected with the surface. Then he recalls the invariable concomitance that smoke is a concomitant of fire. Next he has the knowledge that the hill is possessed of smoke which is a concomitant of fire. This is what is called consideration (*parāmarśa*). After this there arises the inference that the hill has fire. Here the old school says that the sign (*liṅga*) actually being known<sup>1</sup> as a concomitant is the instrument (of inference). This is being criticised:

<sup>1</sup> That is, it must be present at the time of inference.



*The sign, etc.* The reason why the sign is not to be taken as the instrument of inference is being stated: *For then, etc.* If the sign be the instrument of inference, then from a sign that is yet to come or has been destroyed, there would be no inference; for the sign, which is the instrument of inference, is then absent.

### CONSIDERATION

व्याप्यस्य पक्षवृत्तित्वधीः परामर्श उच्यते ।

68. The knowledge that the concomitant (*vyāpya*) exists in the subject (*pakṣa*) is called consideration (*parāmarśa*).

*The knowledge, etc.*—The knowledge that apprehends the relation of what is possessed of concomitance to the subject is the cause of inference. It is either the knowledge that the concomitant is in the subject, or the knowledge that the subject has the concomitant. The inference from the former knowledge takes the form that the thing to be inferred is in the subject, and that from the latter knowledge has the form that the subject has the thing to be inferred. Others say that from both kinds of consideration the inference takes the form that the subject has the concomitant.

Objection (by the Mīmāṃsaka) : Where even without the knowledge that the hill has smoke which is a concomitant of fire, there is the perception that the hill has smoke, and then there is the recollection that smoke is a concomitant of fire, there we notice that inference takes place from two distinct judgments. Hence the knowledge that apprehends the relation of

what<sup>1</sup> is possessed of the invariable concomitance<sup>2</sup> is not always the cause of inference, but the cause must necessarily be the knowledge of (the reason) being an attribute of (i.e. abiding in) the subject<sup>3</sup>—a knowledge in which the determinant<sup>4</sup> of the concomitancehood (*vyāpyatāvachchedaka*) is a feature (*prakāra*);<sup>5</sup> so the assumption of a qualified notion here is cumbrous.

Reply: Not so; for even in the absence of any knowledge<sup>6</sup> of the determinant of the concomitancehood, inference takes place from the knowledge that the subject has a concomitant<sup>7</sup> of fire; hence, and also for the sake of simplicity, the cause should be the knowledge that the concomitant is an attribute of (abides in) the subject—a knowledge in which the invariable concomitance is a feature. Further, inference would take place from the knowledge that the hill has smoke; for there also is the knowledge that the reason is an attribute of the subject—a knowledge in which the determinant of the concomitancehood, viz. smokehood, is a feature. It cannot be urged that the cause

<sup>1</sup> E.g. smoke.

<sup>2</sup> Of fire.

<sup>3</sup> The hill.

<sup>4</sup> Smokehood.

<sup>5</sup> In simpler language, the cause must be the knowledge that the reason (smoke), exclusively in its character as a concomitant, is present in the subject. It should be noted that the 'feature' of knowledge always has reference to the qualifying attribute of the object of that knowledge.

<sup>6</sup> As when one has a doubt as to whether a thing is light or smoke.

<sup>7</sup> Which is not specifically mentioned, the proposition taking the form, 'The hill has fire, because it has a concomitant of fire.'

should be the knowledge that the reason is an attribute of the subject—a knowledge in which the determinant of the concomitance, actually being perceived, is a feature; for then inference would take place if Caitra was aware of the invariable concomitance, and Maitra had the knowledge that the reason was present in the subject. If it be urged that the knowledge on the part of a particular person that the reason is an attribute of the subject—a knowledge in which the determinant of the concomitance, actually being perceived as such by him, is the cause of the inference made by him, then there will be an endless number<sup>1</sup> of causes and effects. In my explanation, however, the knowledge that the reason is an attribute of the subject—a knowledge which arises by the relation of inherence, and in which the invariable concomitance is a feature, causes the inference by the relation of inherence; hence there are not an endless number of causes and effects. But if (as you say) the knowledge in which the invariable concomitance is a feature, and the knowledge that the reason is an attribute of the subject, be independent causes, then there would be two pairs of causes and effects; and inference might take place from the knowledge that smoke is a concomitant of fire, and the hill has light. Thus, even where there are two judgments, we must assume that they constitute a qualified notion; for an explanation, though cumbrous, is allowable when it leads to a result.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Because there are an infinite number of persons to make the inference, and the inference as well as its cause, the consideration, will be different each time.

<sup>2</sup> Viz. the apprehension of the causal relation.



## INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE

व्याप्तिः साध्यवदन्यस्मिन्नसंबन्ध उदाहृतः ॥ ६८ ॥

68. (contd.). Invariable concomitance is described as the absence of relation (of the reason) to anything other than what has the thing to be inferred.

A concomitant is the substratum (*āśraya*) of invariable concomitance. Now it may be asked, what is invariable concomitance? This is being answered: *Invariable concomitance, etc.* In a proposition like, '(The hill) has fire, because it has smoke,' fire is the thing to be inferred : a kitchen etc. are objects having the thing to be inferred; a lake etc. are objects other than those; and smoke is absent in them. Hence the definition is applicable.

In a (fallacious) proposition like, '(The hill) has smoke, because it has fire,' fire is *present* in objects other than what has the thing to be inferred, viz. in a heated lump of iron etc. Hence the definition is not too wide so as to include these. Here objects that have the thing to be inferred should be understood to have it through the same relation that the thing to be inferred bears (to the subject). Otherwise, the parts of fire are possessed of fire by the relation of inherence; a kitchen etc. are things other than those parts; and since smoke is present there, the definition would be too narrow to apply to this case. The expression 'things other than what has the thing to be inferred' should be understood to mean 'things possessed of difference,<sup>1</sup> or

<sup>1</sup> That is, a broad distinction of the form, 'It has not the thing to be inferred (*sādhyaṅ na*).'

mutual non-existence, the counterpositiveness<sup>1</sup> of which is characterised<sup>2</sup> by the possession of just the thing to be inferred.<sup>3</sup> Hence, although smoke may be present in a hill, for instance, which is other than any particular object having fire, such as the kitchen, there is no harm.<sup>4</sup> The absence of the reason in objects other than those having the thing to be inferred is to be understood in respect of the relation that the reason bears (to the subject). Hence, although smoke is present by the relation of inherence in its parts, which are objects other than those having the thing to be inferred, there is no harm.<sup>5</sup> The absence (of the reason) in objects other than those having the thing to be inferred means a non-existence, the counter-positiveness of which is characterised simply by the state of being a presence in objects other than those having the thing to be inferred.<sup>6</sup> Hence in the (fallacious) inference, 'It has smoke, because it has fire,' although (fire) is not present in a lake etc. which are objects other than those having the thing to be inferred, the definition is not too wide so as to include

<sup>1</sup> An attribute of the counterpositive, viz. what has the thing to be inferred (*sādhya*).

<sup>2</sup> Having the thing to be inferred as such, neither more nor less. Otherwise the definition would be futile.

<sup>3</sup> That is, the definition is saved from being one that is nowhere applicable.

<sup>4</sup> Because smoke is not present there by the relation of conjunction.

<sup>5</sup> As before, a general non-existence of the form, 'It is not presence in objects other than those having the thing to be inferred,' is meant.

this.<sup>1</sup> Here, although with regard to a proposition like, 'It is a substance, because it has existence<sup>2</sup> possessed of difference from that of qualities and actions,' there is not absence (of the reason<sup>3</sup>) in objects other than those<sup>4</sup> having the thing<sup>5</sup> to be inferred, viz. qualities etc.<sup>6</sup> because qualified existence and pure existence are one, yet<sup>7</sup> the definition means that there is absence (of the reason there) in respect of the determinant of the of the reasonhood. In other words, the determinant of the reasonhood is not the determinant of the presence<sup>8</sup> as aforesaid.

अथवा हेतुमन्निष्ठविरहाप्रतियोगिना ।

साध्येन हेतोरैकाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरुच्यते ॥ ६९ ॥

<sup>1</sup> Apparently the definition applies here too, but it does not. The absence of fire in this case is not in objects in general, but in particular objects such as a lake. Although fire is absent in these, it is present in a red-hot iron ball, for instance, which is without smoke. Hence the invariable concomitance is vitiated.

<sup>2</sup> Existence abides in substances, qualities and actions. So existence qualified as above abides in substances alone. The inference, therefore, is valid, and the definition ought to apply there, which it does not seem to. Hence it is too narrow. This is the objection.

<sup>3</sup> Existence qualified as above.

<sup>4</sup> That is, substances.

<sup>5</sup> Substancehood.

<sup>6</sup> Since existence abides in qualities and actions (as well as in substances).

<sup>7</sup> Although existence abides in them as existence, yet as qualification plus existence it does not. Hence the definition is all right.

<sup>8</sup> That is, presence in objects other than those having the thing to be inferred.



69. Or the co-existence of the reason with the thing to be inferred which must not be the counterpositive of any non-existence that may abide in things having the reason, is called invariable concomitance.

It may be urged: When the thing to be inferred is exclusively affirmative (universally present), e.g. knowability, there are no such things as objects other than those having the thing to be inferred. Hence the definition fails to apply there. Moreover, in propositions like, 'It has existence, because it has a generic attribute,' the reason is never known to exist in objects other than those having the thing to be inferred, viz. a generic attribute etc., by the relation that determines the reasonhood, viz. inherence; hence the definition falls short of application. Therefore the text says: *Or the co-existence, etc. The co-existence* (lit. the state of having the same substratum) *of the reason with the thing to be inferred which<sup>1</sup> must not be the counter-positive of any non-existence* (lit.

<sup>1</sup>That is, which must be inclusive (*vyāpaka*) of the reason. If the thing to be inferred includes the reason, no substratum of the latter will be without the former. This definition removes the two defects mentioned above. To illustrate: In the proposition, 'It is namable, because it is knowable,' the reason, viz. knowability, is co-existent with the thing to be inferred, viz. namability—since anything, e.g. a jar, is both namable and knowable—and namability includes knowability, since it is not absent in anything that has knowability. Again, in the proposition, 'It has existence, because it has a generic attribute,' the thing to be inferred, existence, is not absent in anything that has the reason, a generic attribute, i.e. in substances, qualities and actions. Hence the thing to be inferred is not the counterpositive of the reason, i.e. it is inclusive of the reason.

absence) *that may abide in things having the reason*, that is, of any non-existence that may be in the substratum of the reason, *is called invariable concomitance*. Here, although in a proposition like, '(The hill or the like) has fire, because it has smoke,' particular fires and so on (belonging to other places) are the counterpositive of the non-existence abiding in the substratum of the reason, e.g. the hill, and hence the definition is too narrow<sup>1</sup>—it cannot be urged that the invariable concomitance must be of (particular) smoke and fire having the same substratum, since even such (co-existent) fire and so on, taken in combination with something else,<sup>2</sup> is non-existent (in that substratum), as we have the notion that although one is there, both are not present—and in a proposition like,<sup>3</sup> 'It has quality, because it has

At the same time a generic attribute is present in everything that possess existence by the relation of inherence, such as substances. Hence they are co-existent.

<sup>1</sup> In the example cited, all fire as fire is the thing to be inferred, and all smoke as smoke is the reason. Hence, if the thing to be inferred be the kitchen fire, it is not present in the hill, which is the substratum of the reason, and therefore *is* the counterpositive (not, as it should be, the reverse of it) of any non-existence that may be in the hill. Similarly, if the reason be the kitchen smoke, its substratum, viz. the kitchen, has no hill fire, which therefore *is* the counterpositive (not the reverse) of any non-existence that may be in the kitchen. So all fire being the counterpositive of the non-existence that is in the substratum of the reason, it lacks inclusiveness. Hence the definition, which is based on that is inapplicable. This is the contention of the opponent.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. a jar.

<sup>3</sup> That is, where the things to be inferred are many, but the reason is one. In the above example, if the substratum of the reason (substancehood) be a jar, there is absence in it of the qualities of a

substancehood,' the definition fails of application, yet it should be stated that invariable concomitance is the co-existence of the reason with the thing to be inferred, as specified by that determinant of being the thing to be inferred (*sādhya-tāvaccchedaka*) which is not the determinant of the counterpositiveness (of the non-existence abiding in the substratum of the reason).<sup>1</sup>

Objection: In a proposition like, 'It has what is possessed of generic attributes concomitant with colourhood, because it has earthhood,' the determinants of being the thing to be inferred are generic attributes concomitant with colourhood, and these generic attributes, e.g. white-colourhood, are the determinants of the counterpositiveness of the non-existence abiding

cloth, which, therefore, are the counterpositive of the non-existence abiding in the substratum of the reason. Similarly with regard to the qualities of a jar, if the substratum of the reason be a cloth. Thus every quality may be shown to be the counterpositive of the non-existence abiding in the substratum of the reason. Yet qualities are co-existent with substancehood, which is the reason.

<sup>1</sup> Thus in the proposition, 'It has fire, because it has smoke,' although there may be the absence of fire as the kitchen fire in a hill, it is not absent there as fire. Hence firehood is not the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the non-existence abiding in the substratum of the reason. Similarly, in a proposition like, 'It has quality, because it has substancehood,' there is not the absence of quality as quality in the substratum of the reason, but there is the absence of it as a particular quality, such as the colour of a jar. The determinant of the counterpositiveness of that non-existence, viz. being the colour of a jar etc. is not qualityhood, which is the determinant of being the thing to be inferred. So the definition is intact.



in a blue jar etc. Hence the definition would fail to apply there.

Reply: Not so. For there it is being a generic attribute concomitant with colourhood that is indirectly the determinant of being the thing to be inferred; and non-existence specified by such qualification is nowhere present in earth. Otherwise it would give rise to the notion that there is no object having generic attributes concomitant with colourhood.<sup>1</sup> Or, as some say, since invariable concomitance varies when the things to be inferred and so on<sup>2</sup> are different, in such a case the definition can be made to fit in by taking it to mean that the determinant of the determinancy of being things to be inferred must not be the determinant of the determinancy of the counterpositiveness (of the non-existence abiding in the substratum of the reason).<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> If the substratum of the reason be, say, a blue jar, then, since it has no whiteness, the determinant of being the thing to be inferred is the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the non-existence abiding in the substratum of the reason. Similarly every determinant of being the thing to be inferred may be shown to be the determinant of that counterpositiveness. Hence the definition is too narrow.

<sup>2</sup> Refers to the reason, the subject, etc.

<sup>3</sup> The trouble arose owing to there being many determinants of being the thing to be inferred. This can be remedied by showing that there is only one such determinant. In the instance cited, the state of being generic attributes concomitant with colourhood abides in the thing to be inferred, viz. what possesses generic attributes concomitant with colourhood (i.e. blue and all other colours), by the relation of being the substratum (blue and all other colours) of its own substratum (generic attributes concomitant with colourhood). Hence it is the only determinant of being the thing to be inferred.

The substratum of the reason should be taken to mean the substratum of what is possessed of the determinant of the reasonhood. Hence in a proposition like, 'It is a substance, because it has existence possessed of defference from that of qualities and actions,' although substancehood is a counterpositive of the non-existence abiding in the substratum of pure existence, viz. qualities etc. the definition is not too narrow to include this case.<sup>1</sup> Similarly the substratum of the reason should be understood in respect of the relation which is the determinant of the reasonhood. Hence, although fire is the counterpositive of the non-existence abiding in the substratum of smoke in respect of the relation of inherence, viz. in its parts, the definition is not too narrow.<sup>2</sup>

The non-existence also should be understood as not being co-existent with its counterpositive. So in the proposition, 'It has the conjunction of a monkey,

The above view has been referred to by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra in his *Siddhānta-Lakṣaṇa*. According to Raghunātha Śīromaṇi, however, when there are many determinants of being the thing to be inferred, any one of them can be treated as such by an indirect relation.

<sup>1</sup> Because the substratum of which qualified existence is substance alone, and there is no absence of substancehood in it.

<sup>2</sup> In a proposition like, 'The hill has fire, because it has smoke,' the substratum of the reason by the relation of inherence is the parts of smoke. These have no fire, and hence the definition might be too narrow. But the substratum of the reason should be taken in the relation of the determinant of the reasonhood, i.e. conjunction. Hence, instead of the parts of smoke, we must take the hill, and there is no absence of fire in it. So the definition is intact.

because it is this tree,' although the conjunction of a monkey is the counterpositive of that non-existence of the conjunction of a monkey, which is in that particular tree within the limits of its root, the definition is not too narrow.<sup>1</sup> It may be urged that if the want of co-existence means presence in something which is not the substratum of the counterpositive, then the definition is, as before, too narrow, because the same non-existence which is present in qualities etc. which are not the substratum of its counterpositive, viz. the conjunction of a monkey, is also present in the tree within the limits of its root<sup>2</sup>; if, on the other hand, it means absence in the substratum of the counterpositive, then with regard to a (fallacious) proposition like, 'It has conjunction, because it has existence,' the definition is too wide, because the non-existence of conjunction in the substratum of existence, viz. qualities etc. also abides in the substratum of the counterpositive,

<sup>1</sup> As it would be unless we take that non-existence which is not co-existent with its counterpositive. Since the non-existence of the conjunction of a monkey and its counterpositive are both present in the same tree, that non-existence is co-existent with its counterpositive. But if instead of this we take some other non-existence, e.g. the non-existence of a jar, then the conjunction of a monkey is not its counterpositive. Hence the definition is saved from being too narrow.

<sup>2</sup> In this alternative, the non-existence of the conjunction of a monkey is not co-existent with its counterpositive. Hence the thing to be inferred being the counterpositive of that non-existence which is not co-existent with its counterpositive and at the same time abide in the substratum of the reason, the definition is too narrow. The idea underlying the objection is that non-existence does not become different by virtue of the difference of the substratums.



viz. substances.<sup>1</sup> This is wrong; because the real meaning is that a non-existence qualified by presence in something that is not the substratum of its counterpositive, abides in the substratum of the reason.<sup>2</sup> To put it in brief,

<sup>1</sup> So this non-existence is to be discarded. Yet there is no other non-existence of which the thing to be inferred, viz. conjunction, is the counterpositive. Hence, the thing to be inferred not being the counterpositive of any non-existence that is not co-existent with its counterpositive and at the same time abides in the substratum of the reason, the definition wrongly extends there also.

<sup>2</sup> That is to say, the expression 'non-existence that is not co-existent with its counterpositive and at the same time abides in the substratum of the reason' should mean 'a non-existence that is *qualified* by being present in what is not the substratum of its counterpositive and at the same time abides in the substratum of the reason.' Thus understood, the definition is no longer too narrow with regard to the proposition, 'It has the conjunction of a monkey, because it is this tree.' Because non-existence that is so qualified, e.g. that non-existence of the conjunction of a monkey which is qualified by being present in qualities, does not abide in this particular tree; for what is *qualified* by being present in something, is not admitted as being present elsewhere. Hence the above non-existence is not co-existent with its counterpositive.

Nor can the definition wrongly extend to the proposition, 'It has conjunction, because it has existence.' Because by 'things that are not the substratum of the counterpositive of the non-existence of conjunction' we may take qualities etc. (conjunction, being a quality, cannot abide in qualities), and this non-existence of conjunction as qualified by being present in them abides in qualities, which are also the substratum of the reason. Therefore the thing to be inferred, viz. conjunction, is the counterpositive of the non-existence abiding in the substratum of the reason. At the same time, that non-existence of conjunction which abides in qualities is not present in substances, which are the substratum of conjunction; so this non-existence is not co-existent with its counterpositive too.

the non-existence must be present in a substratum of the reason that is not the substratum of its counterpositive.<sup>1</sup>

Not being the substratum of the counterpositive means not being the substratum of what is qualified by the determinant of the counterpositiveness (of the non-existence). Hence with regard to a proposition like, 'It has qualified<sup>2</sup> existence, because it has generic attributes,' although the non-existence of qualified existence is co-existent with its counterpositive<sup>3</sup> in the substratum of generic attributes, viz. qualities etc. the definition is intact (not too wide).<sup>4</sup> And not being the substratum of the counterpositive must be understood in respect of the relation which is the determinant of being the thing to be inferred. Hence in a (fallacious)

<sup>1</sup> In the proposition, 'It has conjunction, because it has existence,' the counterpositive of the non-existence of conjunction is conjunction. By 'things which are not the substratum of that and at the same time are the substratum of reason' we may take qualities. By non-existence that abides in them we may have the non-existence of conjunction, and conjunction is the counterpositive of that. Hence the definition is not too wide.

<sup>2</sup> That is, existence qualified by difference from that of qualities and actions.

<sup>3</sup> Like qualified existence, pure existence—which abides in qualities—is also the counterpositive of the non-existence in question, because at bottom they are identical.

<sup>4</sup> Because existence qualified by difference from that of qualities and actions does not abide in qualities. And since it is the counterpositive of the non-existence which is not the substratum of its counterpositive, viz. qualified existence, and at the same time abides in the substratum of the reason, the definition does not wrongly extend to it.

proposition like, '(The soul) has knowledge, because it has existence,' although the substratum of existence, viz. a jar or the like, by virtue of being an object, is also the substratum of knowledge, the definition is intact (not too wide).<sup>1</sup> Similarly in a proposition like, 'It has fire, because it has smoke,' although there is the absence of fire by the relation of inherence in the substratum of the smoke (e.g. a hill), the definition is intact (not too narrow).<sup>2</sup>

Objection: As regards not being the substratum, does it mean that of any one of the counterpositives that are qualified by the determinant of the counterpositiveness? Or that of such counterpositives in general? Or that of what is qualified by any determinant of the counterpositiveness? In the first alternative, in a proposition like, 'It has the conjunction of a monkey, because it is this tree,' the definition is, as before, too narrow; for as 'an object'<sup>3</sup> qualified by the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the non-existence of the conjunction of a monkey' we also get that conjunction of a monkey which is not present in the tree, and the tree is not its substratum. In the second alternative, there is no such thing as a non-existence that is not co-existent with its counterpositive; for every non-existence is co-existent with that counterpositive which is the negation of itself as possessed of presence in the

<sup>1</sup> Because, although knowledge abides in existence etc. by the relation of objecthood, it never does so by the relation of inherence, which is the relation determining the state of being the thing to be inferred.

<sup>2</sup> Because the relation determining the state of being the thing to be inferred is conjunction, and not inherence.

<sup>3</sup> Viz. the conjunction of a monkey.



preceding moment.<sup>1</sup> It cannot be urged that although in a proposition like, 'It has fire, because it has smoke,' the hill or the like is the substratum of that counterpositive of the non-existence of a jar etc. which is the negation of itself as possessed of presence in the preceding moment, yet in respect of the relation<sup>2</sup> determining the state of being the thing to be inferred, the hill or the like is certainly *not*<sup>3</sup> the substratum of the counterpositive in question; and therefore the statement that there is no such thing as a non-existence that is not co-existent with its counterpositive is futile. For that non-existence of fire which is in the non-existence of a jar is but identical<sup>4</sup> with the non-existence of a jar; hence fire also is a counterpositive of the non-existence of a jar, and a hill or the like is its substratum. In this manner a non-existence that is not co-existent with its counterpositive will always be wanting. If it be said that the non-existence of fire or the like in the non-existence of a jar etc. is a distinct entity, even then with regard to a proposition like, 'It has the non-existence of smoke, because it has the non-existence of fire,' the definition

<sup>1</sup> Just as a jar is the counterpositive of the non-existence of a jar, similarly the absence, at the immediately preceding moment, of that non-existence is also a counterpositive. Since this abides, at the next moment, in the substratum of the non-existence of a jar, the latter non-existence is co-existent with its counterpositive. Hence, in this alternative, the definition would nowhere be applicable.

<sup>2</sup> Conjunction.

<sup>3</sup> Because the other relation is selfsameness (*svatūpa*).

<sup>4</sup> For non-existence which has for its substratum another non-existence is considered to be the same as its substratum.

will be too narrow. For there the relation determining the state of being the thing to be inferred is selfsameness (*svarūpa*), and in respect of that relation the substratum of the reason is also the substratum of that counterpositive of every non-existence which is the negation of itself as possessed of presence in the preceding moment. In the third alternative, in a proposition like, 'It has the non-existence of the conjunction of a monkey because it is the soul,' the definition would be too narrow; for there the negation of that non-existence of the conjunction of a monkey which is<sup>1</sup> in the souls is the conjunction of a monkey, and this being a quality, the determinant of the counterpositiveness may also<sup>2</sup> be the state of being the absence of qualities in general, and the substratum of the reason, viz. the soul, is not the substratum of what is determined by that (determinant).

Reply: Not so; for the meaning (of the expression 'not a counterpositive') is that (the determinant of the state of being the thing to be inferred) is not the determinant of that kind of counterpositiveness, the

<sup>1</sup> Because the soul is omnipresent.

<sup>2</sup> One counterpositive is the absence of the conjunction of a monkey. But since the conjunction of a monkey is a quality, the absence of qualities in general may as well be another. So the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the negation of the absence of the conjunction of a monkey is the state of being the absence of qualities in general. Hence the negation of the absence of the conjunction of a monkey is not co-existent with its counterpositive. Its counterpositive is the absence of the conjunction of a monkey, which is the thing to be inferred. Hence the definition is too narrow.

objects qualified by the determinant of which are not present in the thing possessed of the reason.<sup>1</sup>

Objection: In the proposition, 'Time is possessed of a jar, because it has temporal dimension,' there is no such thing as a non-existence that is not co-existent with its counterpositive; for since the substratum of the reason, viz. infinite time, is the substratum of the universe, every non-existence abides in the substratum of its counterpositive by the same relation as that of the determinant of the state of being the thing to be inferred, viz. temporal qualification.

Reply: According to some, in this case the non-existence of a jar as qualified by difference from infinite time is not co-existent with its counterpositive; for although infinite time is the container of a jar, it is not the container of a jar possessed of difference from infinite time, because even in infinite time there is not the difference from itself. But, strictly speaking, we must understand that only when all counterpositiveness of that non-existence, which abides in that substratum of the reason which is not the substratum of the counter-

<sup>1</sup> In the third alternative, in trying to find a counterpositive of the non-existence abiding in the soul, first the counterpositiveness abiding in the absence of qualities was taken, and then the counterpositiveness abiding in the conjunction of a monkey. Hence the definition proved to be too narrow. But there, according to the new interpretation, the substratum of the reason, viz. the soul, is not the substratum of what is qualified by the determinant of a particular counterpositiveness, viz. that abiding in the absence of qualities. And the determinant of the state of being the thing to be inferred, viz. the state of being the absence of the conjunction of a monkey, is *not* the determinant of that counterpositiveness. Hence the definition is not too narrow.



positive of non-existence, by the relation determining the counterpositiveness, possesses the *twofold* non-existence of the state of being qualified by a particular attribute (determining the state of being the thing to be inferred) and the state of being qualified by a particular relation (determining the same), the object characterised by that attribute is inclusive (*vyāpaka*) of that reason in that particular relation.<sup>1</sup> Thus in a

<sup>1</sup> In a fallacy, the thing to be inferred, as qualified by the attribute and the relation determining its state as such, must be wanting in some substratum of the reason. So there the counterpositiveness of the non-existence abiding in the substratum of the reason must be qualified by both the attribute and the relation determining the state of being the thing to be inferred. Hence these two qualifications never being jointly absent, the definition is not too wide. But in a valid proposition, no substratum of the reason is wanting in the thing to be inferred possessing the above double qualification. Therefore the counterpositiveness of the non-existence abiding in the substratum of the reason ever lacks the above two qualifications.

In a fallacious proposition like, 'It has smoke, because it has fire,' the attribute determining the state of being the thing to be inferred (smoke) is smokehood, and the relation determining it is conjunction. Now a red-hot ball of iron has fire (which is the reason), but no smoke. That is, there is the non-existence of smoke in it, of which the counterpositive is smoke, and the relation determining the counterpositiveness is conjunction. In this counterpositiveness there are both smokehood and conjunction. Hence, there being no absence of the two together, the definition does not wrongly extend to it.

In a valid proposition like, 'It has fire, because it has smoke,' there being no absence of fire, through the relation of conjunction

proposition like, 'Time is possessed of a jar, because it has temporal dimension,' it is the non-existence of the jar through the relation of conjunction that is present in the substratum of the reason, viz. infinite time, which is not the substratum of the counterpositive of the non-existence of the jar through the relation of conjunction, viz. the jar; since the counterpositiveness of that possesses the twofold non-existence of the state of being determined by jarhood and the state of being determined by the temporal relation, the definition is not too narrow.

Objection: In a proposition like, 'It has the knowable fire, because it has smoke,' there is no such thing as being determined by the state of being knowable fire; for a cumbrous attribute cannot be the determinant.

Reply: Not so; for our notion, 'There is not the thing with a conch-like neck etc.' has for its object the counterpositiveness that is determined by the state of having a conch-like neck etc.—which shows that even a cumbrous attribute is sometimes admitted to be a determinant. This is the sum and substance of the matter.

in the substratum of the reason, e.g. a hill, all counterpositiveness of the non-existence abiding in the substratum of the reason lacks qualification by the attribute and the relation determining the state of being the thing to be inferred, viz. firehood and conjunction, respectively. Hence, there being the absence of the two taken together, the definition is applicable.

## SUBJECTHOOD

सिषाधयिषया शून्या सिद्धिर्यत्र न तिष्ठति ।

स पक्षः, तत्र वृत्तित्वज्ञानादनुमितिर्भवेत् ॥ ७० ॥

70. A subject (*pakṣa*) is that in which there is no certainty (of the thing to be inferred) bereft of the desire to infer (the same). Inference takes place from the knowledge of the existence (of the reason) in that.

With regard to 'existence in the subject,'<sup>1</sup> what is meant by subjecthood (*pakṣatā*)? This is being explained: *A subject, etc.* Subjecthood (the condition of being a subject) is the absence of certainty bereft of the desire to infer, and a subject is what possesses that; this is the meaning. Simply the desire to infer does not constitute subjecthood; for even without that desire one infers a cloud from its rumbling. Hence even a doubt about (the presence of) the thing to be inferred is not subjecthood; for even without this doubt it is inferred. Even if there is certainty (about the thing to be inferred), inference does take place if there is the desire to infer. Hence the qualification of certainty by an absence of the desire to infer. Thus, where there is no certainty, there is subjecthood, whether there is or is not the desire to infer. Where there is the desire to infer, there is subjecthood, whether certainty is there or not. Where there is certainty, but not the desire to infer, there is no subjecthood; for there we have certainty bereft of the desire to infer.

<sup>1</sup> Referred to in verse 68.



Objection: Where after consideration (*parāmarśa*) there comes certainty, and then the desire to infer, there will be no inference, since the consideration is gone<sup>1</sup> at the time of the desire to infer. Where certainty, consideration and the desire to infer come in order, there, certainty being gone at the time of the desire to infer, inference takes place owing simply to the absence of any obstacle. Where there are the desire to infer, certainty and consideration, there the very desire to infer is absent at the time of consideration. Similarly, in other cases also, there is not the desire to infer either at the time of certainty or at the time of consideration; for the perceptible special qualities of the omnipresent substances<sup>2</sup> cannot be simultaneously known. So why is the qualification of certainty by an absence of the desire to infer?

Reply: Not so. Where there is either the perception or the recollection, 'The hill which has smoke, a concomitant of fire, has fire,' and then there is the desire to infer, there the qualification in question is necessary to bring about the subjecthood. Here it should be understood that the subjecthood of an inference from a particular sign is that absence of certainty bereft of the desire to infer, which corresponds to such desire to infer and such certainty as may lead to an inference from that particular sign. Thus when there are certainty and consideration, inference does not take place even if there is the desire, 'Let there be

<sup>1</sup> Because it lasts only for two moments.

<sup>2</sup> Ether, space, time and the soul. For the special qualities of these see verses 32-34. Of them, impression, merit and demerit only are not perceptible.

some sort of knowledge.<sup>1</sup> But it does take place when there is the perception, 'The hill which has smoke, a concomitant of fire, has fire,' and along with it there is the desire, 'Let there be some other knowledge than perception.'<sup>2</sup> Similarly, when there is consideration regarding smoke, inference does not take place even if there is the desire, 'Let me infer fire through light.'<sup>3</sup> In a particular inference, that kind of certainty should be specifically mentioned as an obstacle, the presence of which during the absence of a desire to infer thwarts that inference. Hence, even if there is the knowledge, 'The hill has heat, the rocky thing has fire,' inference is not counteracted.<sup>4</sup> But since we see that even if there is certainty of the thing to be inferred being in a substratum<sup>5</sup> of the determinant of the subjecthood, inference takes place in subjects<sup>6</sup> qualified by that determinant, we must say that with regard to inference in subjects qualified by the determinant of the subjecthood, it is the certainty of the thing to be inferred in subjects qualified by the determinant of the subject-

<sup>1</sup> Because the desire necessary for the purpose is, 'Let there be knowledge of the presence of the thing to be inferred in the subject.'

<sup>2</sup> Perception is much easier than inference. Therefore in a competition between the two regarding an identical object, perception prevails when the conditions of it are present. Hence the qualification. The presence of the desire for inference together with consideration will lead to inference in spite of the conditions of perception being present.

<sup>3</sup> Because there is no consideration about light, and no desire about inferring through smoke.

<sup>4</sup> It would be if there were the certainty that the hill had fire.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. a particular hill.

<sup>6</sup> Subjects in general, e.g. all hills.

hood that is the obstacle. But with regard to inference, in a subject in which the thing to be inferred has the same substratum as the determinant of the subjecthood, it is simply the certainty<sup>1</sup> of the thing to be inferred that is the obstacle. One thing, however, should be borne in mind: Where, after a doubt as to whether this is a man or not, one has the knowledge that this has hands etc. which are concomitants of manhood, there, in the absence of a desire to infer, perception of manhood takes place, but not inference. Hence the presence of the conditions of perception regarding an identical object, bereft of the desire to infer, is independently<sup>2</sup> an obstacle, as is the desire to know about a lovely woman (in sight).<sup>3</sup> Similarly, since after consideration perception of a subject etc. does not take place unless there is the desire to perceive, the presence of the conditions of inference, bereft of the desire to perceive, is an obstacle to the perception of a different object.

## THE FALLACIES

अनैकान्तो विरुद्धश्चाप्यसिद्धः प्रतिपक्षितः ।

कालात्ययापदिष्टश्च हेत्वाभासास्तु पञ्चधा ॥ ७१ ॥

71. The fallacies are of five kinds, viz. inconstant, contradictory, unfounded, counter-balanced and incongruous.

<sup>1</sup> Of either of the two kinds described above.

<sup>2</sup> This signifies that though it is not an element of the subjecthood, it is an obstacle.

<sup>3</sup> An obstacle to any other knowledge.



In connection with dealing with the reason, the fallacies are being divided: *The fallacies, etc.* The definition of a fallacy is that it is that, having<sup>1</sup> which as its object a particular knowledge thwarts inference (or its cause). To explain: Since a particular knowledge thwarts inference by having inconstancy etc. as its object, these are defects. The expression 'that possessing which' means 'that kind of real entity,<sup>2</sup> possessing which.' Hence, although a mistaken notion of incongruity may thwart inference, the definition is not too wide. Since the notion, 'The hill has the absence of fire,' is unknown as a fact, there is no defect in the reason. It cannot be urged that at the time of the consideration, 'It has rockiness, which is a concomitant of the non-existence of fire,' the smoke, which is a concomitant of fire, is not a fallacy since in this case the subject having a concomitant of the absence of fire is unknown as a fact. For this is a thing we accept. Otherwise incongruity also would be a transitory defect.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, in the instance cited, at the time of the consideration, 'It has rockiness, which is a concomitant of the absence of fire,' the smoke, which is a concomitant of fire, is not fallacious. The inference is only obstructed owing to an error, but the reason is not defective. Similarly a reason being present where the thing to be inferred is absent, and so on,<sup>4</sup> is a

<sup>1</sup> That is, the knowledge of which thwarts inference.

<sup>2</sup> That is to say, not simply the object of the knowledge in question, but the object together with its qualification must be taken into account.

<sup>3</sup> When one has an erroneous notion of it.

<sup>4</sup> Refers to a subject being without the thing to be inferred.

defect; and the reason may have it by any relation whatsoever. This is the view of the new school.

Others, however, maintain that the fact of a reason being fallacious consists in its possessing that, having which as an object a particular knowledge thwarts inference. In the case of counterbalance, it is the opposing invariable concomitance, for example, which is a defect; and the reason has it by the relation of (being an object of the same) cognition.<sup>1</sup> It cannot be urged that since in a proposition like, 'It has fire, because it has smoke,' a mistaken notion of incongruity in the subject thwarts inference by having for its object the absence of the thing to be inferred, even a valid reason would be classed as incongruous, as it too has that (the absence of fire) by the relation of (being an object of the same) cognition. Because there<sup>2</sup> cognition is not considered to be the relation. In the case of counterbalance it is so considered, as is evident from the use of the term 'counterbalanced' (with regard to the reason). In the other case, it is never said that the reason is 'incongruous.'

The thwarting of inference (spoken of above) is the obstruction of either inference or its cause.<sup>3</sup> So the

<sup>1</sup> E.g. of the judge. The knowledge will be of the form, 'The reason is possessed of the opposing invariable concomitance.'

<sup>2</sup> In the case of error.

<sup>3</sup> Viz. consideration or the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Knowledge of inconstancy thwarts the knowledge of invariable concomitance, and the inference can be made with the help of some other reason. Hence inconstancy would be excluded from the list of fallacies. But as thwarting the cause of inference.

definition is not too narrow to include the inconstant reason. The knowledge of a defect with regard to a particular reason is an obstacle to the inference that is based on that reason. Hence, where one reason is known to be inconstant, inference takes place from some other reason, and as the knowledge of the inconstancy does not comprehend the absence of what is a feature<sup>1</sup> in the inference or in its cause, etc. it does not thwart inference (or its cause); nevertheless the definition is intact (not too narrow). This is the gist of it.

### VARIETIES OF FALLACY DEFINED ACCORDING TO THE NEW SCHOOL

आद्यः साधारणस्तु स्यात्, असाधारणकोऽपरः ।

तथैवानुपसंहारी, त्रिधाऽनैकान्तिको भवेत् ॥ ७२ ॥

72. The inconstant reason is of three kinds: The first is styled common, the second uncommon and the third inconclusive.

A fallacy is<sup>2</sup> any one of the total number of defects in a reason connected with a particular thing to be inferred or subject. The mention of five classes is simply in view of possible instances<sup>3</sup> of them.

it too becomes a fallacy. Some editions read *karāṇa* (instrument) instead of *kāraṇa* (cause). The 'instrument' is the knowledge of invariable concomitance.

<sup>1</sup> That is, a qualification of their object.

<sup>2</sup> Here an alternative definition of fallacy is given to include hypothetical cases of inference.

<sup>3</sup> Where all the five defects may occur, as in the proposition, 'The air has smell, because it has oiliness.'



*The inconstant, etc.*—Similarly, the fact of being an inconstant reason consists in its being one of the three varieties—common and so forth. The common reason is present also in objects other than those having the thing to be inferred, and it obstructs the knowledge of invariable concomitance. The uncommon reason is that which has not the same substratum as the thing to be inferred; it thwarts the knowledge that the reason has the same substratum as the thing to be inferred. Others,<sup>1</sup> however, say that the uncommon reason is that which does not abide in similar instances (*sapakṣa*), by which are meant objects indubitably having the thing to be inferred. Thus, when there is the certainty of the latter in the subject, as in the proposition, 'Sound is transitory, because it has soundhood,' the reason is not to be treated as uncommon; for it is indubitably present there. The inconclusive reason occurs where<sup>2</sup> the thing<sup>3</sup> to be inferred, for instance,<sup>4</sup> is not the counterpositive of absolute non-existence.<sup>5</sup> This stands in the way of the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance (*vyatireka-vyāpti*).

The contradictory reason<sup>6</sup> is one which<sup>7</sup> is the counterpositive of that non-existence which includes the thing to be inferred. It acts as an obstacle (to inference) by providing the conditions of the knowledge

<sup>1</sup> The old school.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. 'The jar is namable, because it is knowable.'

<sup>3</sup> Namability.

<sup>4</sup> That is, as well as the reason.

<sup>5</sup> That is, is nowhere absent.

<sup>6</sup> E.g. 'The hill has fire, because it has water.'

<sup>7</sup> That is, which is absent in every substratum of the thing to be inferred.

of the absence of the thing to be inferred (in the subject). In the case of a counterbalanced reason, the rival reason serves to establish the absence of the thing to be inferred, while here the reason is only one. This is the difference. Another point of difference is that it betrays a special incapacity in that what is calculated to establish the absence of the thing to be inferred is here put forward as that intended to establish the thing to be inferred.

The counterbalanced reason is where the subject has a concomitant of the non-existence of the thing to be inferred. Others say that it is the object of a notion,<sup>1</sup> not known to be invalid, that (the subject) has a concomitant of the non-existence of the thing to be inferred, at the time that one has a notion, not known to be invalid, that the subject in question has a concomitant of the thing to be inferred. Here obstruction to inference results from the knowledge that the subject of each proposition has a concomitant of the non-existence of the thing to be inferred, relating to the other proposition.

Regarding this some<sup>2</sup> say: As, in spite of the knowledge that the subject has a concomitant of the non-existence of a jar, one has the notion that the subject has the jar, when there is conjunction of the eye and the jar, and as in spite of the knowledge that a conch has conchhood, which is a concomitant of the non-existence of yellow-colourhood, one has the notion that the conch is yellow, if there is some defect such as

<sup>1</sup> Consideration is meant.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is to the author of the *Ratnakośa*.

an excess of bile, so in spite of the cognition<sup>1</sup> of concomitants of the two alternatives, there arises a doubt in the form of a (mental) perception of the two alternatives. Similarly, in the case of the counterbalanced reason, inference does take place in the form of a doubt. Where, however, there is the cognition of a concomitant of only one alternative, there, owing to its being of greater strength, the cognition of the second alternative is obstructed, and hence no doubt arises—the possession of greater or equal strength being assumed in the light of the result.

This is wrong. Since when there is the knowledge that a thing has a concomitant of the absence of some other thing, no particular spontaneous perception (*uṇānīta-bhāna*)<sup>2</sup> of the latter and no verbal comprehension or the like can take place, the former knowledge is considered to be an obstacle to all knowledge that is not produced by normal connection or particular defects, because this is simpler; not<sup>3</sup> that a different

<sup>1</sup> Certainty.

<sup>2</sup> Certainty about the non-existence of a thing cannot thwart its perception. But it can thwart that spontaneous knowledge of it which is due to the supernormal connection of the organ and object, as also the knowledge that is not due to some physical defect such as an excess of bile. As an instance of the former we may take the case of a lake with a cloud of dust on it, which from a distance is mistaken for smoke. One may under the circumstances have the notion that the lake has smoke. But if at that time one has the conviction that the lake has water which is a concomitant of the absence of smoke, one cannot have the other notion. The same is also true of knowledge that is not due to any physical defect.

<sup>3</sup> As the opponent says.



kind of obstruction has to be assumed for a particular spontaneous perception and for verbal comprehension, because it would be cumbrous. So there being an obstacle, how can inference take place (even in the case of a counterbalanced reason)? Unlike the perception that takes place when there is normal connection (between the organ and object), the inference, in the form of a doubt, that is supposed to take place in the case of a counterbalanced reason is not attested by proof; were it so, the qualifying phrase 'other than an inference' would also<sup>1</sup> be necessary.<sup>2</sup> Where there is the knowledge that (the subject) in both the alternatives has a concomitant (of the thing to be inferred), there doubt arises from the notion of both lacking validity, not otherwise; for the rival notion is an obstacle only when its invalidity has not been known.

The unfoundedness (*asiddhi*) of reason is being any one of the group beginning with unfoundedness of the substratum. Unfoundedness of the substratum is the absence of the determinant of the subjecthood in the subject. Where one is to infer, 'The hill made of gold has fire,' there, if one has the knowledge, 'The hill is not made of gold,' it results in the obstruction of consideration with regard to the hill made of gold. Unfoundedness of nature is the absence of what is considered to be a concomitant<sup>3</sup> (i.e. the reason) in the subject. There, as in a proposition like, 'The lake is a substance, because it has smoke,' if it is already known that the

<sup>1</sup> In addition to the qualifying phrase 'not produced by normal connection or particular defects,' mentioned above.

<sup>2</sup> To the description of the obstacle.

<sup>3</sup> Of the thing to be inferred.

reason which is considered to be a concomitant (of the thing to be inferred) is absent in the subject, it leads to the obstruction of consideration, viz. the knowledge that the subject has the reason which is a concomitant of the thing to be inferred. Unfoundedness of the thing to be inferred and the rest<sup>1</sup> are included in unfoundedness of concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*). Unfoundedness of the thing to be inferred is the absence of the determinant of the state of being the thing to be inferred (*sādhya-tāvacchedaka*) in the thing to be inferred. When this knowledge arises, it results, in a proposition like, '(The hill) has fire made of gold,' in the obstruction of consideration, viz. the knowledge that the subject has the concomitant of the thing<sup>2</sup> to be inferred that is possessed of the determinant of the state of being the thing to be inferred. Similarly unfoundedness of the reason is the absence of the determinant of the reasonhood in the reason, as in a proposition like, '(The hill has fire) because it has smoke made of gold.' Here the absence of a knowledge of the reason possessed<sup>3</sup> of the determinant of the reasonhood results in the absence of a knowledge of invariable concomitance, and the like,<sup>4</sup> due to that. Similarly some also maintain that in a proposition like, '(The hill) has fire, because it has blue smoke,' since blue-smokehood is cumbrous, it cannot be the determinant of the reasonhood, and therefore this is a case of unfoundedness of concomitance.

<sup>1</sup> Refers to unfoundedness of the reason.

<sup>2</sup> That is, of the thing to be inferred as such.

<sup>3</sup> That is, of the reason as the reason.

<sup>4</sup> Refers to (the absence of) consideration and inference.

Incongruity (*bādhā*) is the absence of the thing to be inferred in the subject, and so on.<sup>1</sup> It results in the obstruction of inference, because the certainty of the absence of something (the thing to be inferred) with regard to a particular entity)<sup>2</sup> (the subject) thwarts all knowledge<sup>3</sup> of that something relating to that entity, provided the knowledge is not produced by normal sense-contact or some particular defect. Regarding this some hold that the knowledge, which includes doubt, of the subject being related<sup>4</sup> to the thing to be inferred is the cause of inference, and incongruity and the counterbalanced reason are fallacies, because they thwart this knowledge. This is wrong; for then no inference would take place in cases<sup>5</sup> where the thing to be inferred is not known to exist outside the subject;

<sup>1</sup> Refers to the same idea expressed in another way.

<sup>2</sup> *Dharmin*. In the proposition, 'The ground holds a jar,' the ground is the *dharmin* or *viśeṣya* (substantive).

<sup>3</sup> If a person knows that the ground holds no jar, he cannot have the opposite notion, unless it is a case of perception involving sense-contact. Again if he knows that a conch is white, he cannot regard it as yellow, unless he is suffering from jaundice. 'Knowledge' includes doubt.

<sup>4</sup> The inference taking the form, 'The subject *has the conjunction* of the thing to be inferred,' and not, 'The subject *has the thing to be inferred*,' as is usual.

<sup>5</sup> Exclusively negative inference is meant. In the proposition, 'Earth is different from other things, because it is earth,' the thing to be inferred, viz. difference from other things, is not known to exist outside of earth, which is the subject, and there its presence is under dispute. Hence, there being no previous knowledge of the thing to be inferred abiding in the subject, inference, according to this view, would be impossible.



and it does take place even when there is no doubt regarding the thing to be inferred (being in the subject), and so on.<sup>1</sup> Similarly the judgement that the knowledge of the absence of the thing to be inferred (in the subject) is valid knowledge, is also not an obstacle (to inference)<sup>2</sup>; for it is unwarranted and cumbrous. Otherwise, even in the case of the counterbalanced reason etc.,<sup>3</sup> the knowledge of (the subject) having a concomitant of the negation of a particular thing to be inferred, being valid knowledge, would act as an obstacle. But it is the notion of incongruity etc., not handicapped by the idea of its being an error, that is the obstacle. In this matter, the notion of validity is sometimes helpful by way of removing the doubt about erroneousness.

It cannot be urged that in a case of incongruity, if the reason is present<sup>4</sup> in the subject, the fallacy is inconstancy, and if the reason is absent<sup>5</sup> in the subject, it is unfoundedness of nature only<sup>6</sup>; for there is a distinction between the notion of incongruity and those of inconstancy etc. Moreover, where after consideration,<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Refers to certainty about the thing to be inferred being in the subject while there is the desire to infer.

<sup>2</sup> As the old school maintains it is. According to it, such validity of knowledge is incongruity.

<sup>3</sup> Refers to the contradictory reason etc.

<sup>4</sup> As in the proposition, 'The lake has fire, because it has water.'

<sup>5</sup> As in the proposition, 'The lake has fire, because it has smoke.'

<sup>6</sup> So there is no need for incongruity as a separate fallacy.

<sup>7</sup> E.g. 'The lake has smoke which is a concomitant of fire.'

there is the notion of incongruity,<sup>1</sup> there, the notion of inconstancy or the like being useless,<sup>2</sup> incongruity alone should be held as thwarting inference. Similarly, where there is the notion of the presence of earthhood, which is a concomitant of smell, in a jar or the like at the moment of its origin, there incongruity alone should be considered to be the obstacle. It cannot be questioned how, smell being present in the subject, viz. the jar, it can be a case of incongruity; for it is a matter of experience that inference takes place as associated with the space and time that are the determinants of the subjecthood.<sup>3</sup> The concomitants of fallacies<sup>4</sup> other than incongruity and its concomitant (the counterbalanced reason) are just included in them.<sup>5</sup> Otherwise there would be another fallacy. The counterbalanced reason, which is a concomitant of incongruity, is to be treated as a distinct fallacy, since the saint,<sup>6</sup> who is of independent will, has made a separate mention of it. That the concomitant of the counterbalanced reason is not an obstacle (to inference) is, however, a thing that goes without saying.

<sup>1</sup> E.g. 'The lake has the absence of fire.'

<sup>2</sup> Because it can stay the notion of invariable concomitance only.

<sup>3</sup> In the above instance, the moment of origin is that sort of time. And according to the assumption of the logicians, a jar has no smell at that moment. Hence it is clearly a case of incongruity.

<sup>4</sup> Viz. the inconstant, the contradictory and the unfounded reason.

<sup>5</sup> Those three fallacies.

<sup>6</sup> The author Gautama.

## THE FALLACIES DEFINED ACCORDING TO THE OLD SCHOOL

यः सपक्षे विपक्षे च भवेत्साधारणस्तु सः ।

यस्तूभयस्माद्व्यावृत्तः स चासाधारणो मतः ॥ ७३ ॥

73. That which abides both in similar instances (*sapakṣa*) and contrary instances (*vipakṣa*) is the common reason; while that which is absent from both is considered to be the uncommon reason.

*That which, etc.*—That is to say, the reason that is present in both similar instances (*sapakṣa*) and contrary instances (*vipakṣa*) is called common. A similar instance (*sapakṣa*) is what indubitably has the thing to be inferred. A contrary instance (*vipakṣa*) is what is other than what has the thing to be inferred. The mention of similar instances is to exclude the contradictory reason. Strictly speaking, presence in contrary instances should alone be mentioned; for although the contradictory reason is also a common reason, yet it is distinct from the latter, as the ground of its fallaciousness is different

*While that, etc.*—That is to say, absent from similar instances (*sapakṣa*) and contrary instances (*vipakṣa*). A similar instance (*sapakṣa*) is what is definitely known to be possessed of the thing to be inferred. A contrary instance (*vipakṣa*) is what is definitely known to be devoid of the thing to be inferred. When in a proposition like, 'Sound is transitory, because it has soundhood,' there is doubt of transitoriness in sound, then a jar or



the like<sup>1</sup> constitutes a similar instance,<sup>2</sup> as also a contrary instance,<sup>3</sup> and soundhood is other than that; hence it is an uncommon inconstant reason. When, however, there is certainty of transitoriness in sound, then it is no longer such. This is the view of the old school. The view of the new school has already<sup>4</sup> been stated.

तथैवानुपसंहारी केवलान्वयिपक्षकः ।

यः साध्यवति नैवास्ति स विरुद्ध उदाहृतः ॥ ७४ ॥

74. That of which the subject is exclusively affirmative is the inconclusive reason. That which is never present in what is possessed of the thing to be inferred (the subject) is called the contradictory reason.

*That, of which, etc.*—Since in a proposition like, 'All is namable, because it has knowability,' everything is a subject, there is no other instance for the notion of co-existence (of the reason and the thing to be inferred), and hence no inference can take place. This, however, is not correct; for even if there is the notion of co-existence in a portion of the subject,<sup>5</sup> the definition is intact. Or, let there be no knowledge of co-existence; even this much only constitutes unfoundedness in the form of ignorance (of co-existence);

<sup>1</sup> Refers to jarhood, for instance.

<sup>2</sup> Because a jar is certainly transitory.

<sup>3</sup> This portion applies to what is denoted by the words 'or the like.' Jarhood is a contrary instance, because, being a generic attribute, it is obviously eternal.

<sup>4</sup> On p. 133.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. a jar.

but it cannot be classed as a fallacy. Yet inconclusiveness consists in the reason having a thing to be inferred that is exclusively affirmative. This has already been mentioned <sup>1</sup>

*That which is, etc.*—The intensive particle *eva* indicates the absence of the reason in everything that is possessed of the thing to be inferred. So contradictoriness means: being the counterpositive of the non-existence that includes the thing to be inferred.

आश्रयासिद्धिराद्या स्यात्, स्वरूपासिद्धिरप्यथ ।

व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरपरा, स्यादसिद्धिरतस्त्रिधा ॥ ७५ ॥

75. The first is unfoundedness of the substratum, then comes unfoundedness of nature, and the third is unfoundedness of concomitance. Hence unfoundedness is of three kinds.

Unfoundedness of the reason is being divided:  
*The first, etc.*

पक्षासिद्धिर्यत्र पक्षो भवेन्मणिमयो गिरिः ।

हृदो द्रव्यं धूमवत्त्वादत्रासिद्धिरथापरा ॥ ७६ ॥

76. Unfoundedness of the subject (substratum) occurs where (for instance) a (natural) hill of jewels is the subject. The next one occurs in a proposition like, 'The lake is a substance, because it is possessed of smoke.'

*Unfoundedness of the subject, i.e. of the substratum*  
*The next one, i.e. unfoundedness of nature.*

<sup>1</sup> On p. 133.

व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरपरा नीलधूमादिके भवेत् ।

विरुद्धयोः परामर्शे हेत्वोः सत्प्रतिपक्षता ॥ ७७ ॥

77. The third, viz. unfoundedness of concomitance, occurs where the reason is blue smoke etc. When two opposite things<sup>1</sup> occur in the consideration, the two reasons are said to be counterbalanced.

*Blue smoke, etc.*—Blue-smokehood and so on cannot be the determinant of the reasonhood, since it is cumbrous; for the determinant of the concomitance<sup>2</sup> must be one, of which no other determining<sup>3</sup> attribute of concomitance, co-existing with a particular attribute,<sup>4</sup> is a component factor. The phrase 'co-existing with a particular attribute' is added in order to include the state of being the previous non-existence of smoke.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> That is, the thing to be inferred and its negation.

<sup>2</sup> The concomitant is the reason.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. smokehood.

<sup>4</sup> E.g. blue-smokehood.

<sup>5</sup> Unlike the Mīmāṃsakas, the logicians believe in the previous non-existence of that alone which will take place subsequently. So they may infer: 'This place will have fire because it has the previous non-existence of smoke.' Here the determinant of the reasonhood is the state of being the previous non-existence of smoke. This has for its component factor another attribute (viz. smokehood) which is a determinant of the reasonhood. But the two are not co-existent, because smokehood abides in smoke, which is a positive entity, while the other abides in the previous non-existence of smoke. Hence the attribute 'the state of being the previous non-existence of smoke,' although cumbrous, can be regarded as the determinant of the reasonhood.



*When, etc.*—Even when there is the consideration that something (e.g. a particular tree) possesses the concomitants (*vyāpya*) of both conjunction with a monkey and its negation, it is not a case of the counterbalanced reason. Hence the text says: *Two opposite things*. So the meaning is that the counterbalanced reason is the object of the consideration that the subject possesses a concomitant<sup>1</sup> of the thing to be inferred<sup>2</sup> (from a certain reason<sup>3</sup>), at the time of the consideration that the subject possesses the concomitant of that negation<sup>4</sup> of the thing to be inferred which is opposed to the thing to be inferred from that particular reason.

साध्यशून्यो यत्र पक्षस्त्वसौ बाध उदाहृतः ।

उत्पत्तिकालीनघटे गन्धादिर्यत्र साध्यते ॥ ७८ ॥

78. Where the subject is devoid of the thing to be inferred, it is called incongruity—in which smell or the like is inferred in the jar at the moment of its origin.

*Where, etc.*—*The subject*, i.e. what is possessed of the determinant of the subjecthood.<sup>5</sup> Hence, although there may be smell in a jar, the definition is intact. This should be understood to hold good also in the proposition, 'The tree, within the limits of its root,<sup>6</sup> has the conjunction of a monkey.'

<sup>1</sup> E.g. smoke.

<sup>2</sup> Fire.

<sup>3</sup> Smoke.

<sup>4</sup> The negation of fire.

<sup>5</sup> In the above instance, time.

<sup>6</sup> Which is the determinant of the subjecthood.

## COMPARISON

ग्रामीणस्य प्रथमतः पश्यतो गवयादिकम् ।

सादृश्यधीर्गवादीनां या स्यात्सा करणं मतम् ॥ ७९ ॥

79. When a villager sees for the first time a gayal (*gavaya*) or the like, the notion that arises in his mind of its similarity to a cow etc. is considered to be the instrument (of comparison).

वाक्यार्थस्यातिदेशस्य स्मृतिर्व्यापार उच्यते ।

गवयादिपदानां तु शक्तिधीरुपमाफलम् ॥ ८० ॥

80. The recollection of that meaning of a sentence which has already been known is called the operation (of comparison). The knowledge of the denotative function of words such as 'gayal' is the result of comparison.

Comparison is being explained: *When a villager, etc.* Where a villager has been told by a dweller of the forest that what is denoted by the word 'gayal' resembles a cow, and afterwards he sees in a forest etc. a gayal, the similarity to a cow that is noticed in it is the instrument of comparison. Then there is a recollection of that meaning of the sentence, 'What is denoted by the word gayal resembles a cow,' which has already been known. This is what is called the operation (*vyāpāra*). After that he has the knowledge that a gayal is the import of

the word 'gayal.' This is comparison. Comparison does not consist in the notion, 'This (particular individual) is the import of the word gayal'; for then the the denotative function (*śakti*) of the word will not be apprehended with regard to another gayal.



## VERBAL COMPREHENSION

पदज्ञानं तु करणं, द्वारं तत्र पदार्थधीः ।

शब्दबोधः फलं तत्र, शक्तिधीः सहकारिणी ॥ ८१ ॥

81. The knowledge of words is the instrument (of verbal comprehension), the knowledge (recollection) of the meaning of words is the operation there, verbal comprehension is the result, and the knowledge of denotative function (*Śakti*) is an aid.

The manner in which verbal comprehension takes place is being shown: *The knowledge of words, etc.* It is not that words actually being known are the instrument of it; for we have verbal comprehension even in the absence of words (uttered), as in the case of a man under the vow of silence mentally reciting a verse, and so on.<sup>1</sup> *The knowledge of the meaning of words, etc.*—The recollection of the meaning of words produced by those words is the operation. Otherwise a man who has a knowledge of words would have verbal comprehension even when he has a knowledge of the thing denoted by the words, through perception etc. Even there the recollection should be understood as being produced by words through their signficatory function (*vytti*). Otherwise, when words like 'jar' have given rise to a recollection of ether through the relation of inherence, ether too would become an object of verbal comprehension.

<sup>1</sup> Refers to the conveying of ideas through gestures or writing.

Significatory function is the relation<sup>1</sup> consisting in either denotative function (*śakti*) or implication (*lakṣaṇā*). It is in this<sup>2</sup> that the knowledge of denotative function has utility. Because, unless denotative function is first known, there would be no recollection through the association of words even if there be a knowledge of them. For the knowledge of words reminds us of their meaning by virtue of being the knowledge of either of two related things.<sup>3</sup>

### DENOTATIVE FUNCTION AND HOW IT IS APPREHENDED

Denotative function is the relation of a word to its meaning. It is of the form of a divine will that such and such a word should denote such and such a thing. Recent names also do possess denotative function; for (behind them) there is the divine will<sup>4</sup>; 'On the eleventh day a father should name his child.' One school<sup>5</sup> holds that recent names possess no denotative function. The new school, however, maintains that it is not the divine will that constitutes denotative function, but any will. Hence even recent names certainly possess denotative function. The knowledge of it, however, is derived from a grammar etc. Witness the following: 'The elders say that denotative function is apprehended from grammar, comparison, dictionary, statement of trustworthy persons, usage, supplementary statement,

<sup>1</sup> Between words and the things denoted by them.

<sup>2</sup> Knowledge of things denoted by words, produced by those words through their significatory function.

<sup>3</sup> When one of the relata is known, the other also is recalled through association.

<sup>4</sup> In the form of the Vedic dictum.

<sup>5</sup> The old one.

paraphrase and the contiguity of a well-known word.' The denotative function of verbal roots and augments and so on is apprehended from grammar. Sometimes when there is a contradiction, it is discarded. For instance, grammarians say that the denotative function of the tenfold verbal suffix is regarding the agent. In sentences like, 'Caitra is cooking,' Caitra is to be identified with the agent of the action; but since this is cumbrous, it is discarded. Instead, for simplicity, denotative function is taken to be with regard to effort (*kṛti*), which is apprehended as a feature of Caitra etc.<sup>1</sup> It cannot be urged that as the agent is not expressed (by the verbal suffix), words such as 'Caitra' should take the third (instrumental) case-ending, because it depends on the absence of any expression of the *number* of the agent.<sup>2</sup> And only things that are not circumscribed by being objects (*karmatva*) etc. and are represented by words taking the first (nominative) case-ending, are capable of having their number expressed. The meaning of the clause, 'That are not,' etc. is that the things in question must not be apprehended as referring to what is a description of something else. Hence in sentences like, 'Maitra goes like Caitra,' the number (indicated by the verbal suffix) is not connected with Caitra.<sup>3</sup> To preclude cases where the things in question, as objects of an action and so forth, are not meant to be (solely) a description,<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> That is, it signifies that Caitra is possessed of the effort.

<sup>2</sup> By the verbal suffix.

<sup>3</sup> Because 'like Caitra' is a description of Maitra.

<sup>4</sup> As in the sentence, 'Caitra sees Caitra,' where Caitra is not merely the object of seeing, but the subject as well.



the words, 'And are represented,' etc. have been used. Or the meaning of the first portion is that the things in question are not a description of anything else besides what is denoted by the root of the verb. Hence in sentences like, 'Maitra goes like Caitra,' Caitra etc. are precluded.<sup>1</sup> In sentences like, 'He is cooking a little,' to preclude 'a little' (*stokam*) etc. the second epithet has been used. They are precluded, as they are represented by words having the second case-ending.

Similarly denotative function is not with regard to operation (*vyāpāra*)<sup>2</sup> also; for it is cumbrous. In sentences like, 'The chariot is going,' however, there is the implication either of (self-) activity or of its being the substratum (of activity).<sup>3</sup> In sentences like, 'He knows,' there is the well-established (*nirūḍha*) implication<sup>4</sup> of being the substratum (of activity), and in sentences like, 'It perishes,' that of being the counter-positive (of destruction). How denotative function is apprehended through comparison has already been stated.<sup>5</sup> Similarly denotative function is apprehended through the dictionary. It is sometimes discarded when there is a contradiction. For instance, a dictionary tells us that the denotative function of words such as 'blue' is with regard to blue colour etc. as also to what is possessed of blue colour etc. yet, for the sake of simplicity, denotative function is with regard to blue

<sup>1</sup> From connection with the number indicated by the verbal suffix, because they are a description of something other than what is denoted by the root of the verb.

<sup>2</sup> The view of a certain section of Mīmāṃsakas.

<sup>3</sup> Since effort is out of the question there.

<sup>4</sup> Such implication is as good as denotative function.

<sup>5</sup> In verse 80.

colour alone, while by implication they refer to what is possessed of blue and other colours. Likewise from the statement of trustworthy persons also (denotative function is known). As, from the statement, 'The word *pika* signifies a cuckoo,' we get the denotative function of words such as *pika*.

Similarly from usage also it is apprehended. For instance, an elderly person giving directions says, 'Bring a jar,' and hearing this another elderly person who is called upon to do so brings the jar. Reflecting on this, a boy who stood near concludes that the act of bringing a jar is the result of the words, 'Bring the jar.' Then in expressions like, 'Remove the jar,' and 'Bring the cow,' he understands by a process of inclusion and exclusion that the denotative function of words such as 'jar' is with regard to the jar etc. as connected with certain acts.<sup>1</sup> Thus, according to some,<sup>2</sup> expressions like, 'There is a blue jar on the ground,' lead to no verbal comprehension. To be explicit: Since words such as 'a jar' have been concluded to have the power of denoting a jar etc. as connected with certain acts, and since only *vidhiliṇ* and other suffixes have the power to convey activity, there will be no verbal comprehension, as they are lacking (in this case). This is wrong. For although one may at first conclude that denotative function (of words such as 'jar') is with regard to a jar etc. as connected with certain acts, one should afterwards discard this notion (of connection with acts) for the sake of simplicity.

<sup>1</sup> The view of the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsakas. Then with experience the boy finds out the true denotative function of the word 'jar.'

<sup>2</sup> The Prābhākaras.

Hence, when utterances like, 'Caitra, a son has been born to you, and your (unmarried) daughter is carrying,'<sup>1</sup> are made, one infers from the beaming or sadness of the face that the person addressed is happy or miserable, and by a process of elimination concludes that verbal comprehension is the cause of that, and those words are the cause of that comprehension. So, there being deviations, denotative function must not be taken to be with regard to things as connected with certain acts. Nor should some other words, such as, 'Look at him,' be supplied there; for this is unwarranted, and in expressions like, 'Caitra, a son was born to you and is dead,' it cannot be done. Thus also, for the sake of simplicity, one gives up the notion that denotative function of the word 'jar' is with regard to a jar as connected with some other thing,<sup>2</sup> and concludes that it is simply with regard to a jar.

Similarly from supplementary statement also denotative function is apprehended. As, in the sentence, 'The porridge should be of *yava*,' the word *yava* is used by the Aryans to signify a particular long-awned grain (barley), while the Mlecchas use it in the sense of panic seed (*kaṅgu*). With regard to this we have the statement, 'Now other herbs wither, but these stand flourishing. In the spring all grains lose their leaves, but barley with its awns stands flourishing.' From this supplementary statement we conclude that the denotative function of the word is with regard to the grain with long awns (barley), and that its use to signify panic seed is due to a mistaken notion about its denotative function; for it

<sup>1</sup> In the original sentence there are no verbs.

<sup>2</sup> As the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsakas holds.



is cumbrous to assume multiple denotative function. In words like *hari*,<sup>1</sup> however, since there is no decisive reasoning one way or the other, we have to assume multiple denotative function. Similarly from paraphrase also we apprehend denotative function. Paraphrase is a statement of the meaning of a word through a synonym. For instance, the sentence, 'There is a jar,' is paraphrased by the sentence, 'There is a pitcher'; hence the word 'jar' is known to denote a pitcher. Similarly the word 'cooks' is paraphrased by the words 'does the cooking'; from this we conclude that the verbal suffix *thre* denotes effort. Likewise from the contiguity of a well-known word also denotative function is apprehended. As, in a sentence like, 'A *pika* is singing sweetly in this mango tree,' the denotative function of the word *pika* is apprehended to be with regard to a cuckoo.

Regarding this some<sup>2</sup> say that denotative function is with regard to the generic attribute, and not to the individual, because in that case there would be inconstancy,<sup>3</sup> and denotative function would be infinite in number.<sup>4</sup> And since a generic attribute cannot be known apart from individuals, the latter also become known. This is wrong; for without denotative function there can be no knowledge of individuals.<sup>5</sup> Nor is the individual known by implication; for we know an

<sup>1</sup> Possessing several meanings.

<sup>2</sup> The Mīmāṃsakas.

<sup>3</sup> Since there is verbal comprehension of other individuals also besides the one with regard to which denotative function is assumed.

<sup>4</sup> According to the number of individuals in a class.

<sup>5</sup> In verbal comprehension.

individual (from a word) even without any notion of incompatibility.<sup>1</sup> Nor does the admission of individual denotative function make it infinite in number; for one and the same denotative function is held to be with regard to all individuals. It cannot be urged that denotative function cannot be presented as an attribute common to all the individuals; for cowhood etc. do constitute that.<sup>2</sup> Moreover if denotative function is apprehended in the form, 'The cow is denoted by the denotative function of the word *cow*,' then that function is evidently with regard to the individual. If, however, it is apprehended in the form, 'Cowhood is denoted by the denotative function of the word *cow*,' then there would neither be a recollection of the meaning of the word nor verbal comprehension, in which cowhood is a feature (*prakāra*); for the knowledge of the denotative function of a word leads to a recollection of the meaning of the word and verbal comprehension of the same type. Moreover, if denotative function is with regard to cowhood, then the state of being cowhood (*gotvatva*) should be said to be the determinant of the state of being the thing denoted by the denotative function of the word (*śakyatāvacchedaka*). And the state of being cowhood is—being inherent in all cows, without being inherent in anything else. In that case, since the individual cows are comprised in the determinant of the state of being the thing denoted by the denotative

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the intention of the speaker. Implication is admitted only when the primary meaning is for some reason untenable. But from the word 'jar' we know the individual jars without any hitch.

<sup>2</sup> The reason for admitting one denotative function for all cows is that they all have the common attribute cowhood.

function of the word, it only means cumbrousness for your view. Hence, since the cognition of particular individuals possessed of particular generic attributes and forms cannot be explained (in your view), the denotative function assumed for this purpose turns out ultimately to be with regard to the individual possessed of a particular generic attribute and form.<sup>1</sup>

### VARIETIES OF WORDS POSSESSING DENOTATIVE FUNCTION

What possesses denotative function is the word. It is of four kinds. Sometimes it is derivative (*yaugika*), sometimes conventional (*rūḍha*), sometimes derivatively conventional (*yoga-rūḍha*) and sometimes both derivative and conventional (*yaugika-rūḍha*). For instance, where only the meaning of the component part<sup>2</sup> of a word is understood, it is derivative; as words like *pācaka* (cook). Where, irrespective of the denotative function of the component parts, it is understood only through its collective denotative function it is called conventional; as, words like *go* (cow) or *maṇḍala* (circle). Where, however, in the object denoted by the denotative function of the component parts of a word there is also collective denotative function, it is derivatively conventional; as, words like *paṅkaja* (lotus). To be explicit: The word

<sup>1</sup> The generic attribute cowhood, being of the class that is expressed, cannot be spontaneously known. So its cognition must be accounted for in some other way. But if denotative function is with regard to the individual, then the generic attribute cowhood is unexpressed, and therefore its cognition is spontaneous.

<sup>2</sup> The root and the prefix or suffix.



*pañkaja* conveys, by the denotative function of its component parts, the idea of something that grows in the mud, and by its collective denotative function it conveys the idea of a lotus as a lotus. It cannot be urged that solely by the denotative function of its component parts it may also denote a water-lily; for the knowledge of the conventional meaning obstructs that of the purely derivative meaning. So says the old school. But strictly speaking,<sup>1</sup> to the lotus, which is known from the collective denotative function, is joined, through contiguity, the meaning of the component parts, viz. what grows in mud. Where, however, the conventional meaning is known to be contradicted, there the water-lily etc. are understood by *implication*. And where the intended meaning is not a water-lily as such, and at the same time the idea of a lotus as such is contradicted, there verbal comprehension (of the water-lily) takes place simply by the denotative function of the component parts of the word. So says (the new school). Where, however, as in the case of a 'land-lotus' (*Hibiscus Mutabilis*) the meaning of the component parts is contradicted, there the meaning conveyed by collective denotative function is a lotus as a lotus. If, on the other hand, the land-lotus is held to belong to a different species altogether, then the meaning is obtained by implication alone. But where the derivative and the conventional meaning are conveyed independently of each other, there the word is both derivative and conventional: as words like *udbhīd*. There the meaning

<sup>1</sup> The view of Gangesa Upādhyāya.

conveyed is both what shoots up, such as trees and shrubs, as also a particular kind of sacrifice.

### IMPLICATION: ITS VARIETIES

लक्षणा शक्यसंबन्धस्तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिः ।

82. Implication is the relation with what is denoted by denotative function, where the intention (of the speaker) is not (directly compatible).

*Implication, etc.*—In sentences like, 'There is a cowherd colony in the Ganges,' a cowherd colony is not compatible, either as regards relation or as regards intention, with the primary meaning of the word 'Ganges,' which is a stream. Where this is noticed, there the bank is understood by implication; and this is a kind of relation to the primary meaning (of a word). For instance, since the relation of the primary meaning, viz. a stream, is apprehended with the bank, the latter is recalled; this leads to verbal comprehension. But if the incompatibility of relation be the essence of implication, then in the sentence, 'Admit the sticks,' there would be no implication; for there is nothing incompatible in sticks being related to admission. Therefore, since the intention of the speaker, viz. feeding, is not compatible with the admission of sticks, the implication is with regard to persons carrying sticks. Similarly in sentences like, 'Protect the curd from the crows,' the word 'crows' implies any creature that would spoil the curd; for the intention of the speaker is about protecting the curd from all creatures. Likewise

in sentences like, 'The men with umbrellas are going,' the term 'men with umbrellas' implies all who are in the same batch.<sup>1</sup> This is what is called the implication that does not discard its own meaning; for as belonging to the same batch, both men with umbrellas and persons other than they are meant. If, on the other hand, the incompatibility of relation be the essence of implication, then sometimes the word 'Ganges' would imply the bank, and sometimes the term 'cowherd colony' would imply the fish etc.; hence there would be no fixed criterion. One thing, however, should be borne in mind. If the relation to the thing denoted (the primary meaning) be apprehended with regard to the bank as a bank, then the bank as simply a bank is understood. If, however, it be taken to be the bank of the Ganges, then the recollection takes place in that very form. Therefore the implication is not with regard to the determinant of the state of being the thing implied<sup>2</sup>; for a cognition having that as a feature is possible even without implication regarding it. Further, one should understand that in like manner denotative function too cannot be with regard to the determinant of the state of being the thing denoted by denotative function (the primary meaning); for it can easily be said that a word has the power to call up a memory of the thing denoted by its denotative function, in which the determinant in question is a feature.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Irrespective of the fact that some of them may be without an umbrella.

<sup>2</sup> But with regard to the thing implied.

<sup>3</sup> Verbal comprehension is of the same form as the thing signified by the word. On account of this causal relation



Where, however, the primary meaning of a word is implied by an indirect relation, it is called double implication (*lakṣita-lakṣaṇā*). As, for instance, in words like *dvirepha* (bee). The relation of the two r's is apprehended with the word *bhramara*, and that of the latter with a bee; hence it is a case of double implication. But the word<sup>1</sup> that bears the implied meaning does not lead to (verbal) comprehension; it is some other term<sup>2</sup> that leads to the verbal comprehension of the implied meaning. For words<sup>3</sup> have been ascertained to have the power of generating verbal comprehension of their primary meaning, as connected with the meaning of some other word<sup>4</sup> by the relation of either denotative function or implication.<sup>5</sup> [This is the view of the old school. The new school, however, maintains that it<sup>6</sup> also is certainly a cause of (verbal) comprehension, and the apprehension of the meaning of the

between the two, neither the determinant of the state of being the thing implied nor that of the state of being the thing directly conveyed can be admitted as possessing implication or denotative function, as the case may be. If the bank (of the Ganges) be the thing implied, it is known as possessed of bankhood, which is the determinant of the state of being the thing implied. For this it is not necessary to admit a separate implication. Similarly, where the word 'cow' signifies an individual cow, the latter is directly apprehended as possessed of cowhood. Hence there is no necessity for admitting a separate denotative function with regard to cowhood.

<sup>1</sup> E.g. 'Ganges.'

<sup>2</sup> & <sup>3</sup> E.g. 'a cowherd colony.'

<sup>4</sup> E.g. 'Ganges.'

<sup>5</sup> The word 'Ganges' itself means the bank of the Ganges.

<sup>6</sup> The word that bears the implied meaning.

word is the operation. Otherwise by a parity of reasoning even a word possessing denotative function would fail to lead to any (verbal) comprehension.<sup>1]</sup>

### WHERE IMPLICATION LIES

In a sentence, however, owing to the absence of any denotative function, there is no implication also,<sup>2</sup> which is a kind of relation to the thing denoted by denotative function (the primary meaning). Where it is said, 'The cowherd colony is in the deep river,' there the word 'river' implies the river bank, and the meaning of the word 'deep' is connected by a relation of identity with the river; for sometimes connection with one part (of a word) is also admitted. If even this sort of connection is not admitted here, then the word 'river' implies the bank of the deep river, and the word 'deep' indicates the intention (of the speaker).

In the compound called *Bahuvrihi*<sup>3</sup> too, it is like this; for there, if, in words like *citragu* (the man of the dappled cow), connection with one part (of a word) is admitted, then the word 'cow' implies the owner of the cow and the word 'dappled' is connected by a relation of identity with 'cow'. If, however, connection with one part (of a word) is not admitted, then the word 'cow' implies the owner of the dappled cow, and the word 'dappled' indicates the intention. Similarly, in the expression 'a tree climbed by a monkey,' the word

<sup>1</sup> This portion does not occur in some editions.

<sup>2</sup> On this point, the logicians agree with the Mīmāṃsakas.

<sup>3</sup> In which the compound is an adjective qualifying some other word denoting a person or thing than the words composing it.

'monkey' implies the object climbed by the monkey, and the word 'climbed' indicates the intention. The same thing is to be understood elsewhere too. In the compound called *Tatpuruṣa*, however, the first word bears the implied meaning. For instance, in words like, *rāja-puruṣa* (a royal officer), the meaning of the word *rājan* (king) cannot be directly connected with that of the word *puruṣa* (person); for it is against the rule to conceive that two meanings of names<sup>1</sup> other than particles<sup>2</sup> are connected by a relation of difference. Otherwise, even in the sentence, 'The king is a person,' a similar<sup>3</sup> connection would have to be conceived. In sentences like, 'A cloth is not a jar,' the meaning of 'not' is directly<sup>4</sup> connected with those of 'jar' and 'cloth'; hence the words 'other than particles.' In phrases like 'a blue jar' the two meanings of names are connected by a relation of identity; hence the words 'by a relation of difference.' It cannot be urged that in words like *rāja-puruṣa* we must assume that there is recollection of an elided case-ending; for even one who does not recollect the case-ending apprehends the meaning from the words themselves. Therefore words like *rājan* (king) imply something pertaining to a king, and that is connected by a relation of identity with the meaning of the word *puruṣa* (person).

In the compound called *Dvandva*, however, as in the sentence, 'Cut the *dhava*<sup>5</sup> and catechu plants (*dhava-khadirau*),' both these plants are apprehended

<sup>1</sup> Words other than verbs.

<sup>2</sup> All indeclinables except the prefixes.

<sup>3</sup> That is, by a relation of difference.

<sup>4</sup> Without the help of a case-ending.

<sup>5</sup> *Grislea Tomentosa* or *Anogeissus Latifolia*.



in view of the duality conveyed by the case-ending; hence there is no implication. It cannot be urged that there is implication of association; for *Dvandva* is observed in cases where there is no association. Nor can it be urged that there is association in the form of being connected with the same act; for even when there are different verbs, as in sentences like, 'Behold and cut the *dhava* and catechu plants (respectively),' we see its use, and, moreover, there is never any (verbal) apprehension of the association. Hence in the sentence, 'Let the king and priest (*rāja-purohitau*)<sup>1</sup> perform sacrifices with a view to attaining union with God,' since implication is inadmissible,<sup>2</sup> *Dvandva* is resorted to. Therefore association is not the meaning, but where there is real difference (between words), there the compound *Dvandva* occurs. It cannot be urged how there can be the compound *Dvandva* in a sentence like, 'There is identity of the colour and the jar (*nila-ghaṭayoh*)'; for there the words 'blue colour' imply blue-colourhood, and the word 'jar' implies jarhood, while the word 'identity' means 'identity in respect of the substratum.'<sup>3</sup>

In *Samāhāra-Dvandva*, however, if it be said that the aggregate is also apprehended, then in words like *ahi-nakulam* (snake and mongoose) the second word implies the aggregate of snake and mongoose, and the first word indicates the intention. It cannot be con-

<sup>1</sup> The question is, does it mean king and priest, or two royal priests? The answer is, the former.

<sup>2</sup> Because 'king' in that case would mean 'kingly,' which is cumbersome.

<sup>3</sup> The jar. The two generic attributes by themselves are distinct. Hence *Dvandva* is admissible.

tended how in the sentence, 'Sound the kettle-drum and drum,' the aggregate can be connected (with sounding), since it, being a kind of notion of addition, cannot be sounded; for it can be connected in an indirect way.<sup>1</sup> The same thing also holds good of words like 'a group of five root.' Others,<sup>2</sup> however, say that a word like *ahi-nakulam* denotes a snake and a mongoose, and unity is connected with each; and the name *Samāhāra* is applied only to the compound that is singular and neuter, as mentioned in the aphorism, 'And *Dvandva* where there is an aggregation of the limbs of an animal, of musical instruments, (or of an army),<sup>3</sup> elsewhere the use of the singular number is wrong. In words<sup>4</sup> like *pitarau* (parents) and *śvaśurau* (father-in-law and mother-in-law), the word *pitr* implies the parents, and the word *śvaśura* the parents of one's wife. Similarly in other cases also. In the word *ghaṭāḥ* (jars) there is no implication; for it is possible for many jars to be apprehended through the generic attribute jarhood.

In the case of the compound called *Karmadhāraya*, however, in words like 'a blue lotus' the thing denoted by the word 'blue' is a feature of the thing denoted by the word 'lotus,' by the relation of identity; there is no implication there. Hence in the sentence, 'One should perform sacrifice for the Niṣāda<sup>5</sup> king,' there is not the

<sup>1</sup> That is, as abiding in the same substratum, the instrument.

<sup>2</sup> The new school of logicians.

<sup>3</sup> *Pāṇini* II. iv. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Instances of what is called *Ekaśeṣa Dvandva*, in which only one of the two or more words compounded remains.

<sup>5</sup> A low caste, having a Brāhmaṇa father and a Śūdra mother.

compound called *Tatpuruṣa*,<sup>1</sup> as that would involve implication, but *Karmadhāraya*,<sup>2</sup> since implication is inadmissible. It cannot be urged that a Niṣāda, being of a hybrid caste, is not entitled to study of the Vedas, and hence it is impossible to perform sacrifices for him; for the fact of a Niṣāda's being admitted to the study may be assumed from that very passage. On the ground of simplicity the primary meaning<sup>3</sup> is sought to be connected,<sup>4</sup> and then on the ground of its incompatibility the assumption<sup>5</sup> is resorted to. Hence the latter, being cumbrousness that brings about a result, should not be counted as a blemish.

In words like *upa-kumbham* (in the vicinity of the pitcher) and *ardha-pīppali* (one-half of a long pepper),<sup>6</sup> the second word implies something related to it, and the connection (between them) is understood so as to give prominence to the meaning of the first word. Thus in compounds as a whole there is no denotative function at all, since the denotative function of the component words alone serves the purpose.

<sup>1</sup> In which case the meaning would be: the king of the Niṣādas.

<sup>2</sup> Which would give the direct meaning, which is always to be preferred, viz. a king who is a Niṣāda by birth.

<sup>3</sup> Of the term 'Niṣāda king.'

<sup>4</sup> With the meanings of the other words in the sentence.

<sup>5</sup> Of a Niṣāda's admission to Vedic study.

<sup>6</sup> Which are instances of the compound called *Ayayībhāva*.



## THE MEANS OF VERBAL COMPREHENSION

आसत्तियोग्यताकाङ्क्षातात्पर्यज्ञानमिष्यते ॥ ८२ ॥

कारणं ; संनिधानं तु पदस्यासत्तिरुच्यते ।

पदार्थे तत्र तद्वत्ता योग्यता परिकीर्तिता ॥ ८३ ॥

82 (contd.)-83. The knowledge of contiguity, consistency, expectancy and intention is the cause (of verbal comprehension). The juxtaposition of words is called contiguity. The co-ordination of the meaning of a word with that of another is called consistency.

*The knowledge, etc.*—The knowledge of contiguity, of consistency, of expectancy and of intention is the cause of verbal comprehension. Now the meaning of the word 'contiguity' is being stated: *The juxtaposition, etc.* The apprehension, without an interval, of the meanings of two words, one of which must be connected with the other (to complete the sense), is a cause of verbal comprehension. Hence a string of words like, 'The hill, has eaten, fiery, Devadatta,'<sup>1</sup> does not lead to any verbal comprehension. In a series of words like, 'Blue, jar, substance, cloth,' there is verbal comprehension owing to a mistaken notion of contiguity.<sup>2</sup> Even if a mistaken

<sup>1</sup> For the sake of sense the order should be changed as follows: 'The hill, (is) fiery, Devadatta, has eaten.'

<sup>2</sup> The speaker meant: 'A blue cloth,' and 'A jar is a substance.' But the listener construed the words in the order in which they were spoken and understood: 'A blue jar,' and 'A cloth is a substance.'

notion of contiguity does not lead to a false verbal comprehension, there is no harm.<sup>1</sup>

Objection: When somebody says, 'Devadatta with the umbrella, ear-ring and dress,' etc. then the recollection of the succeeding word destroys that of the preceding word; hence it is impossible to recollect that succeeding word without an interval.

Reply: Not so; for the impressions arising from the apprehension of each word give birth to the final recollection of all the words without an interval. Because, like a single perception arising from diverse connections,<sup>2</sup> it is possible for diverse impressions to give rise to a single recollection; for the apprehension of the last letter, combined with the impressions of all the words, revives (the collective impressions). How else can several letters lead to the recollection of a single word? Some<sup>3</sup> say that, on the analogy of 'pigeons in a barn-yard,' the recollection of the meanings of all the words leads simultaneously to a verbal comprehension of the meanings of all the words connected as actions and objects. 'Just as those pigeons—old, full-grown and young—fall upon a barn-yard simultaneously, similarly the meanings of all the words enter simultaneously into the relation with one another.' Others, however, say, 'The meaning of words is (first) understood from the words themselves, in combination with whatever<sup>4</sup> else is

<sup>1</sup> The view of the old school that it does, is rebutted here.

<sup>2</sup> Of a number of objects with the organ.

<sup>3</sup> The old school.

<sup>4</sup> Such as the fact of their being objects of an action (*karmatva*.)

required by sense, is consistent, and is contiguous.' So, they also say, the comprehension of the meaning of sections of a sentence is followed by the comprehension of the meaning of the complete sentence, in the very same way, through the recollection of the meaning of the words. This also refutes the (theory of the) transcendental word-essence (*sphoṭa*) corresponding to whole words,<sup>1</sup> supposed to be manifested by all its component letter-sounds; for verbal comprehension can be explained just by the (auricular) perception of the last letter-sound, combined with the impressions of the other letter-sounds (of the word)—which (as the grammarians hold) manifests that (*sphoṭa*).<sup>2</sup> One thing, however, should be borne in mind: Where the word 'door' is uttered, verbal comprehension takes place from the apprehension of a word such as 'shut,' and not from the the apprehension of its meaning, such as shutting<sup>3</sup>; for the apprehension of particular meanings of words, which is generated by those words, is the cause of parti-

The word *ghaṭam* (a jar, in the objective case) automatically conveys something more, viz. that it is the object of an action, viz. bringing, even before the word *ānaya* (bring) is spoken.

<sup>1</sup> Upheld by the grammarians. Since the spoken letters are transient, the grammarians, to explain how the meaning of a word is grasped, assume the existence of the eternal *sphoṭa* or word-essence, a metaphysical entity which is manifested by the uttered syllables and directly conveys the meaning of the word.

<sup>2</sup> Since the *sphoṭa* itself depends for its manifestation on the spoken letters, it is superfluous.

<sup>3</sup> As the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsakas holds.



cular verbal comprehensions. Moreover, since words denoting actions and their objects are necessary to sense in their particular forms, how can there be verbal comprehension without words denoting actions? Similarly, since in words like 'for flowers' the use of the dative case-ending is inexplicable without supplying some such word as 'craves,' the supply of *words* is a necessity.

Consistency is being explained: *The co-ordination, etc.* That is to say, the connection of the meaning of a word with that of another word is called consistency. And for want of an apprehension of this, there is no verbal comprehension from sentences like, 'They are watering (the plants) with fire.'

Objection: An apprehension of this consistency is not possible anywhere before verbal comprehension; for the meaning of a sentence is not something that is already well-known.

Reply: Not so; for when particular meanings of words are recalled, it is possible to have an apprehension of consistency, sometimes in the form of doubt and sometimes in that of certainty.

The new school, however, maintains that the apprehension of consistency is not a cause of verbal comprehension. In sentences like, 'They are watering with fire,' no verbal comprehension takes place because of the obstruction due to the conviction of an inconsistency that watering cannot be done with fire. Since the conviction of the absence of a thing is an obstacle to any kind of apprehension of it, other than what is caused by normal sense-contact or particular defects, it goes without saying it is an obstacle with regard to verbal comprehension

also. It is also not tenable that there is delay in verbal comprehension owing to a delay in the apprehension of consistency.

यत्पदेन विना यस्याननुभावकता भवेत् ।

आकाङ्क्षा ; वक्तुरिच्छा तु तात्पर्यं परिकीर्तितम् ॥ ८४ ॥

84. (A word has) expectancy (with regard to that) word without which it cannot produce knowledge (of syntactical connection); while the desire of the speaker is called intention.

Expectancy is being explained: *A word has, etc.* That is to say, a word has expectancy with regard to that word without which it cannot convey any idea of syntactical connection. Substantives in any of the cases do not lead to a sense of connection without a verb; hence they have expectancy with regard to the latter. Although, strictly speaking, the juxtaposition of substantives and verbs is satisfied by contiguity, yet the notion of expectancy about the objective case-ending after the word *ghaṭa* (jar), is a cause of the apprehension of the jar as an object of some verb (e.g. bring). Hence no verbal comprehension takes place from a string of words like, 'Jar, objecthood, bringing, effort.' In an utterance like, 'Here comes the son (*putraḥ*) of the king (*rājñah*); remove the man (*puruṣaḥ*),' since there is apprehension of the intention that the word *rājan* (king) is to be connected with the word *putra* (son), its connection is understood to be with that alone. But if the intention were so apprehended that it was to be connected

with the word *puruṣa* (man), then it would certainly be understood as connected with that.<sup>1</sup>

Intention is being explained: *While the desire, etc.* If the apprehension of the intention were not a cause (of verbal comprehension), then sentences like, 'Bring the *saindhava*,<sup>2</sup> would not sometimes signify a Sind-horse and sometimes salt. It cannot be urged that context and the like<sup>3</sup> which help the apprehension of the intention might as well be causes of verbal comprehension; for they cannot be grouped under a common denomination. If, however, they are so grouped, as producing an apprehension of the intention, then, for the sake of simplicity, let the apprehension of the intention itself be the cause. Thus even in the case of the Vedas, for the sake of the apprehension of the intention, the existence of God<sup>4</sup> is assumed. It cannot be contended that there apprehension of the intention of the teacher is a cause (of verbal comprehension); for there was no teacher at the beginning of creation. Nor can it be urged that since there is no such thing as cosmic dissolution itself, it is idle to speak of a beginning of creation; for cosmic dissolution is dealt with in the Vedas.<sup>5</sup> Thus, even with regard to words uttered by a parrot, appre-

<sup>1</sup> The meaning then would be: Here comes (my) son; remove the royal officer. In the original utterance the word *rājñah* stands between *putrah* and *puruṣah*, which may well cause the confusion.

<sup>2</sup> Lit. product of *sindhu*, which means the sea as well as the territory called Sind. Hence the two meanings: salt and a particular breed of horse.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. nearness, distance, co-existence.

<sup>4</sup> As the Speaker of the Vedas. It is His intention that is expressed through them.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. Nāsadiya-Sūkta (*Rg-Veda* X. xi. 129).



hension of the divine intention is a cause. Where, however, a sentence uttered by a parrot does not give a meaning consonant (with fact), apprehension of the intention of the trainer is the cause. Others, however, hold that with regard to words having multiple meanings and so on, it is only occasionally that apprehension of the speaker's intention is a cause (of verbal comprehension). Thus, with regard to words uttered by a parrot, verbal comprehension takes place even without an apprehension of the intention. As regards the Vedas, however, the meaning is ascertained by means of arguments guided by principles of interpretation that are without beginning.

## RECOLLECTION

In a previous passage<sup>1</sup> knowledge has been spoken of as being of two kinds according to its division into experience and recollection. Of these, the varieties of experience have been shown. Recollection has not been dealt with as being easy to understand. In this, previous experience is the cause. Regarding this some say, 'It is not (previous) experience which is the cause, but (previous) knowledge.'<sup>2</sup> Otherwise recollection cannot be followed by recollection, because the preceding impression is destroyed by a recollection having the same feature.<sup>3</sup> In my view, however, that very recollection generates another recollection through the medium of another impression.' This is wrong. Where after a collective impression (of an experience) there has been the recollection of a jar, a cloth, or the like in succession, but not that of the things as an aggregate, there, the result (the individual recollection) not being destructive of the impression, either time, or disease, or the ultimate result must be said to be destructive of the impression. So it would not be difficult to explain successive recollections. It cannot be urged that this does not explain how repeated recollections lead to deeper impressions; for the word 'depth' here means the swift appearance of a stimulus. Nor can it be contended that owing to the very

<sup>1</sup> In verse 51.

<sup>2</sup> This includes recollection.

<sup>3</sup> That is, of the same object.

absence of any conclusive reasoning (in favour of previous experience), (previous) knowledge also may be the cause; for when the causality of a thing in respect of a particular attribute<sup>1</sup> is not known to have an exception,<sup>2</sup> causality in respect of a general attribute<sup>3</sup> is a superfluity. How else is a staff not held to be the cause (of a jar) through its circular motion, in respect of being a substance?<sup>4</sup> It cannot be urged that the doubt that intermediate recollections<sup>5</sup> destroy the impressions, leads to a doubt about inconstancy,<sup>6</sup> for rather than assume an infinite number of impressions and their destruction, it is simpler to assume that the final recollection alone destroys the impressions, and this removes the doubt about inconstancy. This is how recollection takes place.

<sup>1</sup> E.g. the fact of being experience.

<sup>2</sup> Because recollection is never known to take place without experience.

<sup>3</sup> The fact of being knowledge.

<sup>4</sup> The staff is a cause as a staff, not as a substance.

<sup>5</sup> Between the first and the last recollection.

<sup>6</sup> That the cause may not be experience as experience.



## THE LAST SUBSTANCE: MIND

साक्षात्कारे सुखादीनां करणं मन उच्यते ।

अयौगपद्याज्ज्ञानानां तस्याणुत्वमिहेष्यते ॥ ८५ ॥

85. The instrument of the cognition of pleasure etc. is called the mind. In this system it is considered to be atomic, since states of consciousness are not simultaneous.

Now, to describe the mind which comes in order, it is being stated: *The instrument, etc.* By this a proof is adduced of the existence of the mind. To explain: The cognition of pleasure must be through an instrument, because it is a cognition that is produced, as is the case with ocular cognition. This inference establishes the fact that the mind is an instrument. It cannot be urged that for the cognition of pain etc. also there should be other instruments; because, for the sake of simplicity, a single substance should be held to be the instrument of all such cognitions. Similarly the existence of the mind may be established from the fact of its being the substratum of conjunction, the non-inherent cause of pleasure etc. Now a proof of the atomicity of the mind is being given: *Since, etc.* It is a fact of experience that ocular, palatal and other forms of knowledge are not simultaneous: they are not produced at the same moment. Now, although a number of organs may be in contact with their objects, knowledge arises through

a particular organ owing to the connection of something, and does not arise through the other organs owing to the absence of connection with something. And since the absence of connection is not possible if that something, viz. the mind, is omnipresent, it is not omnipresent. It cannot be urged that the delay in knowledge is due only to the delayed appearance of the stimulus, viz. a particular merit or demerit; for in that case the eye and other organs too need not be assumed. Nor can it be questioned how, in acts like the eating of a 'long cake' (*dirgha-śaṣkuli*), as also in the case of persons attending to various things at the same time, there can be simultaneous knowledge through many organs; for the various forms of knowledge arise, as the mind, being atomic, quickly connects itself with many organs. The notion of simultaneity is an error, as in the case of piercing a hundred lotus leaves, for instance. It cannot also be urged that since the mind is possessed of expansion and contraction, both<sup>1</sup> may be explained; for it is cumbrous to assume multiple parts (of the mind), their destruction and so on, and simpler to assume that the mind is atomic and without any parts. This is the long and short of the matter. The category of substance has been explained.

<sup>1</sup> Simultaneity and its opposite.

## THE QUALITIES

अथ द्रव्याश्रिता ज्ञेया निर्गुणा निष्क्रिया गुणाः ।

86. The qualities should be known as abiding in substances, and being without qualities and actions.

After describing the substances the text proceeds to deal with the qualities in the words: *The qualities, etc.*

Objection: What is the proof of the generic attribute qualityhood (*guṇatva*)?

Reply: The causality that abides in categories—other than substances and actions—possessing generic attributes must be determined by some attribute, since unqualified causality is impossible. Now neither colourhood etc. nor existence can be the determinant here, since they cover (respectively) less and more ground. Hence something must be stated to inhere in all the twenty-four (qualities), and that is qualityhood.

*Abiding in substances:* Although the fact of abiding in substances is not a definition—for it unduly extends to actions etc.—yet the meaning (of qualityhood) is the fact of possessing generic attributes other than existence that are the determinant of what is inclusive of substancehood. Qualityhood is a determinant of what is inclusive of substancehood, and qualities are possessed of it. Neither substancehood nor actionhood is a determinant of what is inclusive of substancehood, since ether



etc.<sup>1</sup> do not possess substance or action.<sup>2</sup> And since the state of being substancehood (*dravyatva*), the state of being a generic attribute, and so on, are not generic attributes, they are excluded.

*Without qualities, etc.*—Although the state of being without qualities applies to actions etc.<sup>3</sup> also, yet it must be understood (that qualityhood consists in) possessing generic attributes, being other than actions and having no qualities. Generic attributes etc. do not possess generic attributes, actions are not other than actions, and substances are not without qualities; hence the definition does not unduly extend to them. *Without actions* is a statement of fact, not a definition; for then it would wrongly extend to ether etc.

### THEIR VARIOUS GROUPINGS

रूपं रसः स्पर्शगन्धौ परत्वमपरत्वकम् ॥ ८६ ॥  
 द्रवो गुरुत्वं स्नेहश्च वेगो मूर्तगुणा अमी ।<sup>1</sup>  
 धर्माधर्मौ भावना च शब्दो बुद्ध्यादयोऽपि च ॥ ८७ ॥  
 एतेऽमूर्तगुणाः सर्वे विद्वद्भिः परिकीर्तिताः ।  
 संख्यादयो विभागान्ता उभयेषां गुणा मताः ॥ ८८ ॥

<sup>1</sup> Refers to space, time and the soul.

<sup>2</sup> That is, by the relation of inherence.

<sup>3</sup> Refers to generic attributes and the rest.

<sup>4</sup> There is a different reading: *Dravatvaṁ sneha-vegaśca matā mūrta-guṇā amī*. In this the word 'weight' is to be supplied from the particle *ca* (and).

86 (contd.)-88. Colour, taste, touch, smell, distance and nearness, liquidity, weight, oiliness and impulse (*vega*)—these are the qualities of limited things. Merit and demerit, tendency, sound, as also knowledge and the rest—all these are described by scholars as the qualities of unlimited things. (Qualities) beginning with number and ending with disjunction are considered to be the qualities of both.

*Impulse*—Impulse includes elasticity. *Qualities of limited things*—i.e. they do not abide in unlimited things. Their definition is: being any one of the above (nine) qualities. So also with what follows.<sup>3</sup>

*Qualities of unlimited things*—i.e. they do not abide in limited things. *Of both*—i.e. qualities of both limited and unlimited things.

संयोगश्च विभागश्च संख्या द्वित्वादिकास्तथा ।

द्विपृथक्त्वादयस्तद्वदेतेऽनेकाश्रिता गुणाः ॥ ८९ ॥

89. Conjunction, disjunction, numbers such as duality, the separateness of two entities (from something)<sup>4</sup> and so on—these are likewise qualities that abide in more than one thing.

<sup>1</sup> Viz. pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort.

<sup>2</sup> See verse 4.

<sup>3</sup> That is, the state of being qualities of unlimited things is the state of being any one of the above ten qualities beginning with merit.

<sup>4</sup> E.g. a jar and a cloth are (together) separate from a jar.

*Abide, etc.*—Conjunction, disjunction, duality, etc. abide in two things. Trinity, quaternity, etc. abide in three things, four things, etc. This is the idea.

अतः शेषगुणाः सर्वे मता एकैकवृत्तयः ।  
 बुद्ध्यादिषट्कं स्पर्शान्ताः स्नेहः सांसिद्धिको द्रवः ॥ ९० ॥  
 अदृष्टभावनाशब्दा अमी वैशेषिका गुणाः ।  
 संख्यादिरपरत्वान्तो द्रवोऽसांसिद्धिकस्तथा ॥ ९१ ॥  
 गुरुत्ववेगौ सामान्यगुणा एते प्रकीर्तिताः ।  
 संख्यादिरपरत्वान्तो द्रवत्वं स्नेह एव च ॥ ९२ ॥  
 एते तु द्वीन्द्रियग्राह्याः ; अथ स्पर्शान्तशब्दकाः ।  
 बाह्येकैकेन्द्रियग्राह्याः ; गुरुत्वादृष्टभावनाः ॥ ९३ ॥  
 अतीन्द्रियाः ; विभूनां तु ये स्युर्वैशेषिका गुणाः ।  
 अकारणगुणोत्पन्ना एते तु परिकीर्तिताः ॥ ९४ ॥

90-94. All other qualities except these are considered to abide in a single individual. The group of six beginning with knowledge, (the four) ending with touch, oiliness, natural liquidity, merit and demerit, tendency and sound—these are special qualities. (Qualities) beginning with number and ending with nearness, artificial liquidity, weight and impulse—these are described to be general qualities. (Qualities) beginning with number and ending with nearness, liquidity and oiliness—these are perceptible to two organs. While (the four) ending with touch, as also sound, are percep-



tible to a single external organ. Weight, merit and demerit, and tendency are transcendent. The special qualities of the omnipresent substances are spoken of as not being produced in accordance with the qualities of their causes.

*All other, etc.*—That is to say, colour, taste, smell touch, unity, dimension, the separateness of one thing (from others), distance and nearness, knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, weight, liquidity, oiliness, tendency, merit and demerit, and sound. *Beginning with knowledge*—i.e. knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort. *Ending with touch*—i.e. colour, taste, smell and touch. *Drava* (liquid) here means liquidity.

*Vaiśeṣika* is the same as *viśeṣa*, the suffix *thak* signifying identity of meaning. In other words, special qualities. *Number, etc.*—That is to say, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, distance and nearness.

*Two organs*—Since they are perceptible to the eye and the skin as well. *External*—Since colour and the rest are perceptible to the eye etc.

*Qualities of the omnipresent substances*—That is to say, knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit and demerit, tendency and sound. *Not being produced, etc.*—The qualities that are produced in an effect by the qualities of its cause are qualities that are in accordance with the qualities of their causes, as for instance colour etc. These will be described presently.

Knowledge etc. however, are not of that kind, since the soul etc. are without a cause.

अपाकजास्तु स्पर्शान्ता द्रवत्वं च तथाविधम् ।  
 स्नेहवेगगुरुत्वैकपृथक्त्वपरिमाणकम् ॥ ९५ ॥  
 स्थितिस्थापक इत्येते स्युः कारणगुणोद्भवाः ।  
 संयोगश्च विभागश्च वेगश्चैते तु कर्मजाः ॥ ९६ ॥

95-96. (The four) ending with touch that are not produced by the action of fire, liquidity of that kind, oiliness, impulse, weight, separateness of one thing (from others), dimension, and elasticity—these are produced by the qualities of their causes. Conjunction, disjunction and impulse—these, however, are produced by action.

*Not produced, etc.*—Colour etc. that are produced by the action of fire (*pāka*) are not produced in accordance with the qualities of their causes; hence the qualification, *not produced by the action of fire. Of that kind, i.e. not produced by the action of fire.* Unity also should be understood as belonging to this group.<sup>1</sup>

*Conjunction, etc.*—Although the fact of being produced by action is not a common feature,<sup>2</sup> since it wrongly extends to jars etc. and does not extend, as it

<sup>1</sup> That is, produced by the qualities of its cause. Not so duality etc. which are due to the notion of addition (*apekṣābuddhi*).

<sup>2</sup> Of conjunction, disjunction and impulse.

should, to conjunction that is due to conjunction,<sup>1</sup> yet it should be understood to mean the possession of those generic attributes concomitant with qualityhood that abide in things produced by action.<sup>2</sup> The same is to be understood in other cases also.<sup>3</sup>

स्पर्शान्तपरिमाणैकपृथक्त्वस्नेहशब्दके ।

भवेदसमवायित्वम् ; अथ वैशेषिके गुणे ॥ ९७ ॥

आत्मनः स्यान्निमित्तत्वम् ; उष्णस्पर्शगुरुत्वयोः ।

वेगेऽपि च द्रवत्वे च संयोगादिद्वये तथा ॥ ९८ ॥

द्विधैव कारणत्वं स्यात् ; अथ प्रादेशिको भवेत् ।

वैशेषिको विभुगुणः संयोगादिद्वयं तथा ॥ ९९ ॥

97-99. The four ending with touch, dimension, separateness of one thing (from others), oiliness and sound have non-inherence. While the fact of being an auxiliary cause abides in the special qualities of the soul. In warm touch weight, impulse, liquidity, and the two beginning with conjunction there are both kinds of causality. The special qualities of the omnipres-

<sup>1</sup> As the conjunction of the body with a book is due to the conjunction of the hand with the book.

<sup>2</sup> A jar is produced by an action, but it has no generic attribute concomitant with qualityhood such as colourhood and tastehood. And conjunction due to conjunction is not produced by an action (but by a quality); yet it has the concomitant generic attribute mentioned above, viz. conjunction-hood.

<sup>3</sup> That is to say, being of sectional extensity (in verse 99) is the possession of those generic attributes concomitant with qualityhood that abide in what has partial extensity.



ent substances, as also the two beginning with conjunction, are of sectional extensity.

*The four, etc.*—Here touch should be regarded as other than hot. Since the suffix *tva* in *eka-prthaktva* (separateness of one thing) must be joined to each term (of the compound), the word should be taken to mean both unity and separateness, and the word 'separateness' to mean separateness of one thing (from others). *Have non-inherence*: The colour, taste, smell and touch of a jar etc. spring from those of its two halves. Similarly the dimension etc. of the two halves of a jar are the non-inherent cause of the dimension etc. of the jar. Sound also is the non-inherent cause of a second sound.<sup>1</sup> The same<sup>2</sup> should be understood with regard to elasticity as also separateness of one thing (from others).

*The fact of being an auxiliary cause*—That is to say, because knowledge etc. are the auxiliary cause<sup>3</sup> of desire and so forth.

*Both kinds of causality*—non-inherent and auxiliary. For instance, warm touch (of the parts) is the non-inherent cause of warm touch (of the whole), and the auxiliary cause of (the touch) that is produced by the action of fire. Weight (of the parts) is the non-inherent cause of weight (of the whole) and (the first) fall, and

<sup>1</sup> Sound is a quality, the inherent cause of which is ether. The first sound inhering in ether produces the second sound, and is therefore the non-inherent cause of the latter.

<sup>2</sup> That is, the elasticity and separateness of one thing (from another) belonging to the pair of halves of a jar are the non-inherent cause of those of the jar, and so on.

<sup>3</sup> Not non-inherent cause. See footnote 2 on p. 25.

the auxiliary cause of impact. Impulse (of the parts) is the non-inherent cause of impulse (of the whole) and movement, and the auxiliary cause of impact. Liquidity (of the parts) is the non-inherent cause of liquidity (of the whole) and dripping, and the auxiliary cause of cohesion. The conjunction of the kettle-drum and stick is the auxiliary cause of sound, while the conjunction of the kettle-drum and ether is its non-inherent cause. The disjunction of the two halves of a bamboo is the auxiliary cause of sound, and the disjunction of the halves of the bamboo and ether its non-inherent cause. *Are of sectional extensity*—cover only a part of a given space.

### COLOUR, TASTE, SMELL AND TOUCH

चक्षुर्ग्राह्यं भवेद्रूपं द्रव्यादेरुपलम्भकम् ।

चक्षुषः सहकारि स्यात् ; शुक्लादिकमनेकधा ॥ १०० ॥

100. Colour is perceptible to the eye and is an aid to the perception of substances etc.<sup>1</sup> It is auxiliary to the eye, and is diverse—white and so on.

*Colour, etc.*—The generic attribute colourhood is a fact of perception.

Objection: But there is no perception in which the word *rūpa* (colour) specifically occurs.

<sup>1</sup> Refers to actions, generic attributes, inherence as well as certain qualities of the visible substances. See verses 54-55.

Reply: The word *rūpa* may not actually be used, yet a particular generic attribute common to blue, yellow and other colours is indeed a fact of experience. Although the word *rūpa* may not actually be used, yet we certainly have such perceptions as 'blue colour' or 'yellow colour,' in which the (synonymous) word *varṇa* specifically occurs. Similarly generic attributes such as blue-colourhood (*nilatva*) are also facts of perception. It cannot be urged that blue and other colours are each a single individual, and hence, on account of abiding in a single individual, blue-colourhood and so on cannot be generic attributes. Because we have the perception that blue colour has been destroyed, red colour has been produced, and so on; hence, being subject to origin and destruction, blue colour etc. are manifold. Otherwise when one blue colour is destroyed, the world would altogether be devoid of blue colour. Nor can it be urged that the above perception is concerning the origin and destruction of only the inherence of blue and red colours; for the perception does not specifically mention inherence. Neither can it be contended that the (admission of) oneness is due to the perception that it is that same blue colour, and to considerations of simplicity. Because the perception in question has for its object something of the same class, as is the case with the statement, 'It is that same *Gurjari* (tune)'; and the question of simplicity is nullified by perception.<sup>1</sup> Otherwise jars etc. would also become one, and the notion of their origin and destruc-

<sup>1</sup> Of the multiplicity of individuals.



tion would only centre round inherence.<sup>1</sup> By this taste etc. are also explained.<sup>2</sup>

*Perceptible to the eye*—That is to say, a special quality perceptible to the eye. Similarly with regard to what comes next.<sup>3</sup> *Is an aid, etc.*—is the cause of the perception. This is being explained: *It is auxiliary, etc.* Manifested colour is the cause of the ocular perception of substances, qualities, actions and generic attributes. *Diverse, etc.*—And that colour is of many kinds, being divided into white, blue, yellow, red, green, grey, composite (*citra*), etc.

Objection: How can composite colour be an extra variety?

Reply: In the following manner: The aggregate that is made up of parts comprising blue, yellow and other colours cannot in the first place be colourless, since this would make it imperceptible. Nor are blue and other colours covering an entire body brought into existence, since in that case blue colour would be perceived even where there is yellow colour only. Neither are blue and other colours that do not cover an entire body brought into existence, because it would be contradictory for qualities of a class that covers an entire body to cover only a part of it. Therefore we conclude that different kinds of colour produce in the aggregate a

<sup>1</sup> Of the jars. That is, it would mean the origin and destruction not of the jars, but only of their inherence in their halves.

<sup>2</sup> That is, it also proves the existence of tastehood etc. as generic attributes.

<sup>3</sup> Viz. taste, touch and smell. That is, they too are special qualities perceptible to the tongue, skin and nose, respectively.

distinct colour called composite. Hence also we have the experience, 'A composite colour.' For it would be cumbrous to assume many colours (in its stead).<sup>1</sup> Thus, since blue colour, for instance, may be supposed to obstruct the production of yellow or any other colour in the aggregate, neither yellow nor any other colour is produced.

By this touch also is explained.<sup>2</sup> Taste etc. also do not cover only a part of a body; but there is no harm even if there is no taste in an aggregate made up of parts possessing tastes of different kinds. There the tongue perceives the taste of the parts only; and since the tongue etc. have not the power of perceiving substances, there is no harm even if the aggregate is without any taste. The new school, however, says: In the aggregate there is a variety of colours covering only a part of it; for it is cumbrous to assume that blue colour, for instance, obstructs yellow or any other colour. This is also the explanation of a scriptural text like the following: 'That is called a *nīlāvṛṣa* (blue bull) which has a grey mouth and tail, white hoofs and horns and is (otherwise) red in colour.'<sup>3</sup> It cannot be urged that there is contradiction between two individuals possessed of generic attributes, each covering an entire body as well as only a part of it;

<sup>1</sup> One may contend that since blue and other colours forming the parts produce an aggregate, the latter also must have those different colours. This is refuted as above.

<sup>2</sup> That is, for the above reasons composite touch is also to be admitted.

<sup>3</sup> *Laghu-Śāṅkha-Smṛti* II ; (with a slight variation) *Padma-Purāṇa*, Uttara-khaṇḍa, xxxii, 22 and *Bṛhaspati-Smṛti*.

for there is no evidence to support it.<sup>1</sup> Nor can it be urged that for the sake of simplicity, we must admit only one colour; for this is contrary to experience. Otherwise jars etc. too should be one, for the sake of simplicity. By this touch etc. are also explained.<sup>2</sup>

जलादिपरमाणौ तन्नित्यम्, अन्यत्सहेतुकम् ।

रसस्तु रसनाग्राह्यो मधुरादिरनेकधा ॥ १०१ ॥

101. It (colour) is eternal in atoms of water etc. while the other (colour) is possessed of a cause. Taste is perceived by the tongue. It is of many kinds—sweet and so forth.

*It is eternal, etc.*—Colour is eternal in atoms of water and fire. But the colour of atoms of earth is not eternal, since under the action of fire another colour is produced in them. When a jar has been baked, we certainly do not find its parts unbaked. The shreds of the reddened halves of a jar never have parts that are blue. In this order even an atom must be held to be affected by the action of fire. *The other*, i.e. colour other than that of atoms of water and fire, *is possessed of a cause*, or is caused.

Taste is being described: *Taste, etc.*

सहकारी रसज्ञाया ; नित्यतादि च पूर्ववत् ।

घ्राणग्राह्यो भवेद्बन्धो घ्राणस्यैवोपकारकः ॥ १०२ ॥

<sup>1</sup> For example, we may have a red and a yellow ball, as also a red and yellow ball.

<sup>2</sup> Touch, taste and smell also can be various in different parts of an aggregate, and there is no necessity of admitting a composite variety of these.



102. It is auxiliary to the tongue. Its eternity etc. are as above. Smell is perceived by the nose, and is an aid to it.

*Auxiliary etc.*—i.e. taste is the cause of palatal perception. *As above*: That is to say, taste is eternal in atoms of water, and every other taste is transitory.

Smell is being described: *Smell, etc. An aid*—i. e. the cause of nasal perception. All smell is only transitory.

सौरभश्चाऽसौरभश्च स द्वेधा परिकीर्तितः ।

स्पर्शस्त्वगिन्द्रियग्राह्यस्त्वचः स्यादुपकारकः ॥ १०३ ॥

103. It is stated to be of two kinds—fragrance and stench. Touch is perceived by the skin, and is an aid to it.

Touch is being described: *Touch, etc. An aid*—That is to say, touch is the cause of tactual perception.

अनुष्णाशीतशीतोष्णभेदात्स त्रिविधो मतः ।

काठिन्यादि क्षितावेव ; नित्यतादि च पूर्ववत् ॥ १०४ ॥

104. It is considered to be of three kinds, according to its division into cold, hot, and neither hot nor cold. Hardness etc. are in earth alone. Its eternity etc. are as above.

*It is, etc.*—In earth and air the touch is neither hot nor cold, in water it is cold, in fire it is hot. *Hardness, etc.*—That is to say, hard as well as soft touch is in earth alone. Hardness etc. are not generic attributes abiding in conjunction<sup>1</sup>; for in that case it would be perceptible to the eye. *As above*—That is to say, the touch of atoms of water, fire and air is eternal, while the rest is transitory.

<sup>1</sup> But a particular form of touch only.

CHANGE IN EARTH THROUGH THE ACTION  
OF FIRE

एतेषां पाकजत्वं तु क्षितौ, नान्यत्र कुत्रचित् ।

तत्रापि परमाणौ स्यात्पाको वैशेषिके नये ॥ १०५ ॥

105. The fact of their being due to change through the action of fire (*pāka*) occurs in earth alone, and nowhere else. Even there, change through the action of fire takes place, according to the Vaiśeṣika system, only in atoms.

*Their*—Of colour, taste, smell, and touch. *No-where else*—Because in earth alone we find change of colour, taste, smell and touch through the conjunction of fire. Colour etc. do not change in water, even if it is heated in a hundred ways. Fragrance and heat in water are ascertained, by the principle of agreement and difference, to be merely adventitious, like the cold touch, for instance, in air and earth. *Even there*, i.e. in earth, it is only in atoms that colour etc. change through the action of fire—so the Vaiśeṣikas maintain. Their idea is as follows: Change through the action of fire is not possible in the parts held together by an aggregate; but when the aggregate is destroyed by the conjunction of fire, change through the action of fire takes place in the disengaged atoms. Again, by the conjunction of the atoms that have been changed by the action of fire, the final aggregate is formed in the order of dyads etc. Since fire is exceedingly swift, the former aggregation is destroyed and a new aggregation produced in the twinkling of an eye. Here, for the enlightenment of the pupil,

the process of change is being set forth in terms of moments (*kṣaṇa*)<sup>1</sup> showing in how many moments, commencing from that of their destruction, a dyad etc. are recreated and attain a new colour etc.

Now, if disjunction due to disjunction<sup>2</sup> is not admitted, the duration is nine moments. But if it is admitted, then disjunction must be held to produce disjunction only by depending on something. If it does that independently of anything, then it becomes an action. For 'Action is the independent cause of conjunction and disjunction'<sup>3</sup>—so runs the Vaiśeṣika aphorism (I. i. 17). The word 'independent' means: independent of any positive entity that is produced after it. Otherwise an action also, to get a subsequent conjunction, must require the cessation of the previous conjunction—which would make the definition too narrow. Now, if the disjunction due to disjunction takes place immediately after the time associated with the destruction of the conjunction that produced the substance, then the process takes ten moments. If, however, the disjunction due to disjunction takes place immediately after the time associated with the destruction of the substance, then the process takes eleven moments.

<sup>1</sup> The smallest indivisible part of time.

<sup>2</sup> The disjunction of the atom from ether, consequent on the disjunction of the two atoms constituting a dyad. See verse 120. Unless this is admitted, there can be no conjunction of the atom with an object in space at a subsequent moment, and consequently the action in the atom cannot cease.

<sup>3</sup> Whenever an action takes place, there is automatically either conjunction or disjunction.



For instance, the process taking nine moments is as follows: Through the conjunction of fire there is action in one of the atoms; then there is disjunction from the other atom (of the dyad); this is followed by the destruction of the conjunction that produced the dyad; (1) then comes the destruction of the dyad. (2) Next there is the destruction of the dark or any other colour in the atom. (3) Then there is the origination of red or any other colour. (4) Then comes action conducive to the production of the (new) substance. (5) This is followed by disjunction. (6) Then there is the destruction of the previous conjunction. (7) Next comes the conjunction that produces the (new) substance. (8) This leads to the production of the dyad. (9) Then there is the origination of the red or any other colour.

Objection: Let the action conducive to the production of the (new) substance take place in the atom at the moment of the destruction of the dark or any other colour, or at the moment of the origination of the red colour.

Reply: Not so; for without the destruction of the action that has started in the atom possessing the conjunction of fire, as also without the origination of the qualities, there cannot be another action in the atom, since no action can be produced in anything that already has an action, and in a substance that has no qualities no action conducive to the production of a (new) substance can take place.

Objection: Yet red or any other colour may originate in the atom simultaneously with the cessation of the dark or any other colour.

Reply: No, because the destruction of the previous colour etc. is also a cause<sup>1</sup> in the production of another colour.

This is the process lasting for nine moments. Now about that lasting for ten moments. That would be if the disjunction due to disjunction takes place immediately after the time associated with the destruction of the conjunction that produced the substance. For instance, through the conjunction of fire there is action in the atom that goes to make up the dyad; then there is disjunction; next there is the destruction of the conjunction that produced the substance; (1) this is followed by the destruction of the dyad and the disjunction due to disjunction. (2) Then comes the destruction of the dark colour<sup>2</sup> and of the previous (non-productive) conjunction.<sup>3</sup> (3) This is followed by the origination of red colour and the conjunction with the neighbouring point of space. (4) Then there is the destruction of the action in the atom that was produced by the contact of fire. (5) Next comes action conducive to the production of the (new) substance, owing to the conjunction of a soul<sup>4</sup> possessed of merits and demerits. (6) Then there is disjunction.<sup>5</sup> (7) Then comes the destruction of the previous conjunction. (8) This is followed by the conjunction that would produce the dyad. (9) Then there is the origination of the dyad. (10) Then comes the origination of red colour.

<sup>1</sup> Hence it must precede the latter.

<sup>2</sup> Of the atom.

<sup>3</sup> Of the atom and ether.

<sup>4</sup> Viz. the potter or the person for whom the jar is made.

<sup>5</sup> Of the atom from the point of space occupied by it.

Now about the process that takes eleven moments. Through the conjunction of fire there is action in the atom; then there is disjunction; next comes the destruction of the conjunction that produced the substance; (1) then there is the destruction of the dyad. (2) This is followed by the disjunction due to disjunction and destruction of the dark colour, immediately after the time associated with the destruction of the dyad. (3) Then there is the destruction of the previous (non-productive) conjunction as also the origination of red colour. (4) Then there is (non-productive) conjunction with another point of space. (5) Next there is the destruction of the action in the atom that was produced by the contact of fire. (6) Then there is action conducive to the production of the (new) substance, owing to the conjunction of a soul possessed of merits and demerits. (7) This is followed by disjunction. (8) Then there is the destruction of the previous conjunction. (9) Next comes that conjunction with the other atom which would produce the (new) substance. (10) Then there is the origination of the dyad. (11) Next there is the origination of red colour etc.

The destruction and origination of the colours do not take place, analogously to the intermediate sound,<sup>1</sup> from the same conjunction of fire, because the same

<sup>1</sup> A sound produced at one part of ether leads to a succession of sounds. When one of these is produced in the ether circumscribed by the ear, we perceive it. In this series of sounds the second one destroys the first and produces the third. Similarly the same conjunction of fire might destroy the dark colour and produce the red one. But it does not.



fire does not last so long.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, if the destroying agency is also the originating agency, then after the (conjunction of) fire is destroyed with the colour etc. the atom will ever remain colourless.<sup>2</sup> And if the originating agency is also the destroying agency, then after the fire is destroyed with the origination of the red colour, the atom can never be redder.<sup>3</sup>

If, on the other hand, we conceive action to take place in the other atom also, then qualities originate even beginning with the fifth moment. For instance, action takes place in one of the atoms; then there is disjunction; this is followed by the destruction of the conjunction that produced the dyad and by (productive) action in the other atom; (1) then comes the destruction of the dyad, as also the disjunction due to action in the other atom—this is one moment. (2) Then there is the destruction of the dark or any other colour, as also of the previous conjunction owing to the above disjunction—this is another moment. (3) Then there is the origination of red colour as also the conjunction that produces the (new) substance—this is the third moment. (4) Next there is the origination of the dyad. (5) Then

<sup>1</sup> The conjunction of fire that destroys the dyad is also destroyed with it. It does not last till the moment preceding the origination of red colour, and hence cannot be its cause.

<sup>2</sup> Since the final conjunction of fire, coming at the end of a series of destructions and originations of colours, must also destroy the final colour, and since it is itself destroyed, there is no other agency to originate another colour.

<sup>3</sup> The cause in this case is the conjunction of fire, and the effect just a coloured atom of earth. So the cause being the same, the effects cannot be different, but as a matter of fact, atoms of vermilion are much redder than others.

comes the origination of red colour. These are the five moments.

If we conceive action to take place in the other atom simultaneously with the destruction of the substance, qualities originate at the sixth moment. For instance, the action in one atom leads to its disjunction from the other atom; then there is the destruction of the conjunction that produced the dyad; (1) next comes the destruction of the dyad as also action in the other atom. (2) Then there is the destruction of the dark or any other colour as also disjunction due to action in the other atom. (3) Next comes the origination of red colour as also the destruction of the previous conjunction in the other atom. (4) Then there is conjunction with another atom. (5) Next there is the origination of the dyad. (6) Then there is the origination of red colour. This is the process lasting for six moments.

Similarly, if we conceive action to take place in the other atom at the moment of the destruction of the dark colour, then the process takes seven moments. For instance, there is action in the atom; then there is disjunction from the other atom; next comes the destruction of the conjunction that produced the dyad; (1) then there is the destruction of the dyad. (2) Then there is the destruction of the dark or any other colour as also action in the other atom. (3) This is followed by the origination of red colour, and in the other atom the disjunction due to action. (4) Then there is the destruction of the previous conjunction with the other atom. (5) Next comes conjunction with another atom. (6) Then there is the origination of the dyad. (7) Then

comes the origination of red colour. This is the process lasting for seven moments.

Likewise, if we conceive action to take place in the other atom simultaneously with the origination of red colour, the process takes eight moments. For instance, there is action in the atom; then disjunction from the other atom; next, the destruction of the conjunction that produced the dyad; (1) then the destruction of the dyad. (2) Then there is the destruction of the dark colour. (3) Next comes the origination of red colour as also action in the other atom. (4) Then there is the disjunction due to action in the other atom. (5) Then comes the destruction of the previous conjunction in the other atom. (6) This is followed by conjunction with the other atom. (7) Then there is the origination of the dyad. (8) Next comes the origination of red colour. This is the process lasting for eight moments.

### NUMBER, DIMENSION AND SEPARATENESS

नैयायिकानां तु नये द्व्यणुकादावपीभ्यते ।

गणनाव्यवहारे तु हेतुः संख्याभिधीयते ॥ १०६ ॥

106. In the logicians' system, however, it (change through the action of fire) is also admitted in dyads etc. The cause of the convention of counting is called number.

*In the logicians' system, etc.*—According to the logicians, change through the action of fire takes place even in aggregates such as the dyad. Their idea is



this: Since the aggregates are porous, their change through the action of the fine parts of fire that penetrate them is not inconsistent, although the parts of the aggregates may be held together (by the latter); for it is cumbrous to assume an infinite number of aggregates (being successively produced) and their destruction. Thus the recognition that it is that same jar is also consistent. Where, however, there is no recognition, there the destruction of the aggregate also is admitted.

In order to describe number the text says: *The cause, etc.* That is to say, the extraordinary cause of the convention of counting is number.

नित्येषु नित्यमेकत्वम्, अनित्येऽनित्यमिष्यते ।  
द्वित्वादयः परार्थान्ता अपेक्षाबुद्धिजा मताः ॥ १०७ ॥

107. Unity<sup>1</sup> is considered to be eternal in the eternal substances and transitory in the transitory substances. Numbers beginning with duality and ending with a hundred thousand billions are considered to spring from the notion of addition.

*Unity, etc.*—Unity is eternal in the eternal substances such as the atoms, while it is transitory in the transitory substances such as jars. Numbers that collectively cover many things, such as duality, are the outcome of the notion of addition (*apekṣā-buddhi*).

The numbers, according to the logicians, are unity, duality, etc. not one, two, etc.

अनेकाश्रयपर्याप्ता एते तु परिकीर्तिताः ।

अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशाश्च नाशस्तेषां निरूपितः ॥ १०८ ॥

108. They are said collectively to extend over many substratums. Their destruction has been decided to take place from that of the notion of addition.

*They are, etc.*—Although the inherence of duality etc. is even in each jar and so on, yet owing to the absence of any notion that one is two, and because of the existence of the notion that one is not two, a particular relation of duality etc. called collective extensity (*paryāpti*), abiding in many substances, is assumed. *Their destruction, etc.*—First there is the notion of addition; then there is the origination of duality; next comes the perception of the characteristic trait (*viśeṣaṇa*) of duality, that is, the indeterminate perception of dualityhood<sup>1</sup>; this is followed by the perception of what<sup>2</sup> is possessed of dualityhood, as also the destruction of the notion of addition; then there is the destruction of duality. Although knowledge lasts only for two moments—because the perceptible special qualities of the omnipresent substances<sup>3</sup> are destroyed by the qualities that succeed them—yet the notion of addition is assumed to last for three moments. Otherwise at the time of indeterminate perception, after the notion of addition has been destroyed, duality itself would be de-

<sup>1</sup> As well as duality. This is a vague sort of knowledge, in which the object, its characteristic trait and the relation between the two are not well-defined. See verse 136.

<sup>2</sup> That is, duality.

<sup>3</sup> The soul and ether.

stroyed, and no perception of it would take place, owing to the absence of any object at the time; for it is only *existent* objects that are admitted as being perceptible to the eyes etc. Therefore the perception of duality etc. is assumed to be destructive of the notion of addition. It cannot be questioned how the destruction of duality follows from that of the notion of addition; for since there is no perception of duality at any other time, it is assumed that the notion of addition gives birth to it, and with its destruction, duality also is destroyed. Hence it is also assumed that duality etc. created by the notion of addition of a particular individual are perceived by him alone. It cannot be urged that the notion of addition should be held to be the cause of the *perception* of duality; because, for the sake of simplicity, it ought to be considered the cause of duality itself. It is *yogins* who have the notion of addition regarding dyads etc. which are beyond the senses. With regard to atoms etc. at the time of the beginning of creation, the notion of addition of God, or of *yogins* belonging to other universes, is the cause of duality etc.

अनेकैकत्वबुद्धिर्या सापेक्षाबुद्धिरिष्यते ।

परिमाणं भवेन्मानव्यवहारस्य कारणम् ॥ १०९ ॥

109. The notion of many unities is considered to be the notion of addition. Dimension is the cause of the convention of measurement.

It may be asked what is the notion of addition? This is being answered: *The notion, etc.* That is to say, a notion of the form, 'This is one, this is one,' and so on.



One thing should be understood in this connection. Where the notion of unity is concerning an indefinite number of objects, there a number conveying multiplicity, which is different from those conveying triplicity etc. is produced, as in the case of an army, a forest, etc. This is the view of the author<sup>1</sup> of the *Nyāya-kandali*<sup>2</sup>. Udayana, however, holds that multiplicity is nothing but triplicity etc. So the generic attribute multiplicityhood, which includes triplicityhood etc. is not an additional entity. In the case of an army, a forest and so on, although triplicity etc. are produced, these are not comprehended on account of some defect.<sup>3</sup> Hence the notion, 'This army is more numerous than that,' is consistent. But they would not be consistent if multiplicity conveyed a different number, because it would not admit of any comparison. This should be borne in mind.

Dimension is being described: *Dimension, etc.* That is to say, dimension is the extraordinary cause of the convention of measurement.

अणु दीर्घं महद्द्रव्यमिति तद्भेद ईरितः ।

अनित्ये तदनित्यं स्यात्, नित्ये नित्यमुदाहृतम् ॥ ११० ॥

110. Its varieties are said to be—minute, medium (*mahat*), long and short. It is transitory in transitory things, and is described as eternal in eternal things.

<sup>1</sup> Sridharācārya.

<sup>2</sup> A commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras*.

<sup>3</sup> Viz. the absence of the definitive notion of many unities.

It is fourfold—minute, medium, long and short. *It*—i.e. dimension. *Eternal*—Here the word 'dimension' is to be repeated.

संख्यातः परिमाणाच्च प्रचयादपि जायते ।

अनित्यं, द्व्यणुकादौ तु संख्याजन्यमुदाहृतम् ॥ १११ ॥

111. The transitory (dimension) springs from number, dimension and also accumulation. That of a dyad etc. is described as being due to number.

*Springs from*—Here also the word 'dimension' is to be repeated. The word 'transitory' is to be construed with what goes before. So the meaning is that the transitory number is due to number, to dimension and to accumulation. Of these, that due to number is being exemplified: *In a dyad, etc.* The cause of the dimension of a dyad or a triad<sup>1</sup> is not the dimension of atoms or dyads, since dimensions produce superior dimensions of the same kind; but the atomic dimension of a dyad is not superior to that of an atom; and the dimension of a triad is not of the same kind (as that of a dyad). Hence the *number* duality that abides in an atom is the non-inherent cause of the dimension of a dyad, and the number triplicity that abides in a dyad is the non-inherent cause of the dimension of a triad.

परिमाणं घटादौ परिमाणजमुच्यते ।

प्रचयः शिथिलाख्यो यः संयोगस्तेन जन्यते ॥ ११२ ॥

परिमाणं तूलकादौ ; नाशस्त्वाश्रयनाशतः ।

संख्यावत्तु पृथक्त्वं स्यात्पृथक्प्रत्ययकारणम् ॥ ११३ ॥

<sup>1</sup> Made up of three dyads.

112-13. The dimension of a jar etc. is said to be that due to dimension. Accumulation is that conjunction which is designated as loose. This causes that dimension of cotton etc. The destruction (of dimension) is due to that of its substratum. Separateness is the cause of the notion of a thing being separate. (It is) analogous to number.

The dimension due to dimension is being exemplified: *The dimension, etc.* The dimension of a jar etc. is caused by that of its two halves, and so on. To illustrate the dimension due to accumulation, the text goes on to define accumulation: *Accumulation, etc.* And dimension is destroyed just after its substratum is destroyed. This is being stated: *The destruction, etc.* That is to say, of dimension itself. It cannot be asked, how can only the destruction of the aggregate lead to the destruction of its dimension, since it is a well-known fact of perception that even while the aggregate lasts, the loss or accession of three, four or more atoms produces a new dimension, although the aggregate may still be recognised as being the same? Because a dyad must be held to be destroyed when it loses an atom; and when it is destroyed, the triad also is destroyed. In this order the destruction of the final aggregate is inevitable. And when there is a destroying agency, it is impossible to refute destruction merely by a denial. When there is an accession of parts in the body etc. the non-inherent cause (conjunction) is inevitably destroyed, and hence also the aggregate.

It cannot be urged that even without the destruction of a cloth, for instance, there would be an increase



in its dimension by the conjunction of an extra thread; for even there the destruction of the non-inherent cause, viz. conjunction of the thread, by the impact of the loom etc. is inevitable. Moreover, if the extra thread forms a part of that cloth, it would never be the identical cloth before that; for the cause, viz. the extra thread, would then be missing. And if the extra thread does not form a part of the cloth, it would not increase its dimension, like another substance joined to it. Therefore it must be admitted that in the instance cited, the addition of the extra thread destroys the previous cloth, and in its stead another cloth is produced. As for the recognition of the aggregate, it is due to both belonging, to the same class, as is the case with a lamp flame etc. It cannot be urged that the previous threads alone, with the help of the extra thread, may originate a new cloth while the old cloth lasts; for since it is contradictory for two limited things to occupy the same space, there cannot be two pieces of cloth there, and the simultaneous perception of more than one substance there is contrary to fact. Hence we must conclude that after the previous substance, which acts as an obstacle, is destroyed, another substance is produced.

Separateness is being described: *Separateness, etc.* The extraordinary cause of the notion that a thing is separate from something else is separateness. Its eternity etc. are like those of number. For instance, unity is eternal in eternal substances and transitory in transitory ones. Transitory unity is produced at the moment next to that of the origin of its substratum, and is destroyed after the latter is destroyed. So also the separateness of

one thing (from others). The separateness of two things, and so on, (from others) is analogous to duality etc.<sup>1</sup>

अन्योन्याभावतो नास्य चरितार्थत्वमिष्यते ।

अस्मात्पृथगिदं नेति प्रतीतिर्हि विलक्षणा ॥ ११४ ॥

114. Its purpose is not considered to be served by mutual non-existence; for the notion, 'It is separate from this,' is distinct from the notion, 'It is not this.'

Objection: In sentences like, 'It is separate from this,' we find a case of mutual non-existence. So why is separateness admitted as a distinct quality? It cannot be urged that there may well be separateness, but not mutual non-existence; for then there would be no such notion as, 'A jar is not colour.' In colour there is certainly no other quality<sup>2</sup> called separateness from a jar, nor is there in a jar any separateness from a jar,<sup>3</sup> in which case an indirect relation might be assumed.

This is being answered: *For the notion, etc.*

Objection: It is only a difference in words, but not in sense.

Reply: Not so; for unless there was a difference in sense, there would be an ablative case-ending in the sentence, 'A cloth is not a jar,' as in the sentence, 'It is separate from a jar.' Therefore the sense that requires an ablative case-ending is different from the sense of

<sup>1</sup> See verse 108.

<sup>2</sup> Because a quality cannot have any other quality.

<sup>3</sup> It cannot be separate from itself.

the negative particle 'not', which is mutual non-existence, and it is assumed to be a distinct quality.<sup>1</sup>

## CONJUNCTION AND DISJUNCTION

अप्राप्तयोस्तु या प्राप्तिः सैव संयोग ईरितः ।

कीर्तितस्त्रिविधस्त्वेषः, आद्योऽन्यतरकर्मजः ॥ ११५ ॥

115. The meeting of two things that are removed from each other is called conjunction. It is described as being of three kinds: The first is due to action in either of them.

Conjunction is being described: *The meeting, etc.* It is being divided: *It is described, etc.* It—refers to conjunction.

तथोभयक्रियाजन्यः, भवेत्संयोगजोऽपरः ।

आदिमः श्येनशैलादिसंयोगः परिकीर्तितः ॥ ११६ ॥

116. Similarly it may be due to action in both; and the third is due to conjunction. The conjunction of a falcon and a hill and so on is described as being of the first kind.

मेषयोः संनिपातो यः स द्वितीय उदाहृतः ।

कपालतरुसंयोगातसंयोगस्तरुकुम्भयोः ॥ ११७ ॥

तृतीय स्यात्; कर्मजोऽपि द्विधैव परिकीर्तितः ।

अभिघातो नोदनं च; शब्दहेतुरिहादिमः ॥ ११८ ॥

<sup>1</sup> The new school does not accept this view.



117-18. The encounter of two rams is said to be of the second kind. The conjunction of a jar and a tree owing to the conjunction of one-half of the jar and the tree is of the third kind. Conjunction due to action also is described as being twofold: Impact and contact. Of these the first is the cause of sound.

*Encounter*—i.e. conjunction. *Second*—i.e. due to action in both things. *Is of the third kind*—i.e. conjunction due to conjunction. This is to be construed with the preceding verse. *The first*—i.e. impact.

शब्दाहेतुर्द्वितीयः स्यात् ; विभागोऽपि त्रिधा भवेत् ।

एककर्मोद्भवस्त्वाद्यः, द्वयकर्मोद्भवोऽपरः ॥ ११९ ॥

119. The second is not the cause of sound. Disjunction also may be of three kinds. The first arises from action in one thing; the second from action in two things.

*The second*—i.e. the conjunction called contact.

Disjunction, which is the extraordinary cause of the notion that a thing is disjoined (from another), is being described: *Disjunction, etc. Action in one thing, etc.*—Their illustrations, we must understand, are the disjunction of the falcon from a hill, and so on, analogously to those of conjunction.<sup>1</sup>

विभागजस्तृतीयः स्यात् ; तृतीयोऽपि द्विधा भवेत् ।

हेतुमात्रविभागोऽप्यः, हेत्वहेतुविभागजः ॥ १२० ॥

<sup>1</sup> See the second half of verse 116 and the first half of verse 117.

120. And the third is due to disjunction. The third, again, may be of two kinds: that arising from the disjunction of the cause alone, and that arising from the disjunction of the the cause as also what is not the cause.

*The third*, viz. disjunction due to disjunction, springs from the disjunction of its cause alone, and from disjunction between its cause and what is not its cause. The first is where an action takes place in one of the two halves of a jar; then there is disjunction between the two halves; then destruction of the conjunction that originated the jar; next, destruction of the jar; then that very disjunction between the two halves of the jar produces disjunction between that half of the jar in which the action takes place and ether; next there is the destruction of conjunction with ether; then conjunction with another point of space; and finally the destruction of the action. It cannot be asked why that very action does not produce disjunction<sup>1</sup> from another point of space; for it is contradictory for the same action to cause that disjunction which is opposed to productive conjunction as also that disjunction which is opposed to non-productive conjunction. Otherwise a lotus bud would be shedding its petals as it blooms.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, if it causes that disjunction which

<sup>1</sup> That is, disjunction of the two halves of the jar from ether etc.

<sup>2</sup> In the case of a blooming lotus there is at its tip action that causes the disjunction which is opposed to unproductive conjunction. Now if that very action produces the disjunction that is opposed to the productive conjunction which is at the stem of the lotus, then it will destroy the productive conjunction and thereby destroy the lotus also.

is opposed to non-productive conjunction, then it will not cause that disjunction which is opposed to productive conjunction. It cannot be asked why the disjunction occurring in the cause does not also produce its disjunction from another point of space, before the substance is destroyed; for it is impossible for the part<sup>1</sup> that possesses that disjunction which is opposed to productive conjunction, to produce disjunction from another object in space while the substance exists.

The second<sup>2</sup> kind of disjunction is this: Where action in the hands produces disjunction of the hand from a tree, and this leads to a notion that the body also has been disjoined, there the action in the hand is not the cause of the disjunction of the body from the tree; for that action has a different substratum.<sup>3</sup> In the body there is no action at all; for action in an aggregate depends on action in all its parts taken together. Hence there the disjunction<sup>4</sup> between the cause and what is not the cause produces the disjunction between the effect<sup>5</sup> and what<sup>6</sup> is not the effect. Therefore disjunction is an extra quality. Otherwise there would be no notion with regard to the body that it has been disjoined.

<sup>1</sup> Viz. one of the two halves of the jar.

<sup>2</sup> Viz. disjunction due to that between its cause and what is not so.

<sup>3</sup> Viz. the hand, while the disjunction in question abides in the body and the tree.

<sup>4</sup> The disjunction between the body and the tree is due to that between the hand and the tree. Here the hand is the cause, and the tree is not.

<sup>5</sup> The body.

<sup>6</sup> The tree.



Hence disjunction is not rendered superfluous by the destruction of conjunction.<sup>1</sup>

### DISTANCE AND NEARNESS

परत्वं चापरत्वं च द्विविधं परिकीर्तितम् ।

दैशिकं कालिकं चापि ; मूर्त एव तु दैशिकम् ॥ १२१ ॥

परत्वं मूर्तसंयोगभूयस्त्वज्ञानतो भवेत् ।

अपरत्वं तदल्पत्वबुद्धितः स्यादितीरितम् ॥ १२२ ॥

121-22. Distance and nearness are described as being of two kinds, viz. spatial as also temporal. The spatial kind abides only in limited things. Distance arises from a notion of preponderance of the conjunction of limited things, and nearness is said to arise from a notion of its meagreness.

Distance and nearness, which are the extra-ordinary cause of the convention that a thing is far or near, are being described: *Distance, etc. The spatial, etc.*—Spatial distance arises from the notion that a thing is removed by a larger measure of conjunction with limited things. Similarly nearness arises from the notion of a smaller measure of it. Here the ablative case-ending is required to indicate the starting point. As, Prayāga (Allahabad)

<sup>1</sup> That is, it is not mere cessation of conjunction. In the instance cited, since there is no action in the body, there is no cessation of conjunction either. An action in the hand cannot destroy the conjunction of the body with the tree; for action in one thing cannot terminate conjunction in another thing.

is farther from Pāṭaliputra (Patna) than Kāśī (Benares), and Prayāga is nearer to Pāṭaliputra than Kurukṣetra.

तयोरसमवायी तु दिक्संयोगस्तदाश्रये ।

दिवाकरपरिस्पन्दभूयस्त्वज्ञानतो भवेत् ॥ १२३ ॥

परत्वम्; अपरत्वं तु तदीयाल्पत्वबुद्धितः ।

अत्र त्वसमवायी स्यात्संयोगः कालपिण्डयोः ॥ १२४ ॥

123-24. Their non-inherent (cause) is the conjunction of space with their substratum.<sup>1</sup> (Temporal) distance arises from a notion of preponderance of the sun's movement; while (temporal) nearness arises from a notion of its meagreness. Here the non-inherent (cause) is the conjunction of time with a (limited) substance.

*Their*—i.e. of spatial distance and nearness. *Non-inherent*—is non-inherent cause. *Their substratum*—the substratum of spatial distance and nearness. *Distance, etc.*—Here distance and nearness should be understood as temporal. That is older, with regard to which the sun's movement is more, and that is younger, with regard to which it is less. Temporal distance and nearness abide only in substances that are produced. *Here*—With regard to temporal distance and nearness.

अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशेन नाशस्तेषां निरूपितः ।

125. Their destruction is described as resulting from that of the notion of addition.

*Their*—of temporal and spatial distance and nearness.

<sup>1</sup> Some limited substance, which is their inherent cause.

## KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAIN FACTS ABOUT INFERENCE

### OTHER VARIETIES OF KNOWLEDGE: THEIR CAUSES

बुद्धेः प्रपञ्चः प्रागेव प्रायशो विनिरूपितः ॥ १२५ ॥

125 (contd.). The varieties of knowledge have already been almost completely described.

To describe knowledge, which comes next in order, the text goes on to say: *The varieties, etc.*

अथावशिष्टोऽप्यपरः प्रकारः परिदर्श्यते ।

अप्रमा च प्रमा चेति ज्ञानं द्विविधमिष्यते ॥ १२६ ॥

126. Now the varieties that remain are also being shown: Knowledge is said to be of two kinds—invalid knowledge and valid knowledge.

तच्छून्ये तन्मतिर्या स्यादप्रमा सा निरूपिता ।

तत्प्रपञ्चो विपर्यासः संशयोऽपि प्रकीर्तिः ॥ १२७ ॥

127. The notion with regard to something that is has a particular attribute, which it has not, is described as invalid knowledge. Its varieties are said to be illusion as also doubt.

Of these, invalid knowledge is being described: *The notion, etc.* That is to say, the notion with regard to something that is devoid of a particular attribute, that it has that attribute, is an error. *Its varieties*—the varieties of invalid knowledge.



आद्यो देहेष्वात्मबुद्धिः, शङ्खादौ पीततामतिः ।

भवेन्निश्चयरूपा या ; संशयोऽयं प्रदर्श्यते ॥ १२८ ॥

128. Of the first kind is one's identification with the body etc. or one's notion of yellowness in a conch etc. which are of the nature of a certitude. Now doubt is being exemplified.

*Of the first kind*—i.e. an illusion. The settled notion of identity with regard to the body etc. as, 'I am fair,' as also the settled notion with regard to a conch etc. as, 'A conch is yellow,' is an error.

किंस्विन्नरो वा स्थाणुर्वेत्यादिवुद्धिस्तु संशयः ।

तदभावाप्रकारा धीस्तत्प्रकारा तु निश्चियः ॥ १२९ ॥

129. Doubt is a notion like, 'Is it a man, or the stump of a tree?' Certitude<sup>1</sup> is the knowledge of a thing as possessed of an attribute without reference to its absence.

*Doubt, etc.*—'Is it' etc. signifies deliberation. The definition of certitude is being stated: *Certitude, etc.* Certitude is that knowledge of a thing's possessing attributes, in which the absence of these attributes is not felt as a feature.

स संशयो मतिर्या स्यादेकत्राभावभावयोः ।

साधारणादिधर्मस्य ज्ञानं संशयकारणम् ॥ १३० ॥

130. Doubt is the notion of the presence and absence (of some attribute) with regard to the same subject. Its cause is the knowledge of

<sup>1</sup> Refers to error as well as to valid knowledge.

attributes that are common (to two things), and so forth.

Doubt is being defined: *Doubt, etc.* That is, doubt is a knowledge of contradictory features, viz. presence and absence, with regard to the same substantive. *Its cause, etc.*—The cause of doubt is the knowledge of attributes that are common to two things. For instance, knowing height, which is common to the stump of a tree and a man, one doubts whether it is a stump or not. Similarly the knowledge of the extraordinary attribute of a thing is also a cause. For instance, soundhood is perceived in sound as being excluded from both eternal and transitory things. Hence a person doubts whether sound is eternal or not.<sup>1</sup> Dispute (*vipratipatti*), however, which consists of words like, 'Is sound eternal or not?'—is not a (third) cause of doubt, because words, the knowledge of invariable concomitance of things, and so forth have the nature of producing only certitude. But in a dispute words produce a knowledge (recollection) of two alternatives, while doubt is a mental (perception). Similarly it should be understood that a doubt about the validity of knowledge leads to a doubt about its object, a doubt about the concomitant leads to a doubt about that which includes it, and so on. But in doubt, the knowledge of the thing that possesses attributes (*dharmin*), or the connection between it and the organ, is the cause.

<sup>1</sup> Soundhood is absent in things definitely known to be eternal, e.g. ether, and also in things definitely known to be transitory, e. g. a jar or a cloth, and yet it is present in sound alone. Hence there is the doubt as to whether sound is eternal or not.

दोषोऽप्रमाया जनकः, प्रमायास्तु गुणो भवेत् ।

पित्तदूरत्वादिरूपो दोषो नानाविधः स्मृतः ॥ १३१ ॥

131. Defects are the cause of invalid knowledge, and merits that of valid knowledge: Defects are said to be of various kinds, viz. (an excess of) bile, distance, and so forth.

*Defects, etc.*—With regard to invalid knowledge defects are the cause,<sup>1</sup> and with regard to valid knowledge merits are the cause. There too defects such as (an excess of) bile are not identical in all cases. That they are causes is established by the method of agreement and difference, while the fact of merits leading to valid knowledge is established through inference. For instance, valid knowledge is produced by causes other than the general causes of knowledge, since it is a knowledge that is produced, as is the case with invalid knowledge. It cannot be urged that the absence of defects alone should be the cause; for in that case, when there is the knowledge that a conch is yellow, there would not be any valid knowledge regarding the conch (even),<sup>1</sup> owing to the presence of a defect, viz. (an excess of) bile. And in the absence of any conclusive reasoning on either side, it is proper that merits should be the cause, rather than the absence of an infinite number of defects. Nor can it be urged that even when merits are present, there is no knowledge of whiteness in the conch owing to obstruction through (excessive) bile; hence the absence of defects such as (an excess of) bile must be held to be the cause.<sup>2</sup> So what is the use of assuming merits

<sup>1</sup> While as a matter of fact there is valid knowledge.

<sup>2</sup> The absence of obstacles is a cause of effects in general.



to be the cause? Nevertheless, by the method of agreement and difference merits are proved to be the cause. (Otherwise) by a parity of reasoning it would also be very easy to say that the absence of merits is the cause of error. Now one may ask, what are those defects? This is being answered: *Defects are said, etc.* Sometimes when there is an erroneous perception of yellow colour etc. the defect is (an excess of) bile. Sometimes when the moon etc. are mistaken to be of a small size, the defect is distance. Sometimes, again, when a bamboo is mistaken for a snake, the defect is the collyrium of a toad's fat. Defects such as these are the cause of error, but they are not identical in all cases.

प्रत्यक्षे तु विशेष्येण विशेषणवता समम् ।  
 सन्निकर्षो गुणस्तु स्यात्, अथ त्वनुमितौ पुनः ॥ १३२ ॥  
 पक्षे साध्यविशिष्टे तु परामर्शो गुणो भवेत् ।  
 शक्ये सादृश्यबुद्धिस्तु भवेदुपमितौ गुणः ॥ १३३ ॥

132-3. In perception the merit is the connection (of the organs) with objects that possess the attributes. In inference, again, it is consideration<sup>1</sup> with regard to a subject that is possessed of the thing to be inferred. In comparison the merit is the knowledge of similarity in the thing directly meant by a word.

शब्दबोधे योग्यतायास्तात्पर्यस्याथवा प्रमा ।  
 गुणः स्यात् ; भ्रमभिन्नं तु ज्ञानमत्रोच्यते प्रमा ॥ १३४ ॥

<sup>1</sup> *Parāmarśa*. See verse 68.

134. In verbal comprehension the merit is the valid knowledge of either consistency or intention. Here knowledge other than error is called valid knowledge.

Now it may be asked, what are the merits? So the merits with regard to perception etc. are being pointed out in order: *In perception, etc.* In perception the merit is the connection (of the organs) with objects possessing true (not fictitious) attributes. In inference the merit is the knowledge of the presence, in what has the thing to be inferred (the subject), of the concomitant of the thing to be inferred. Similarly we must understand with regard to what follow. Valid knowledge is being described: *Here knowledge, etc.*

अथवा तत्प्रकारं यज्ज्ञानं तद्विशेष्यकम् ।

तत्प्रमा ; न प्रमा नापि भ्रमः स्यान्निर्विकल्पकम् ॥ १३५ ॥

प्रकारतादिशून्यं हि संबन्धानवगाहि तत् ।

135-6. Or valid knowledge is the knowledge that has reference to a substantive possessed of a particular attribute which is also a feature (*prakāra*) in that knowledge. Indeterminate knowledge is neither valid knowledge nor error. For it is devoid of reference to an adjectival feature<sup>1</sup> etc. and does not concern itself with relations.

It may be objected: Where with regard to a nacre and a piece of silver there arises the knowledge, 'These two are silver,' there, even with regard to the portion

<sup>1</sup> *Prakāratā*, lit. featurehood, is not something over and above the feature. The 'etc.' refers to the substantive element of knowledge.

that relates to the silver, there would be no valid knowledge, since that knowledge is not different from error. This is being answered: *Or, etc.* In other words, that knowledge is valid the substantive of which is (actually) possessed of the attribute that is a feature in the knowledge.

Objection: But then recollection too would be valid.

Reply: What if it is?

Objection: In that case, its instruments too would be an additional means of knowledge.

Reply: No; for only the instruments of valid *experience* are intended as means of knowledge. One thing, however, should be borne in mind: The reference of the knowledge to the attribute and to the substantive element as qualified by it should be understood in respect of that (very) relation in which one is (actually) possessed of the other. Hence the definition does not wrongly extend to the knowledge that arises with regard to a jar, for instance, being related to its two halves by conjunction.<sup>1</sup> Such being the case, it may be urged that indeterminate knowledge is not valid knowledge, since it does not refer to an adjectival feature. This is being answered: *It is neither, etc.*

Objection: Then the knowledge of the conjunction of a monkey with a tree is both an error and valid knowledge.

<sup>1</sup> A jar abides in its two halves by the relation of inherence, not conjunction. Hence the statement that the two halves are possessed of the jar by the relation of conjunction, would be an error.



Reply: No; for the knowledge of conjunction with something<sup>1</sup> which has that absence of conjunction of a monkey which is not co-existent with its counterpositive, is an error. It cannot be urged that the knowledge of conjunction (of a monkey) with that part of a tree where there is no conjunction of the monkey, would not be an error, since the absence of conjunction there is co-existent with its counterpositive; for the knowledge of conjunction with that part where there is no conjunction is an error. Even if, owing to the lack of uniformity in the things to be defined, the definition too is not uniform, there is no harm.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> E.g. quality.

<sup>2</sup> An objection is raised that the definition of invalid knowledge which is modified in three different cases, is not uniform but uniformity of definition is always desirable. The Naiyāyika replies to the objection as follows: The lack of uniformity in the definition is due to a corresponding lack of uniformity in the different varieties of invalid knowledge, and as such does not indicate an incapacity on our part. The first definition of invalid knowledge as knowledge of an attribute in a substratum where it is absent, holds good in all cases except that of conjunction, which is invariably concomitant with its absence. The second definition is thus put forward, viz. that the knowledge of the absence of conjunction in a place where such absence of conjunction is not co-existent with its presence, is invalid. But we can conceive of another situation. In a substratum where there is actual conjunction together with its absence, but necessarily in different parts, the knowledge of conjunction in the part which is actually devoid of it would not be a case of invalid knowledge, as the absence of conjunction here is co-existent with its presence, and so falls outside the scope of the definition. But this is clearly a case of invalid knowledge, and to cover such cases, a new definition is put forward, viz. that the knowledge of conjunction in respect of a part wherein the conjunction is absent, is also invalid.

# THE VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE NOT SELF-EVIDENT

प्रमात्वं न स्वतो ग्राह्यं, संशयानुपपत्तिः ॥ १३६ ॥

136 (contd.). The validity of knowledge is not self-evident, because in that case doubt cannot be explained.

*The validity, etc.*—The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that the validity of knowledge is self-evident. Now according to the Teacher,<sup>1</sup> since knowledge is self-effulgent, its validity is perceived by itself. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, knowledge is transcendent, but the fact of a thing being known by means of knowledge is perceptible, and by this knowledge is inferred. According to Murāri Miśra,<sup>2</sup> knowledge is perceived through apperception.<sup>3</sup> And according to all Mīmāṃsakas, the validity of a particular knowledge is perceived through the knowledge that has the former knowledge for its object; for knowledge is determined by its object, and hence the object is known by the cognition of knowledge. These views are being criticised: *Is not self-evident, etc. Because, etc.*—If the validity of knowledge were self-evident, then there would be no doubt regarding the validity of knowledge that has not undergone repetition.<sup>4</sup> For if the knowledge is cognised, then according to you its validity is also certainly known; so how can there be a doubt?

<sup>1</sup> Nickname of Prabhākara.

<sup>2</sup> A commentator on the *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras* of Jaimini. Cf. the adage, 'Murāri follows the third path.'

<sup>3</sup> Perception of a perception.

<sup>4</sup> Hence, not been tested.

If, on the other hand, the knowledge is not cognised, then, in the absence of a knowledge of the substantive, how can there be a doubt? Therefore the validity of knowledge is to be inferred. For instance, 'This knowledge is valid knowledge, because it leads to a successful inclination; that which is not of this kind<sup>1</sup> is not such,<sup>2</sup> as for example invalid knowledge.' 'This knowledge, in which earth-hood is a feature, is valid knowledge, because, it is a knowledge, about something possessed of smell, in which earth-hood is a feature.' Similarly, 'This knowledge, in which waterhood is a feature, is valid knowledge, because it is a knowledge, about something possessed of oiliness, in which waterhood is a feature.' It cannot be questioned how the knowledge of the reason takes place, because the fact<sup>3</sup> of its having earth-hood as its feature is self-evident. Here,<sup>4</sup> through the perception of smell it is easy to perceive also the fact of its having for its substantive something that has the smell. But<sup>5</sup> the fact of its having for its substantive something<sup>6</sup> that is possessed of particular attribute,<sup>7</sup> which fact is determined by the fact of the knowledge having them as a feature, is not perceived, in order to make room for (the possibility of) doubt.

<sup>1</sup> That is, not valid knowledge.

<sup>2</sup> Does not lead to a successful inclination.

<sup>3</sup> Only this, but not the fact of its having a particular object.

<sup>4</sup> Where the knowledge is of something possessed of smell, and has earth-hood as its feature.

<sup>5</sup> Each of the two facts is perceived singly, but not jointly.

<sup>6</sup> Viz. earth.

<sup>7</sup> E.g. earth-hood.



Objection (by the Teacher): Since all knowledge is valid, it is superfluous to qualify the definition of valid knowledge by the expression, 'The fact of its having for its substantive something that is possessed of particular attributes.' It cannot be urged, 'One who desires silver will have no inclination for tin through error, since according to you there is no error.' For there the cause is the non-perception, owing to a defect of difference from silver, which has independently<sup>1</sup> presented<sup>2</sup> itself to the mind, with regard to something that is in front. In a real case of silver, however, since there is knowledge of a real thing,<sup>3</sup> that alone is the cause (of inclination). Or let us assume that there also is the non-perception of difference, and that is the cause. But knowing one thing as another (*anyathā-khyāti*) is not possible,<sup>4</sup> inasmuch as the cause of the perception of silver, viz. connection of silver with the organs, being absent, there cannot be any notion of silver with regard to tin.

Reply: Not so; for, in a real case of silver, knowledge of a thing actually possessed of an attribute is acknowledged to be the cause of inclination, and therefore that is considered to be the cause elsewhere<sup>5</sup> too. It cannot be urged that with regard to a successful inclination it is the cause, while with regard to an unsuccessful inclination non-perception of difference is the cause; because for the sake of simplicity knowledge

<sup>1</sup> That is, not as an attribute of the subject 'this'.

<sup>2</sup> Through recollection etc.

<sup>3</sup> Viz. of silver possessed of silverhood.

<sup>4</sup> In which case it might be the cause of a successful inclination.

<sup>5</sup> In a case of error.

of a thing actually possessed of an attribute (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) is considered to be the cause of all inclination. Thus there is no harm even in assuming supernormal connection<sup>1</sup> through knowledge in conformity with the *notion* of the tin being possessed of silverhood; for cumbrousness that leads to a result is not a defect. Moreover, where with regard to tin and silver there has arisen the notion that both these are silver or tin, there is no obliteration of the cause<sup>2</sup> either. Further, where with regard to tin and silver there arises the notion that these are silver and tin respectively, there simultaneously one would have inclination and disinclination. For if tin is perceived to be different from tin, and silver different from silver, it would be knowing one thing for another—a thing you dread; so, to avoid it, you would say that owing merely to a defect, there is the non-perception of difference from silver with regard to tin,<sup>3</sup> and the non-perception of difference from tin with regard to silver.<sup>4</sup> Besides, if the non-perception of difference<sup>5</sup> be the cause of inference, then, when with regard to a lake there is the non-perception of difference from what is possessed of smoke, the concomitant of fire, the inference<sup>6</sup> would be unimpeded.

<sup>1</sup> The previous knowledge of silver serves as the connection to bring about the erroneous perception of silver in the tin.

<sup>2</sup> The non-perception of their difference.

<sup>3</sup> This will lead to inclination.

<sup>4</sup> This will lead to disinclination.

<sup>5</sup> From what is possessed of the concomitant.

<sup>6</sup> Of fire in the lake, which is clearly a wrong inference. Hence knowing one thing as another must be admitted.

If, on the other hand, the knowledge of something<sup>1</sup> possessing something else<sup>2</sup> be the cause, then with regard to a red-hot ball of iron the notion of (the presence of) smoke, the concomitant of fire, comes in<sup>3</sup> for the sake of the inference.<sup>4</sup> So it is a rope with a noose at each end (a dilemma). Thus perception alone is the evidence of knowing one thing as another, since one has the experience, 'I knew tin as silver.' This is the sum and substance of the thing.

### HOW INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE IS APPREHENDED

व्यभिचारस्याग्रहोऽपि सहचारग्रहस्तथा ।

हेतुर्व्याप्तिग्रहे ; तर्कः क्वचिच्छङ्कानिवर्तकः ॥ १३७ ॥

137. The cause of the knowledge of invariable concomitance is the non-apprehension of inconstancy (*vyabhicāra*) as also the apprehension of co-existence. Sometimes argument (*tarka*)<sup>5</sup> removes a doubt.

Invariable concomitance has already been dealt with, but the way to apprehending it has not been shown. Hence it is being pointed out: *The cause, etc.* The non-apprehension of inconstancy and the appre-

<sup>1</sup> E.g. a hill.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. smoke, the concomitant of fire.

<sup>3</sup> And this, again, is knowing one thing as another. Hence the dilemma.

<sup>4</sup> Of fire in the red-hot ball of iron, which would take place and be a valid inference.

<sup>5</sup> *Reductio ad absurdum*.



hension of co-existence are the cause of the apprehension of invariable concomitance. That is to say, since the apprehension of inconstancy is an obstacle to the apprehension of invariable concomitance, the absence of it is the cause of the latter. Similarly, by the method of agreement and difference, the apprehension of co-existence is also a cause. But repeated observation is not a cause, since sometimes the apprehension of invariable concomitance takes place even from a single observation in case inconstancy does not suggest itself. Sometimes repeated observation is of assistance by removing doubts about inconstancy. Where, however, doubts are not removed even by repeated observation, there argument contradicting rival propositions is required. For instance, if there is a doubt that smoke may exist even where there is no fire, then it is removed by the knowledge of the causal relation subsisting between fire and smoke: If it be not possessed of fire, it would not be possessed of smoke, since an effect cannot be produced without a cause. If even then<sup>1</sup> there is a doubt that should there ever be an effect without a cause, it will take place just arbitrarily, then it is removed by means of a check: If indeed an effect takes place without a cause, then, according to you, one will not uniformly have recourse to fire for the sake of smoke, nor to eating for the sake of satisfaction. Where there is naturally no occasion for a doubt, there argument also is not required. This is expressed by the text: *Sometimes argument removes a doubt.*

<sup>1</sup> Even when the causal relation between fire and smoke is known.

## THE VICIOUS CONDITION

साध्यस्य व्यापको यस्तु हेतोरव्यापकस्तथा ।

स उपाधिर्भवेत् ; तस्य निष्कर्षोऽयं प्रदर्श्यते ॥ १३८ ॥

138. That which is inclusive (*vyāpaka*)<sup>1</sup> of the thing to be inferred, but not of the reason, is called a vicious condition (*upādhi*). The pith of it is being shown.

सर्वे साध्यसमानाधिकरणाः स्युरुपाधयः ।

हेतौरेकाश्रये येषां स्वसाध्यव्यभिचारिता ॥ १३९ ॥

139. All vicious conditions are co-existent with the thing to be inferred; in some substratum of which<sup>2</sup> the reason exists without the particular vicious condition and the thing to be inferred.

Now in order to thwart another's apprehension of invariable concomitance a vicious condition (*upādhi*) is being described: *That which, etc.* In other words, a vicious condition is that which is inclusive of what is considered<sup>3</sup> to be the thing to be inferred, but not of what is considered to be the reason.

Objection: In the sentence, 'He is dark, because he is the son of Mitrā,' the fact of being due to eating spinach will not be a vicious condition; for it is not inclusive of the thing to be inferred (darkness), since

<sup>1</sup> Of the vicious condition; and therefore also of the thing to be inferred.

<sup>2</sup> That is, which is never absent where the other is present.

<sup>3</sup> But is not in reality.

darkness is present in a jar etc. also. Similarly in the sentence, 'Air is perceptible, because it is the substratum of touch, which is perceptible,' the fact of having manifested colour will not be a vicious condition, since perceptibility is present in the soul etc. where colour is absent. Likewise in the sentence, 'Destruction is perishable, because it is produced,' the state of being a positive entity will not be a vicious condition, since perishableness is present in previous non-existence also, where the fact of being a positive entity is absent.

Reply: Not so; for the intended meaning (of the term 'vicious condition') is that it must not be inclusive of a reason that has the same attribute as is possessed by the thing to be inferred that is included by the vicious condition. The fact of being due to eating spinach is inclusive of the darkness that is qualified by the fact of being the son of Mitrā, but not of the reason that is qualified by it.<sup>1</sup> Similarly the possession of manifested colour is inclusive of the perceptibility that is qualified by the state of being an *external* substance — which<sup>2</sup> abides in the subject—but not of the reason that is qualified by the state of being an external substance. Likewise in the sentence, 'Destruction is perishable, because it is produced,' the state of being a positive entity is inclusive of the thing to be inferred that is qualified by the state of being produced. But a valid reason has no such attribute as can be inclusive of the thing to be inferred that is qualified by a particular

<sup>1</sup> This is in the fair sons of Mitrā as well, where, however, the fact of being due to eating spinach is absent.

<sup>2</sup> Refers to the state of being an external substance.



attribute, but not of the reason that is qualified by that attribute. With regard to a case of the inconstant reason, however, a vicious condition will at least be inclusive of the thing to be inferred that is qualified<sup>1</sup> by the state of being either that substratum of the vicious condition which is also the substratum of the thing to be inferred, or that substratum<sup>2</sup> of the absence of the thing to be inferred which is not co-existent with the vicious condition.

Hence the thing defined, viz. the nature of a vicious condition, is being pointed out in accordance with the above definition: *All vicious conditions, etc. Svāsādhya* means *sva* and *sādhya*, the vicious condition and the thing to be inferred; existence without them is meant.

व्यभिचारस्यानुमानमुपाधेस्तु प्रयोजनम् ।

140. The utility of a vicious condition lies in the inference of inconstancy (of the reason).

The cause<sup>3</sup> of the vitiating effect of a vicious condition is being stated: *The utility, etc.* That is to say, the utility lies in the fact that the absence of the vicious condition (in the reason) leads to an inference of the absence of the thing to be inferred in the reason.<sup>4</sup> For instance, where the vicious condition is inclusive of the thing to be inferred as unqualified, there the absence of the vicious condition as unqualified leads to

<sup>1</sup> That is, co-existent with either of the two substratums.

<sup>2</sup> Which has the reason, but neither the thing to be inferred nor the vicious condition.

<sup>3</sup> Why the existence of a vicious condition makes the reason fallacious.

<sup>4</sup> Serving as the subject of the inference.

an inference of the absence of the thing to be inferred (in the reason). For example, in a proposition like, '(The hill) has smoke, because it has fire,' we infer that the fire exists without smoke, because it exists without the conjunction of damp fuel, which is inclusive of the smoke, and that which exists without the inclusive entity (*vyāpaka*) will necessarily exist without the concomitant. Where, however, the vicious condition is inclusive of the thing to be inferred that is possessed of a particular attribute, there the absence of the vicious condition in something possessed of that particular attribute leads to an inference of the absence of the thing to be inferred. For instance, in a proposition like, 'He is dark, because he is a son of Mitrā,' the fact of being a son of Mitrā is present where darkness is not, because in some son of Mitrā the state of being due to eating spinach is absent. But the state of being other than a subject (*pakṣetaratva*) that is not known to be associated with an incongruous reason,<sup>1</sup> is not a vicious condition, because there is no evidence<sup>2</sup> to make known the fact of its being inclusive of the thing to be inferred, and also because it is self-destructive.<sup>3</sup> The state of being other than a subject, however, that is known to be associated with an incongruous reason, is certainly a vicious condition. For instance, in a proposition like, 'Fire is not hot, because it is produced,' since fire is known to be hot through perception, the

<sup>1</sup> The thing to be inferred from which is not in the subject.

<sup>2</sup> Because here the subject is not known to have the absence of the thing to be inferred, but it has not the difference from itself, which is the vicious condition.

<sup>3</sup> Because it would also apply to cases where the reason is valid.

state of being other than fire is a vicious condition. Where it is a matter of doubt whether the vicious condition is inclusive of the thing to be inferred, it is a case of the doubtful vicious condition. The state of being other than a subject, however, is not to be put forward, even if it be a doubtful vicious condition, in deference to the tradition among debaters.

Some, however, maintain that the result of a vicious condition is the raising of an instance of the counterbalanced reason. For example, a proposition like 'The red-hot ball of iron has smoke, because it has fire,' may give rise to the proposition, 'The red-hot ball of iron has no smoke, because it has no damp fuel,' which is an instance of the counterbalanced reason. Similarly an entity, though inclusive of the reason, is also sometimes a vicious condition. For example, in a proposition like, 'A hailstone is earth, because it has hard conjunction,' the state of possessing touch that is neither hot nor cold is a vicious condition.<sup>1</sup> It cannot be urged that here incongruity alone is the defect; for everywhere a vicious condition is mixed up with some other defect. According to this view, a vicious condition is an attribute that is inclusive of the thing to be inferred, but is *absent* in the subject.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Giving rise to the rival proposition, 'A hailstone is not earth, because it has no touch that is neither hot nor cold.'

<sup>2</sup> In the above two instances, the conjunction of damp fuel and the state of possessing touch that is neither hot nor cold are inclusive of the things to be inferred, viz. smoke and earth-hood, but are absent in the subjects, viz. the red-hot ball of iron and hailstone. Hence they are vicious conditions. According to this school, if a vicious condition abides in the subject, then the absence in it of the thing to be inferred cannot be proved through the absence of the former.



# VERBAL TESTIMONY AND COMPARISON ALSO MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

शब्दोपमानयोर्देव पृथक्प्रमाण्यमिच्छते ॥ १४० ॥

अनुमानगतार्थत्वादिति वैशेषिकं मतम् ।

तन्न सम्यक्, विना व्याप्तिबोधं शाब्दादिवोधतः ॥ १४१ ॥

140 (contd.)-1. Verbal testimony and comparison are not recognised as separate means of valid knowledge, because their purpose is served by inference. This is the Vaiśeṣika view. It is not correct; for verbal comprehension and the like take place (even) without the knowledge of invariable concomittance.

*Verbal testimony, etc.* According to the Vaiśeṣikas, perception and inference are the means of valid knowledge, while verbal testimony and comparison are means of valid knowledge only as forms of inference. For example, secular words like, 'Drive the cow in with a stick,' or Vedic words like, '(One) should perform sacrifices,' are preceded by a valid knowledge of that connection among the recalled meanings of words, which is the subject-matter of the speaker's intention, because they are group of words possessing expectancy etc. analogous to a group of words like, 'Bring the jar.' Or these meanings of words are connected with one another, because they are recalled by words possessing consistency etc. analogously to words of that kind. In examples also, the thing to be inferred is established by another example. Thus, after perceiving an individual gayal (*gavaya*), (one may infer that) the word *gavaya* is possessed of gavayahood, which is

the connotation<sup>1</sup> of the word *gavaya*, because in the absence of any other significative function the elders use it to mean that<sup>2</sup>; and with regard to a thing in respect of which the elders, in the absence of any other significative function, use a particular word, that word is possessed of a connotation,<sup>3</sup> as the word 'cow' is possessed of a connotation. Or the fact of (the word *gavaya*) possessing gavayahood, which is its connotation, is established, on the strength of its abiding in the subject,<sup>4</sup> from the inference: 'The word *gavaya* possesses a connotation, because it is an approved word.' This view is being criticised: *It is not correct, etc.* Because it is a fact of experience that verbal comprehension takes place even without the knowledge of invariable concomitance. There is certainly no evidence to prove that the hearing of a word is always followed by the knowledge of invariable concomitance.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, we should consider this: If in every case of verbal comprehension we assume the knowledge of invariable concomitance, then in every case of inference also why should we not assume the knowledge of words, and thereby admit verbal comprehension alone?

## VARIETIES OF INFERENCE

त्रैविध्यमनुमानस्य केवलान्वयिभेदतः ।

द्वैविध्यं तु भवेद्व्याप्तेरन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ॥ १४२ ॥

<sup>1</sup> Lit. the reason for the application of a word to a particular object, which is invariably the connotation of the word.

<sup>2</sup> A gayal.

<sup>3</sup> Viz. gavayahood.

<sup>4</sup> Since the subject is the word *gavaya*.

<sup>5</sup> Of the word and its direct meaning.

142. Inference is of three kinds, including the purely affirmative form. Invariable concomitance is of two kinds according to its division into affirmation and negation.

अन्वयव्याप्तिरुक्तैव, व्यतिरेकादिहोच्यते ।

साध्याभावव्यापकत्वं हेत्वभावस्य यद्भवेत् ॥ १४३ ॥

143. Affirmative invariable concomitance has already been spoken of; that due to negation is here being dealt with: It is the inclusion of the absence of the thing to be inferred, by the negation of the reason.

*Inference, etc.* Inference is of three kinds, according as it is purely affirmative, purely negative or both affirmative and negative. Of these, that which has no contrary instance (*vipakṣa*) is purely affirmative—as in a proposition like, 'A jar is namable, because it is knowable.' For there, since everything is namable, there is no contrary instance. That which has no similar instance (*sapakṣa*) is purely negative—as in a proposition like, 'Earth is different from other things, because it has smell.' For there, since the difference from the thirteen<sup>1</sup> entities beginning with water has not already been definitely known, a similar instance, or what definitely has the thing to be inferred, is wanting. That which has both similar and contrary instances is both affirmative and negative—as in a proposition like,

<sup>1</sup> The eight substances other than earth, and the remaining five categories. The number should be fourteen, but non-existence is left out of account here, as there is no unanimity with regard to its being a category.



'(The hill) has fire, because it has smoke'. Because it has both similar instances, such as a kitchen, and contrary instances, such as a lake. In a negative inference,<sup>1</sup> the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance is the cause. Hence that is being described: *It is the inclusion, etc.* That is to say, it is the counterpositiveness of that non-existence which is inclusive of the non-existence of the thing to be inferred. Here we must understand this: The inclusion (by the thing to be inferred<sup>2</sup>) of (the reason<sup>3</sup>) as determined in a particular relation<sup>4</sup> (to the subject<sup>5</sup>), by a particular attribute,<sup>6</sup> is apprehended in a particular relation, in a particular form.<sup>7</sup> From the knowledge of (the subject<sup>8</sup>) possessing that non-existence<sup>9</sup> which is determined by that attribute,<sup>10</sup> and the counterpositiveness of which is determined by that relation, we infer that non-existence<sup>11</sup> which is determined by that relation, and the counterpositiveness of which is determined by that attribute.<sup>12</sup> Thus, where in the (absolute) non-

<sup>1</sup> The proposition. 'The hill has fire, because it has smoke,' leads to the inference, 'The lake has the absence of smoke, because it has the absence of fire.' Here the thing to be inferred and the reason change places.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. fire.

<sup>3</sup> Smoke.

<sup>4</sup> Conjunction. So in the rest of the passage.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. a hill.

<sup>6</sup> Smokehood.

<sup>7</sup> As fire.

<sup>8</sup> E.g. a lake.

<sup>9</sup> Of fire.

<sup>10</sup> Firehood.

<sup>11</sup> Of smoke.

<sup>12</sup> Smokehood.

existence of smell we apprehend the inclusion of otherness (from something)<sup>1</sup> by the relation of selfsameness, there the absence of the non-existence of smell leads to the inference of the absolute non-existence of the otherness. Where, however, we apprehend that the absence of smell includes the other<sup>2</sup> things by the relation of identity, there we infer the absence of the other things by the relation of identity. This is mutual non-existence.<sup>3</sup> Thus, where the invariable concomitance of fire is apprehended, by the relation of conjunction, in smoke, which also bears the relation of conjunction (to its substratum), there that non-existence of fire, the counterpositiveness of which is characterised by the relation of conjunction, leads to the inference of that non-existence of smoke, the

<sup>1</sup> For example: 'Water etc. have the absence of smell, because they have otherness from earth.'

<sup>2</sup> As in the proposition, 'Water etc. have the absence of smell, because they have other things than earth *by the relation of identity*,' i.e. because they are identical with those other things.

<sup>3</sup> Like the determinant of the counterpositiveness, the counter-positive also is considered to be the absence of mutual non-existence. The mutual non-existence that has the form, 'It is a not a jar,' abides everywhere except in a jar. Hence its absence, i.e. absence of difference from a jar, abides only in a jar, as does jarhood. So it is the same as jarhood. Similarly as a jar abides in itself by the relation of identity, it is also regarded as the absence of mutual non-existence (of a jar) by that relation. Hence jarhood and a jar in respect of the relation of identity both constitute the absence of difference from a jar. In the case cited above, in the example, 'Earth is different from other things, because it has smell,' the absence of this difference may be considered to be just otherness or other things.

counterpositiveness of which is characterised by the relation of conjunction in a lake. In this apprehension of negative invariable concomitance the knowledge of negative co-existence<sup>1</sup> is the cause. Some, however, maintain: 'The knowledge of negative co-existence leads to an apprehension of affirmative invariable concomitance alone; it is not that the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance is a cause (of inference). But where invariable concomitance is apprehended through the knowledge of negative co-existence, there the inference is called negative. The knowledge of the thing to be inferred (viz. difference from other things) first arises with regard to a jar etc.<sup>2</sup>; afterwards it is inferred in things characterised only by earth-hood.<sup>3</sup>

अर्थापत्तिस्तु नैवेह प्रमाणान्तरमिष्यते ।

व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिबुद्ध्या चरितार्था हि सा यतः ॥ १४४ ॥

<sup>1</sup> The co-existence of the absence of the thing to be inferred and that of the reason.

<sup>2</sup> That is, some individual possessing earth-hood.

<sup>3</sup> According to this school, even in negative inference there is affirmative invariable concomitance. The knowledge of this concomitance presupposes that of the thing to be inferred. But in a negative inference the thing to be inferred is not known beforehand. That is to say, in a proposition like, 'Earth has difference from other things,' inference can take place, without a knowledge of difference from other things, simply from a knowledge of the otherness or other things. Hence, if here also there is affirmative invariable concomitance, there must be the knowledge of the thing to be inferred, viz. difference from other things. How that knowledge can arise, is being shown here.



144. In this system presumption is not at all recognised as a separate means of valid knowledge, because its purpose is served by the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance.

*In this, etc.*—Some<sup>1</sup> hold that presumption is a separate means of valid knowledge. For instance, where it is known from Astrology that Devadatta is to live a hundred years, and it is observed through perception that the living man is not at home, there, it being impossible for the man who is to live a hundred years not to be at home unless he is outside, it is concluded that he is outside. This is not accepted since, its purpose is served by inference. For instance, where aliveness is known to be a concomitant of one or the other of two alternatives, viz. being outside and being at home, there one of the two must be held to be true; and existence at home being contradicted (by perception), existence outside is presented by inference. Similarly, in a proposition like, 'Stout Devadatta does not eat at daytime,' since stoutness is known to be a concomitant of eating, eating is proved; and since eating at daytime is contradicted, we conclude that he eats at night. Since the perception of non-existence is based on experience, non-perception also is not a separate means of knowledge.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, if non-perception is a cause (of knowledge) without itself being known, then it comes under perception, since it is (knowledge) not due to another knowledge; while if it is a cause through itself being known, then it pre-

<sup>1</sup> The Mīmāṃsakas.

<sup>2</sup> As the Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins hold.

supposes<sup>1</sup> another non-perception, which would lead to a *regressus ad infinitum*. Similarly voluntary movement<sup>2</sup> also is not a separate means of valid knowledge, because it only recalls words that indicate their relation to their meaning, and thus partakes of the nature of letters etc.; hence it is included in verbal testimony. Where, however, there is apprehension of invariable concomitance etc. there it is nothing but inference.

<sup>1</sup> Since it is itself a non-existence.

<sup>2</sup> That of the lips, hands, etc.

## THE REMAINING QUALITIES

### PLEASURE, PAIN, DESIRE AND AVERSION

सुखंतु जगतामेव काम्यम्, धर्मेण जायते ।

अधर्मजन्यं दुःखं स्यात्, प्रतिकूलं सचेतसाम् ॥ १४१ ॥

145. Pleasure is what is covetable to the whole world. It is produced by merit. Pain is produced by demerit. It is repugnant to all sentient beings.

Pleasure is being described: *Pleasure, etc.* What is covetable—the (direct) object of desire. *Produced by merit*: That is to say, between merit and pleasure there is the relation of cause and effect.<sup>1</sup>

Pain is being described: *Pain, etc.* That is to say, between demerit and pain there is the relation of cause and effect. *Repugnant, etc.*—That is, owing to the very knowledge of its being pain, it is an object of natural aversion to everybody.

निर्दुःखत्वे सुखे चेच्छा तज्ज्ञानादेव जायते ।

इच्छा तु तदुपाये स्यादिष्टोपायत्वधीर्यदि ॥ १४६ ॥

146. The desire for painlessness and pleasure arises only from the knowledge of them, while there is desire for their means if there is the notion that they are means to what is desirable.

<sup>1</sup> The new school does not hold this view.



Desire is being described: *The desire, etc.* Desire is twofold—that relating to the result and that relating to the means. The result is pleasure and the absence of pain. Of these, the cause of a desire for the result is the knowledge of the result. Hence (pleasure and the absence of pain) can be the object of human pursuit (*puruṣārtha*)<sup>1</sup>; for its definition is: That<sup>2</sup> which being known is desired as belonging to oneself, is the object of human life. To be more explicit, it is the object of one's desire, independent of any other desire.<sup>3</sup> The cause of a desire for the means is the knowledge of its conduciveness to what is desirable.

चिकीर्षा कृतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारेच्छा च या भवेत् ।

तद्धेतुः कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वमतिर्भवेत् ॥ १४७ ॥

147. The desire to do is that wish (for an action) in which feasibility through one's effort is a feature. Its cause is the notion of feasibility through one's effort and conduciveness to what is desirable.

*The desire, etc.*—The desire to do is that wish which has feasibility through one's effort as its feature, and relates to an action that is feasible through one's effort; for it is experienced in the form: 'I shall effect cooking through (my) effort.' The cause of the desire to do is the notion of feasibility through one's effort and conduciveness to what is desirable. *Its cause, etc.*—Hence

<sup>1</sup> In the form of pleasure and the absence of pain.

<sup>2</sup> That, knowing which one wants to possess it.

<sup>3</sup> Not so the desire for the means, which is dependent on that for ends.

there is no desire to do with regard to rain etc. because the notion of their feasibility through one's effort is absent.

बलवद्द्विष्टहेतुत्वमतिः स्यात्प्रतिबन्धिका ।

तदहेतुत्वबुद्धेस्तु हेतुत्वं कस्यचिन्मते ॥ १४८ ॥

148. The notion of a thing leading to what is extremely repugnant is an obstacle (to the desire to do). According to some, the notion of not being a source of that is the cause (of the desire to do).

*The notion, etc.*—The notion of a thing leading to what is extremely repugnant is an obstacle. Hence there is no desire to eat a food with which honey and poison are mixed. Others hold that strong aversion is the obstacle. *According, etc.*—That is to say, the notion of not being a source of what is extremely repugnant is the cause.

द्विष्टसाधनताबुद्धिर्भवेदेषस्य कारणम् ।

149. The cause of aversion is the notion of producing something repugnant.

Aversion is being described. *The cause of aversion, etc.* In other words, the cause of aversion to what brings on pain is the notion of its being productive of what is extremely repugnant; and the notion of its producing highly desirable results is an obstacle (to aversion). Hence there is no aversion to cooking etc. which cause trouble in the interim.

<sup>1</sup> What is extremely repugnant.

## EFFORT: ITS VARIETIES AND THEIR CAUSES

प्रवृत्तिश्च निवृत्तिश्च तथा जीवनकारणम् ॥ १४९ ॥

एवं प्रयत्नत्रैविध्यं तान्त्रिकैः परिकीर्तितम् ।

चिकीर्षाकृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वमतिस्तथा ॥ १५० ॥

उपादानस्य चाध्यक्षं प्रवृत्तौ जनकं भवेत् ।

निवृत्तिस्तु भवेद्द्वेषाद्विष्टसाधनताधियः ॥ १५१ ॥

149 (contd.)-51. Inclination, disinclination and that (effort) which sustains life—thus has effort been described as of three kinds by the teachers of this system. The cause of inclination is the desire to do, the notion of a thing being feasible through one's effort and being productive of what is desirable, and the perception of the materials; while disinclination springs from aversion and from the notion of producing something repugnant.

Effort is being described: *Inclination, etc.* That is to say, effort is of three kinds according to its division into inclination, disinclination and the effort that sustains life (respiration). *The cause of inclination, etc.*—In other words, one is not inclined, for instance, to eat a food with which honey and poison are mixed, because the desire to do is wanting on account of a notion that it will produce great harm. (The school above referred to) also says that like the notion of a thing being feasible through one's effort, and so on, the notion of not producing any great harm is also a cause of inclination, by an independent process of agreement and difference.



The followers of the Teacher (Prabhākara) hold that the notion of feasibility is the cause of inclination. To explain: In order to produce inclination, nothing further is necessary for knowledge than the desire to do, and that is caused by the notion of feasibility through one's effort; for it is a rule that desire is caused by a notion that has the same feature as itself. Now the desire to do is a wish of which feasibility through one's effort is a feature. In this, feasibility through one's effort is a feature, and a notion that has the same feature is the cause of the desire to do and, through that, of inclination. It is not that the notion of its conduciveness to what is desirable is the cause of inclination; for then there would be an inclination for such acts as bringing down the lunar orb, which is beyond one's power to do.

Objection (by the logician): The notion that it is beyond one's power to do is an obstacle.

Reply (by the Mīmāṃsaka): Not so; for it is simpler to conceive that the notion of feasibility through one's effort is the cause, rather than the absence of the obstacle.<sup>1</sup> It cannot be urged that both together are the cause, since it would be cumbrous.

Objection (by the logician): According to you also, there would be an inclination for eating a food with which honey and poison are mixed, and for saluting a road-side tree<sup>2</sup> (*caitya*); for there also is the notion of their feasibility.

<sup>1</sup> For the alternative cause would be: the notion of conduciveness to what is desirable, as qualified by the absence of the notion of its unfeasibility.

<sup>2</sup> That is not consecrated: *Caitya* may also mean 'a sepulchre of Buddhist saints.'

Reply (by the Mīmāṃsaka): Not so; for the cause of inclination is that notion of feasibility which is produced by the knowledge of a characteristic of oneself<sup>1</sup> being (in the subject<sup>2</sup>). In optional activities like a sacrifice or cooking, undertaken for self-satisfaction, the desire is the characteristic of the person. Thence arises the notion of feasibility consequent on the notion of an action being a means to what one desires, unattended by highly undesirable consequences. This leads to inclination. A man whose hunger has been appeased, has no inclination for eating, because then the desire is not a characteristic of the person. In the case of regular obligatory rites, ceremonial purity etc. are the characteristic of the person. Hence the notion of feasibility through one's effort, dependent on the notion of ceremonial purity<sup>3</sup> etc. is the cause of them.

Objection (by the logician): Rather than that, for the sake of simplicity, let the cause be the notion of feasibility regarding what is a means to something desirable, unattended with highly undesirable consequences; and this last phrase means either not produc-

<sup>1</sup> The person having the inclination. The characteristic is his desire (with regard to optional actions undertaken for self-satisfaction) or purifying ceremonies etc. (with regard to regular obligatory rites).

<sup>2</sup> Of the inference based on the notion of feasibility, e.g. a sacrifice or cooking.

<sup>3</sup> Ceremonial purity is the condition of the performance of obligatory rites. So when a man is in mourning and hence lacks ceremonial purity, he cannot perform the rites, though otherwise obligatory.

ing more pain than what intervenes<sup>1</sup> before the appearance of the desired thing, or not producing that pain which is the object of strong aversion.

Reply (by the Mīmāṃsaka): Not so; for conduciveness to what is desirable and feasibility through one's effort cannot be apprehended together, since being an attainable end and being the means are contradictory. Only that which has not been accomplished is attainable, and only what is already accomplished can be the means (to what is desirable). A thing cannot be known by the same person to be both accomplished and unaccomplished at the same time. Therefore the two are apprehended at different times.

Objection (by the logician): Not so; since for the sake of simplicity the cause (of inclination) is the notion of feasibility through one's effort, combined with that of being a means to what is desirable, without producing highly undesirable consequences. And there is no contradiction between the same thing being an end and a means; for there can be no contradiction in its being an end or a means at different times, and we can simultaneously have the *notion* of a thing being an end and a means. The new school (of Mīmāṃsakas), however, maintains that the notion, 'This is feasible through my effort,' is not a cause of inclination, since such knowledge is impossible with regard to something that is yet to come.<sup>2</sup> But when a man finds that a certain

<sup>1</sup> Such as the trouble of lighting a fire and getting together the accessories of cooking.

<sup>2</sup> Because in such a case, if connection due to common features is not admitted, perception is impossible. And because there is no knowledge of the subject, e.g. a jar, inference is impossible.



act is feasible through the effort of a particular person, he judges himself to be similar to the latter and is inclined to that act. Thus he thinks, 'Cooking is feasible through the effort of a person who desires food, has knowledge of what goes to make it, and is in possession of the materials, and I am like him,' and is inclined to cook.

This is wrong; for this (reflection) is absent where one feels inclined to write a script conceived by oneself, as also with regard to gratifications due to the appearance of the sex urge in youth. One thing, however, should be understood in this connection: The cause of inclination is the notion, at the present time, of conduciveness to what is desirable, and so on. Hence a boy has no inclination for his future crown-princehood; for then he has no notion of its feasibility through his effort. Similarly one whose hunger has been appeased does not feel inclined to eat; for then one has no notion of its conduciveness to what is desirable. But a man with his mind tainted by anger is inclined to take poison etc. because then he has no notion of its producing highly undesirable consequences. It cannot be questioned how, regarding the inclination of a believer in the scriptures for union with a forbidden woman, the killing of an enemy, and so on, there can be the notion of an absence of highly undesirable consequences, since he knows that these will lead to hell; for the notion of their leading to hell is obscured by inordinate attachment etc. In the case of rain etc. however, there is neither the desire to do nor inclination, since there is no notion of their feasibility through one's

effort, but there is only desire, owing to the notion of their conduciveness to what is desirable.

Effort (*kṛti*) again (in the above paragraphs) is to be understood as inclination.<sup>1</sup> Hence there is no inclination for the movements of the five vital forces, which are due to the effort (*yatna*) that sustains life. Thus for the sake of their being the cause of inclination, injunctions also mean only conduciveness to what is desirable, and so on. Hence also, in passages like, 'One should perform the *Viśvajit* sacrifice,' even where no result is mentioned by the Śrutis, heaven is assumed to be that result.

Objection: In passages like, 'One should daily perform the *sandhyā* ceremony,' since no desirable result is produced, how can there be inclination? It cannot be urged that the result in question is either the world of Brahman etc. mentioned in the eulogistic passages, or the absence of any demerit<sup>2</sup>; for in that case it would be an optional activity for self-satisfaction, which would mar its character as a regular obligatory rite; while in the absence of desire nobody would care to do it. Thus, where there is mention of results in the Śrutis, it is mere eulogy.

Reply: Not so; for as in the case of reverential offerings to the departed ancestors during an eclipse, for instance, there is no contradiction between their characters as regular (*nitya*) and occasional (*naimittika*) obligatory rites,<sup>3</sup> so there is none<sup>4</sup> between the charac-

<sup>1</sup> That is, not the other two divisions of effort.

<sup>2</sup> Arising from its omission.

<sup>3</sup> They are regular obligatory rites, but at the same time have reference to the occasion, viz. an eclipse.

<sup>4</sup> A fact denied by the Mīmāṃsakas.

ters of regular obligatory (*nitya*) rites and optional activities for self-satisfaction (*kāmya*). It is not that in the absence of desire nobody would care to do them; for, as in the case of reciting hymns three times a day, we do assume the presence of desire. It is not possible that there would be inclination (only) from the notion that a certain act is to be done, since the Vedas inculcate this<sup>1</sup>; for unless one knows that it is a means to what one desires, there can be no inclination even from a thousand such notions. As for the theory<sup>2</sup> that the effect (of the regular obligatory rites) is a barren extraordinary result,<sup>3</sup> that too is incorrect; for the objection that in the absence of desire nobody would care to do the act, applies to it equally. While if desire is assumed, let the result be that<sup>4</sup> mentioned in the eulogistic passages, on the analogy of the sacrifices known as *Rātri-satras*<sup>5</sup>; otherwise there would be no inclination (to perform them). Hence<sup>6</sup> some conceive the warding off of demerit (to be the result in question).

<sup>1</sup> As the followers of Prabhākara hold.

<sup>2</sup> Held by the followers of Prabhākara.

<sup>3</sup> *Pañda-apūrva*. *Apūrva* (same as *adrṣṭa* or the unseen result) is the potential good or evil result of an action. It afterwards fructifies as the attainment of heaven or hell. Since the regular obligatory rites produce no tangible result, the *apūrva* is here considered to be barren or unproductive.

<sup>4</sup> Viz. the world of Brahman, and so on.

<sup>5</sup> Lit. 'nocturnal sacrifices.' No result is mentioned in the Śrutis for these sacrifices. So fame, mentioned in the eulogistic passages of the Vedas, is supposed to be their result (*Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* IV. iii. 17-18).

<sup>6</sup> Since it is simpler to assume the result mentioned in the eulogistic passages.



Thus,<sup>1</sup> 'But those who, being keen on their vows, ever perform the *sandhyā* ceremony, are freed from their sins and go to the peaceful world of Brahman,' and, 'With a view to causing satisfaction to the departed ancestors...one should daily make reverential offerings to them' (*Manu-Smṛiti* III. 82)—let such things alone be the result. It cannot be questioned how the satisfaction of the ancestors can be the result, since it is not co-existent (with the act)<sup>2</sup>; for as in the case of the reverential offerings to the ancestors made at Gayā, etc. sometimes an action is conceived to produce results that relate only to the person for whom it is intended. Hence it is stated, 'The results mentioned in the scriptures accrue to the doer of the action—this is the general rule.'<sup>3</sup> If, however, the ancestors are already liberated,<sup>4</sup> then the performer himself attains heaven as the results; for all regular and occasional obligatory rites have the general result of leading to heaven.

Again, inclination (to act even) for the sake of a barren extraordinary result is not possible; for the latter is neither itself an end of human life, like pleasure or the absence of pain, nor a means to it. Should it be asked how, in order to ward off demerit, there can be inclination, the answer is, in the following manner: Just as when regular obligatory rites are done, the (previous) non-existence of demerit continues, and in

<sup>1</sup> The eulogistic passages are being illustrated.

<sup>2</sup> The act abides in the son, and the satisfaction in the ancestors.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Pūruṣa-Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* III. vii. 18.

<sup>4</sup> In which case the reverential offerings made at Gayā, which help departed souls to get a new body, have no meaning for them.

their absence it ceases,<sup>1</sup> similarly, so long as the (previous) non-existence of demerit lasts, the previous non-existence of pain also continues, and in the absence of the former it also ceases.<sup>2</sup> Thus with regard to the previous non-existence of pain also, (the previous non-existence of demerit) may well be said to possess a causality that is the common ground of production and maintenance (of *status quo ante*).<sup>3</sup> In just the same way, expiatory rites also possess the causality regarding (the continuity of) the previous non-existence of pain.

Objection: In the dictum, 'One should not eat the meat of an animal killed with a poisoned weapon (*kālañja*),'<sup>4</sup> how is the meaning of the negative particle to be connected with that of the injunction, since (there) it cannot inculcate the absence of conduciveness

<sup>1</sup> Giving rise to demerit.

<sup>2</sup> That is, pain is produced.

<sup>3</sup> Causality is apprehended by the joint method of agreement and difference, and the joint method is irrespectively applicable to cases where a new effect is produced and also to cases where only the *status quo ante* is extended. The rule can be exemplified by the following formula: 'If the existence and non-existence of A are respectively followed by the existence and non-existence of B (in the next moment), then A is the cause, and B is the effect.' In the present case, the existence and non-existence of the performance of regular rites is followed by the existence and non-existence of *absence of demerit*, and so the latter is the effect of the former. The formula of the joint method as propounded here thus applies irrespectively to cases where a new effect is produced and where the previous state is only preserved, provided of course it would cease if the antecedent were absent. Cf. '*Tasmin sati agrima-kṣane yasya sattvam, yadyatireke cāsattvam, tat tajjanyam*' (*Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha* of Appaya Dikṣita, p. 167).

to what is desirable nor that of feasibility through one's effort?

Reply: Not so. There, owing to contradiction,<sup>1</sup> the meaning of the injunction is not conduciveness (of the act) to what is desirable, or its feasibility through one's effort, but only not being attended with highly undesirable consequences,<sup>2</sup> and the negative particle indicates the absence of that. Or the meaning of the injunction is feasibility through one's effort, along with conduciveness to what is desirable, that is not attended with highly undesirable consequences. And the negation of that, conveyed by the negative particle, is the negation of a qualified entity, which, applied to a case where the thing specified<sup>3</sup> is present, is reduced<sup>4</sup> to a negation of the qualification.<sup>5</sup>

Objection: In passages like, 'Wishing to kill an enemy, one should perform the Śyena sacrifice,' how can the meaning be 'not being attended with highly undesirable consequence'? For the Śyena sacrifice, being an activity contributing to death, is doing injury (*himsā*),

<sup>1</sup> Since eating this flesh is both agreeable and feasible.

<sup>2</sup> Viz. suffering from hell as a result of the sin incurred by eating the forbidden meat.

<sup>3</sup> Viz. eating that kind of meat with which are associated conduciveness to what is desirable and the rest.

<sup>4</sup> The negation of something that is qualified virtually signifies the absence of the thing specified when the specification is present, that of the specification when the thing specified is present, and that of both when both are wanting. Here it is the second alternative.

<sup>5</sup> That is, absence of being attended with highly undesirable consequences.



and hence must lead to hell. It cannot be urged that being enjoined (by the scriptures), it is not forbidden; for regarding acts meant to kill an enemy, expiatory rites are enjoined. Nor can it be urged that if every activity contributing to death is doing injury, then the maker of a sword and the digger of a well would be doers of injury, and death caused by the eating of food that sticks in the throat would be suicide; for the phrase 'with death as the intention' is also a qualification (of the definition of injury). As for the expiatory ceremony enjoined on one who happens to kill a Brāhmaṇa with a *nārāca*<sup>1</sup> shot at somebody else, its authority is only scriptural.<sup>2</sup>

Reply: Not so; for to exclude the *Śyena* sacrifice, the qualifying epithet, 'of which merit and demerit are not the operation,' should be added (to the definition of injury). Hence the worship of Śiva, and so on, for the purpose of dying at Benares is not injury. It cannot be urged that only what directly causes death is injury, and the *Śyena* sacrifice is not like that; but it is the extraordinary result (merit and demerit) accruing from it that causes death. Because in that case when a Brāhmaṇa dies of a cut with the sword, indirectly through the suppuration of the wound, it would not be considered an injury. Some, however, are of opinion that the result of the *Śyena* sacrifice is injury, not death. Hence the meaning of the word *abhicāra* is injury in the shape of a cut with the sword, brought on by the *Śyena* sacrifice, and that causes sin. Hence, although the

<sup>1</sup> An arrow with a crescent-shaped blade.

<sup>2</sup> The suggestion is that really he is not guilty of killing a Brāhmaṇa.

Śyena sacrifice, being enjoined by the scriptures, does not lead to sin, good people have no inclination for it, anticipating the subsequent sin. But in the opinion of the Ācārya (Udayana), the meaning of an injunction is the intention of a trustworthy person (*āpta*).<sup>1</sup> Just as sentences like, 'You should cook', convey desire in the form of an order, etc. similarly every *vidhiliṅ* suffix signifies desire;—for this is simpler. Thus in sentences like, 'One who desires heaven must perform sacrifices' (*Tāṇḍya Br. XVI iii. 3*, etc.), the meaning is that sacrifices are desired by a trustworthy person as being feasible through the effort of one who desires heaven. Therefore a man infers from the fact of an action being desired by a trustworthy person, that it is a means to what is desirable, and so on, and feels inclined to it. Since that is wanting with regard to eating the meat of an animal killed with a poisoned weapon, he has no inclination for it. To one who does not admit that the Vedas are not the work of a person, the injunctions alone are—like conception in the case of a maiden—a proof of the Śruti's connection with a person.<sup>2</sup> The fact that no author of the Vedas is recalled, is no bar (to their springing from a person); for to this day we find rather a mention of their author by Kapila, Kaṇāda and others. Otherwise even the Smṛtis would be regarded as being without any authors. Should it be urged that therein is a mention of their authors, the answer is that in the Vedas too there is indeed a mention of their

<sup>1</sup> God or a sage.

<sup>2</sup> An injunction is the intention of a trustworthy person. The Vedic injunctions cannot obviously be the intention of persons like ourselves; hence they must be attributed to God.

author in such passages as, 'From Him sprang the Vedas,' etc. (*Rg-Veda* X. xc. 9, etc.). Likewise the passage, 'In the regime of each Manu, a different Śruti is produced,' may also be cited. As for the passage, 'Thou hast recited in times past these blessed Vedas that are self-manifested; from Śiva down to the seers, all are but their recallers, not authors,' it is only a eulogy of the Vedas. It cannot be urged that if they be composed by a person, there would be chances of error etc. in them, which would take away their authoritativeness; for since (the Author) is eternal and omniscient, He is unimpeachable. Hence, any other person being liable to error etc. even Kapila and the rest are not the authors of the Vedas. Moreover, since (articulate) letters themselves will be spoken of as transitory, the Vedas, being a collection of them, must be all the more transitory. This is the sum and substance of the matter.

*And the perception, etc.*—The perception of the inherent cause is also a cause of inclination. *While disinclination, etc.*—In other words, that the notion of conduciveness to what is repugnant is the cause of disinclination, is established by the method of agreement and difference.

यत्नो जीवनयोनिस्तु सर्वदातीन्द्रियो भवेत् ।

शरीरे प्राणसंचारे कारणं परिकीर्तितः ॥ १५२ ॥

152. The effort that sustains life remains throughout and is beyond the senses. It is described as the cause of the movement of the vital force in the body.



*The effort, etc.*—The effort that sustains life continues throughout life, and it is beyond the senses. A proof of this is being stated: *It is described, etc.* The movement of the vital force, in the form of quickened respiration, for instance, is brought about by effort. Thus the inference that all movements of the vital force are due to effort, coupled with the fact that visible effort is contradicted (by experience), establishes the existence of imperceptible effort. That is the effort that sustains life.

### WEIGHT, LIQUIDITY AND OILINESS

अतीन्द्रियं गुरुत्वं स्यात्, पृथिव्यादिद्वये तु तत् ।

अनित्ये तदनित्यं स्यात्, नित्ये नित्यमुदाहृतम् ॥ १५३ ॥

153. Weight is imperceptible to the senses. It abides in the two substances beginning with earth. It is transitory in transitory things, and is spoken of as eternal in eternal things.

Weight is being described: *Weight, etc. It is said, etc.*—*It*, i.e. weight, is *transitory in transitory things*, beginning with dyads. *Eternal in eternal things*, i.e. in atoms. The word 'weight' is to be supplied from above.

तदेवासमवायि स्यात्पतनाख्ये तु कर्मणि ।

सांसिद्धिकं द्रवत्वं स्यात्, नैमित्तिकमथापरम् ॥ १५४ ॥

154. In the action called falling, it is that which is the non-inherent (cause). Liquidity is natural as also artificial.

*That*—i.e. weight, 'Non-inherent' in the text means the non-inherent cause. *In the action, etc.*—That is to say, in the first fall.

Liquidity is being described: *Liquidity, etc.* Liquidity is of two kinds, natural and artificial.

सांसिद्धिकं तु सलिले, द्वितीयं क्षितितेजसोः ।

परमाणौ जले नित्यम्, अन्यत्रानित्यमुच्यते ॥ १५५ ॥

155. Natural liquidity is in water, and the second is in earth and fire. It is eternal in atoms of water, and is spoken of as transitory elsewhere.

*The second*—i.e. artificial. *It is eternal, etc.*—That is, liquidity is eternal in atoms of water. *Elsewhere*—i.e. in atoms of earth etc.<sup>1</sup> and in dyads etc.<sup>2</sup> of water, liquidity is transitory.

नैमित्तिकं वह्नियोगात्तपनीयघृतादिषु ।

द्रवत्वं स्यन्दने हेतुः, निमित्तं संग्रहे तु तत् ॥ १५६ ॥

156. Artificial liquidity is due to the contact of fire. It (occurs) in gold, clarified butter, etc. Liquidity is the (non-inherent) cause of dripping, and is the auxiliary cause in the formation of a lump.

In some forms of fire and some forms of earth there is artificial liquidity. Now what is the meaning of the word 'artificial'? This is being shown: *Artificial liquidity, etc. Contact of fire*—Artificial liquidity is produced by the

<sup>1</sup> Refers to fire.

<sup>2</sup> Refers to triads etc.

conjunction of fire, and it occurs in fire in the form of gold etc. and in (varieties of) earth such as clarified butter and lac. This is the meaning (of artificiality). *Liquidity, etc. Cause*—i.e. non-inherent cause. *Formation of a lump*—a particular kind of conjunction of fried powdered barely etc. *It*—liquidity, which should be understood as being mixed with oiliness. Hence there can be no formation of a lump with molten gold etc.

स्नेहो-जले ; स नित्योऽणौ, अनित्योऽवयवित्यसौ ।

तैलान्तरे तत्प्रकर्षाद्हनस्यानुकूलता ॥ १५७ ॥

157. Oiliness exists in water. It is eternal in an atom, and it is transitory in an aggregate. Because of its abundance in oil, the latter helps combustion.

Oiliness is being described: *Oiliness, etc. In water*—i.e. in water alone. *It* (in 'It is transitory') refers to oiliness. It may be contended that even in a modification of earth, viz. oil, oiliness is perceived, and it is not a property of water, since in that case it would thwart combustion. This is being answered: *Because of, etc. Its abundance*—the abundance of oiliness. Even the oiliness that is perceived in oil indeed belongs to water.<sup>1</sup> That it helps combustion is on account of its abundance. For it is only owing to its minute quantity of oiliness that water extinguishes fire. This is the idea.

<sup>1</sup> To the element of water that is in oil.



## VARIETIES OF TENDENCY

संस्कारभेदो वेगोऽथ स्थितिस्थापकभावेन ।

मूर्तमात्रे तु वेगः स्यात्, कर्मजो वेगजः क्वचित् ॥ १५८ ॥

158. The varieties of tendency are impulse (*vega*), elasticity and impression (*bhāvanā*). Impulse abides only in limited substances<sup>1</sup>. It is sometimes due to action and sometimes due to another impulse.

Tendency is being described: *The varieties, etc.* That is to say, tendency is of three kinds according to its division into impulse, elasticity and impression. *Impulse, etc.*—In other words, impulse is of two kinds according as it is due to action or to another impulse. In an arrow etc. impulse is produced by action due to (silent) pushing. That destroys the previous action,<sup>2</sup> then follows the subsequent action. Similarly further on.<sup>3</sup> Since an action is an obstacle to another action, without impulse there cannot be any destruction of the preceding action and origination of the succeeding action. Where impulse is produced in the jar made out of its two moving halves, it is a case of impulse due to another impulse.

स्थितिस्थापकसंस्कारः क्षितौ, केचिच्चतुर्वपि ।

अतीन्द्रियोऽसौ विज्ञेयः, क्वचित्स्पन्देपि कारणम् ॥ १५९ ॥

<sup>1</sup> The first four elements and mind.

<sup>2</sup> This assumption is necessary, as there is no conjunction with another object in space to destroy the previous action.

<sup>3</sup> That is, a subsequent action also destroys the previous motion, this is followed by a new motion, and so on.

159. The tendency called elasticity abides in earth. Some (consider it to be present) in all the four (substances). It should be regarded as beyond the senses. Sometimes it is the cause of movement also.

*The tendency, etc.*—Because the return (to their former position) of branches etc. that have been pulled and let go, is caused by elasticity. *Some, etc.*—Some consider elasticity to be present in the four (substances), beginning with earth. The idea is that the view is incorrect. *It* (in 'It should be,' etc.) refers to elasticity. *Sometimes*—as for instance in the case of a branch that has been pulled.

भावनाख्यस्तु संस्कारो जीववृत्तिरतीन्द्रियः ।

उपेक्षानात्मकस्तस्य निश्चयः कारणं भवेत् ॥ १६० ॥

160. The tendency called impression (*bhāvanā*) abides in the soul and is imperceptible to the senses. Certitude that is not of the nature of indifference is its cause.

*The tendency, etc. Its*—of the tendency. Since knowledge of the nature of indifference does not give rise to any tendency, the text says: *That is not of the nature of indifference*. Since doubt that is not of the nature of indifference cannot produce any tendency, the word 'certitude' is used. So it comes to this that certitude other than indifference, as such, is the cause of tendency.

Objection: Certitude other than indifference, as such, is the cause of recollection; hence in a case of

indifference etc. there is no recollection. So let knowledge as such be the cause of tendency.<sup>1</sup>

Reply: No; for owing to the absence of any conclusive reasoning also,<sup>2</sup> certitude other than indifference, as such, is the cause of tendency. Moreover, (if knowledge be considered to be the cause), we have to assume (the presence of) tendency in a case of indifference (also), and since this is cumbrous,<sup>3</sup> it is taken for granted that certitude other than indifference, as such, is the cause of tendency.

स्मरणे प्रत्यभिज्ञायामप्यसौ हेतुरुच्यते ।

161. In recollection and recognition also it is called the cause.

*It*—refers to tendency.<sup>4</sup> A proof of its existence is being given: *In recollection, etc.* Because it produces recollection and recognition, therefore the existence of tendency is assumed. For without an operation a past experience has no power to give rise to recollection etc. and in the absence of either itself or its operation, it cannot be a cause.<sup>5</sup> It cannot be urged that since the

<sup>1</sup> That is, instead of saying that tendency is due to certitude other than indifference, and recollection is due to tendency, why not say at once that recollection is due to certitude other than indifference, and tendency is due to knowledge?

<sup>2</sup> This word suggests that knowledge, put forward as a cause of tendency, is a superfluity.

<sup>3</sup> As that tendency does not lead to any recollection, it is needless to assume it.

<sup>4</sup> The tendency called impression.

<sup>5</sup> Since experience is destroyed at the moment of recollection, something serving as the operation of it must be assumed, and this is tendency.



respective tendencies are the cause of recognition, the latter, being produced by tendency, is reduced<sup>1</sup> to recollection; for there is no corroborative argument. Others,<sup>2</sup> however, say that since un-awakened tendency does not lead to recognition, instead of assuming awakened tendency to be the cause, it is better to assume that 'the respective recollections' are the cause of recognition.

### MERIT AND DEMERIT

धर्माधर्मावदृष्टं स्यात्; धर्मः स्वर्गादिसाधनम् ॥ १६१ ॥

161 (contd.). The unseen result is merit and demerit. Merit is what leads to heaven etc.

The unseen result is being described: *The unseen result, etc. Heaven etc.*—That is to say, merit is the means of attaining all enjoyable things such as heaven, and the bodies etc. that lead to (the enjoyment of) heaven.

गङ्गास्नानादियागादिव्यापारः स तु कीर्तितः ।

कर्मनाशजलस्पर्शादिना नाशयस्त्वसौ मतः ॥ १६२ ॥

162. It is said to be the operation (*vyāpāra*) of such acts as a bath in the Ganges and sacrifices. It is considered to be destroyed by the touch of the water of the Karmanāśā, and so on.

To furnish a proof of that, the text says: *The operation, etc.* Merit is inferred as the operation of

<sup>1</sup> While, as a matter of fact, it is perception, and not recollection.

<sup>2</sup> Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the author of the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*.

sacrifices etc. Otherwise, sacrifices etc. being long destroyed and having no operation, cannot lead to heaven, which will take place at a subsequent time. So the Ācārya (Udayana) has said, 'An action that is long destroyed cannot produce a result, unless there is some extraordinary effect.'<sup>1</sup>

One may object: The destruction of the sacrifice may itself be the operation. It cannot be urged that the counterpositive<sup>2</sup> and its destruction cannot both be the cause of the same thing; for it is not proved to be always the case. Nor can it be urged, 'According to you, the result would be unending'<sup>3</sup>; but according to me, since the ultimate result<sup>4</sup> is the destroyer of the extraordinary result, such is not the case<sup>5</sup>; for particular times are an aid.'<sup>6</sup>

This is being answered: *A bath, etc.* That is to say, if a bath in the Ganges leads to heaven, an infinite number<sup>7</sup> of conjunctions of water and the destruction thereof would be considered to be the operation; instead of that just one extraordinary result is assumed, for the sake of simplicity.

One may object: Let not destruction be the operation either. It cannot be questioned how a thing that is long destroyed and has no operation can be a cause; for there also is the invariable antecedence that

<sup>1</sup> *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* I, verse, 9.

<sup>2</sup> The sacrifice.

<sup>3</sup> Since the operation, being non-existence, is endless.

<sup>4</sup> Heaven etc.

<sup>5</sup> There is no further heaven.

<sup>6</sup> The destruction of the sacrifice produces the result through the aid of a particular time. Since the latter is not always present, there is no result all the time.

<sup>7</sup> Because the particles of water are innumerable.

is not a superfluity.<sup>1</sup> Immediate antecedence is (a condition) of the causality of the conjunction of the eye (and the object), and so on, but not everywhere,<sup>2</sup> just as presence at the time when the effect takes place is (a condition) of the causality of an *inherent* cause.<sup>3</sup> This is being answered: *It is considered, etc.* If indeed there were no extraordinary result, then merit would not be subject to destruction by the touch of the water of the Karmanāśā, and so on; for the touch and so forth can neither destroy nor obstruct the sacrifices etc. these being already accomplished facts. This is the idea. This also refutes the view that the satisfaction of the gods is the only result.<sup>4</sup> Besides, the satisfaction of the gods is not always possible through acts like a bath in the Ganges, and although the gods are sentient beings, their satisfaction is not the end in view. Moreover, satisfaction, being a form of pleasure, is impossible in the case of Viṣṇu, for instance, since no pleasure that is caused exists in Him. Hence the term 'the satisfaction of Viṣṇu' means only heaven etc. contemplated by the opponents,<sup>5</sup> which are due to the satisfaction of Viṣṇu.

अधर्मो नरकादीनां हेतुर्निन्दितकर्मजः ।

प्रायश्चित्तादिनादयोऽसौ ; जीववृत्ति त्विमौ गुणौ ॥ १६३ ॥

<sup>1</sup> Which is the definition of a cause.

<sup>2</sup> So admitting heaven etc. to be the result of sacrifices and so forth, there is no need to assume any operation, such as destruction or the extraordinary result, to ensure that the cause is immediately antecedent to the effect.

<sup>3</sup> But not of a non-inherent cause.

<sup>4</sup> Of such acts as a bath in the Ganges and sacrifices.

<sup>5</sup> The Mīmāṃsakas.



163. Demerit is the cause of (suffering) hell etc. and is produced by condemnable work. It can be destroyed by expiation etc. Both these qualities abide in the individual soul.

*Demerit, etc.*—That is to say, demerit is the cause of all sorts of pain such as (those of) hell, as also of bodies etc. pertaining to hell. A proof of its being furnished: *It can, etc.* If demerit did not exist, it would not be subject to destruction by expiation etc. Expiation cannot indeed either destroy or obstruct such acts as the murder of a Brāhmaṇa; for the act is already destroyed. This is the idea. *Individual soul*—This is to say, because God has no merit or demerit.

इमौ तु वासनाजन्यौ ज्ञानादपि विनश्यतः ।

164. These two are produced by subtle impressions (*vāsanās*)<sup>1</sup> and are destroyed by knowledge also.

*These two*—merit and demerit. *Produced, etc.*—Hence good and evil acts, even when done by a man of realisation, cannot produce any results. This is the idea. *Knowledge also*: The 'also' suggests enjoyment or suffering.

Objection: How can the realisation of Truth destroy merit and demerit, since it contradicts the dictum, 'Actions<sup>2</sup> are never destroyed except by experience, not even in a thousand million cycles'? Thus, for men of realisation, all actions are simultaneously

<sup>1</sup> The effects of false knowledge, the beginnings of which cannot be traced.

<sup>2</sup> That is, their results.

destroyed by experience through multiple bodies assumed by them.

Reply: Not so; for there experience is but suggestive of all means of destruction inculcated by the scriptures, How otherwise can actions be destroyed by expiation etc.? This has been stated in the passage, 'The fire of knowledge (reduces to ashes) all actions,' etc. (*Gītā* IV. 38). Also, 'His actions are destroyed when He who is both high and low is realised' (*Mu. Up.* II. ii. 8).

Objection: Then, for a man of realisation, there can be neither continuation of the body nor pleasure and pain, since all his actions are destroyed by knowledge.

Reply: Not so; for the destruction is only of actions other than the *prārabdha*. And *prārabdha*<sup>1</sup> is that action which leads to the enjoyments and sufferings in the present body. The dictum, 'Actions are never,' etc. refers to that.

## SOUND

शब्दो ध्वनिश्च वर्णश्च ; मृदङ्गादिभवो ध्वनिः ॥ १६४ ॥

164 (contd.). Sound is inarticulate and articulate. Inarticulate sound is that which is produced from a drum etc.

कण्ठसंयोगादिजन्या वर्णास्ते कादयो मताः ।

सर्वं शब्दो नभोवृत्तिः, श्रोत्रोत्पन्नस्तु गृह्यते ॥ १६५ ॥

165. Sounds such as *ka* that are produced by the conjunction of the throat, and so on, are

<sup>1</sup> Lit. what has already begun to bear fruit.

regarded as articulate. All sound abides in ether, but it is perceived when it is produced in the ear.

*Abides in ether*, i.e. is inherent in ether. Since distant sounds are imperceptible, the text says: *When it is produced in the ear.*

वीचीतरङ्गन्यायेन तदुत्पत्तिस्तु कीर्तिता ।

कदम्बगोलकन्यायादुत्पत्तिः कस्यचिन्मते ॥ १६६ ॥

166. Its origination is said to take place in the manner of waves. According to some, the origination is in the manner of *kadamba* buds.<sup>1</sup>

It may be objected: Since sound is produced within the limits of a drum etc. how can it be said to be produced in the ear? This is being answered: *Its origination, etc.* Outside a sound, another sound covering the ten quarters, is produced by that very sound. By that, another sound enveloping it is produced. In this order sound is produced in the ear, when it is perceived. This is the idea. *According, etc.*—From the first sound ten sounds are produced in ten directions. By them, ten other sounds are produced. This is the idea. Since this view is cumbrous, the text says: *According to some.*

उत्पन्नः को विनष्टः क इति बुद्धेरनित्यता ।

सोऽयं क इति बुद्धिस्तु साजात्यमवलम्बते ॥ १६७ ॥

167. Sound is transitory, because we have the notion that (the sound) *ka* is produced, and the sound *ka* is destroyed. As for the recogni-

<sup>1</sup> All the filaments of a bud appearing together.



tion, 'This is that *ka*,' it apprehends its belonging to the same class.

It may be urged that since sound is eternal, it is improper to speak of its origination. This is being answered: *Sound is, etc.* That is to say, sound is transitory, because it is related to our notion about its origin and destruction. It may be urged that sound is eternal, since we recognise that this is the same *ka*, and so on; so our notion about the origin and destruction of sound is but an error. This is being answered: *Belonging to the same class*: There the object of the recognition is the fact of (the sound *ka*) *belonging to the same class* as the first, and not that of its identity with the first individual; for that would contradict the above notion. Thus both<sup>1</sup> the notions are correct.

तदेवौषधमित्यादौ सजातीयेऽपि दर्शनात् ।

तस्मादनित्या एवेति वर्णाः सर्वे मतं हि नः ॥ १६८ ॥

168. Because it<sup>2</sup> is noticeable even among things of the same class, as for instance in the notion, '(This is) that medicine.' Therefore we maintain that all articulate sounds are indeed transitory.

It may be asked: Where is the recognition, 'This is that,' noticeable among things of the same class? This is being answered: *Because it is, etc.* That is to say, because we notice (expressions like), 'The very medicine that I made was made by another also.'

<sup>1</sup> The notion of origination and the recognition.

<sup>2</sup> Recognition.

## GLOSSARY

- akhaṇḍopādhi: unanalysable characteristic  
 atideśa: extended application  
 ativyāpti: too wide application  
 atīndriya: beyond the senses, transcendent  
 atyantābhāva: absolute non-existence  
 adhikaraṇa: substratum  
 anavasthā: *regressus ad infinitum*  
 anupapatti: untenability, impossibility  
 anupalambha: non-perception  
 anupasamhārin: inconclusive  
 anubhūti: experience  
 anumāna: inference (the instrument)  
 anumiti: inferential knowledge  
 anuyogin: base, support, substratum  
 anuvyavasāya: perception of a perception, apperception  
 anaikānta: inconstant (a kind of fallacy)  
 antaḥkaraṇa: the internal organ  
 antyāvayavin: final aggregate  
 anyathā-khyāti: error, taking one thing for another  
 anyathā-siddha: superfluous  
 anyonyābhāva: mutual non-existence  
 anvaya: method of agreement  
 anvaya-vyatirekin: having both similar and contrary  
     instances  
 aparatva: nearness in time or place  
 apavarga: liberation  
 apūrva: the extraordinary result  
 apekṣā-buddhi: the notion of addition

- apramā: invalid knowledge, error  
 abhighāta: impact  
 arthāpatti: presumption  
 alaukika: supernormal  
 avacchedaka: determinant, the distinguishing characteristic  
 avacchinna: determined  
 avayava: part  
 avayavin: aggregate, whole  
 avyāpati: too narrow application  
 avyāpya-vṛtti: of partial extensivity  
 asamavāyin: non-inherent  
 asādhāraṇa: uncommon (a kind of fallacy)  
 asiddha: unfounded (a kind of fallacy)  
 ākāmksā: expectancy  
 ākāśa: ether  
 āpta: a trustworthy person  
 ārambhaka: productive  
 ālaya-vijñāna: ego-consciousness  
 āśraya: substratum  
 āsatti: contiguity  
 iṣṭa: desirable  
 iṣṭāpatti: welcome objection  
 udbhūta: manifested  
 upanīta-bhāna: spontaneous presentation  
 upamāna: comparison (the instrument)  
 upamiti: knowledge based on comparison  
 upasthiti: knowledge  
 upādāna: material or inherent cause  
 upādhi: (1) a general property other than the generic attribute (jāti); (2) a limiting adjunct; (3) a vicious condition



- kapāla: half of a jar  
 kāraṇatā: causality  
 kālātyayāpadiṣṭa: see *bādha*  
 kṛti: effort  
 kevalānvayin: having no contrary instance, universally  
     present  
 kevala-vyatirekin: having no similar instance  
 guṇa: quality  
 gaurava: cumbrousness  
 graha: apprehension  
 citra: composite  
 ceṣṭā: voluntary movement  
 jāti: (eternal) generic attribute  
 jīva: individual self  
 jīvana-yoni: life-sustaining  
 jñāna-lakṣaṇa: based on knowledge  
 tarka: argument, *reductio ad absurdum*  
 tātparya: intention  
 tādātmya: identity  
 tejas: fire, light  
 trasareṇu: triad, an aggregate of three dyads  
 diś: space  
 dehin: soul  
 dravya: substance  
 dveṣa: aversion  
 dvyaṇuka: dyad  
 dharma: (1) attribute; (2) merit  
 naya: system  
 nigamana: conclusion  
 nimitta-kāraṇa: auxiliary cause  
 nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā: a well-established implication  
 nirvikālpaka: indeterminate  
 naimittika: artificial

nodana: soundless contact

pakṣa: subject, that in which something is inferred  
the thing denoted by the minor term

pakṣatā: the condition constituting a subject

pakṣa-dharmatā: presence in the subject

pada: word

padārtha: (1) category; (2) the thing denoted by a  
word

paratva: distance in time or place

paramāṇu: atom

paramparā-sambandha: indirect relation

parāmarśa: consideration, the knowledge that a con-  
comitant of the thing to be inferred is in the subject

paryāpti: collective extensity

pāka: change under heat

pārimāṇḍalya: atomicity, dimension of an atom

pāriśeṣya: the principle of residuum

puruṣa: soul

prakaraṇa: context

prakāra: feature, the adjectival part of an object of  
knowledge

prakṛti: Nature, the material cause of the universe

pradhvaṃsābhāva: non-existence pertaining to destruc-  
tion

pracaya: accumulation, loose conjunction

pratyogin: (1) counterpositive, that which is negated;  
(2) that which rests on something else (*anyogin*)

pratyakṣa: perception (the instrument as well as the  
knowledge)

pratyabhijñā: recognition

pratyaya: notion

pratyāsatti: connection between a sense-organ and its  
object

- pramā: valid knowledge  
 pramāṇa: instrument of valid knowledge  
 prameya: knowable, object of valid knowledge  
 pravṛtti: inclination, volition  
 prāgabhāva: previous non-existence or potential existence  
 bādha: incongruity, the absence of the thing to be inferred in the subject  
 buddhi: (1) knowledge; (2) Sāṃkhya, intellect  
 bhāna: knowledge  
 bhāva: positive entity  
 bhūta: an element such as earth and water  
 maṅgala: invocation  
 mahat: of medium dimension, neither atomic nor infinite  
 mahat-tattva: cosmic intelligence, the first product of Nature  
 mūrta: limited or finite  
 yoga-rūḍha: derivatively conventional  
 yogyatā: consistency  
 yaugika: derivative  
 yaugika-rūḍha: both derivative and conventional  
 rūḍha: conventional  
 rūpa: colour  
 lakṣaṇa: definition  
 lakṣaṇā: implication, secondary meaning  
 lāghava: the law of simplicity or parsimony, explaining a thing by the fewest assumptions  
 liṅga: sign, reason  
 laukika: normal, ordinary  
 vāsanā: impression left in the mind  
 vijñāna: consciousness  
 vijñāna-vāda: idealism



- vinigamanā: conclusive reasoning  
 vipakṣa: contrary instance  
 viparyāsa: illusion, error  
 vipratipatti: dispute  
 vibhāga: disjunction  
 vibhu: omnipresent  
 viruddha: contradictory, where the subject has the  
     thing to be inferred, but not the reason  
 viśiṣṭa-buddhi: notion regarding a qualified entity  
 viśeṣa: ultimate difference  
 viśeṣaṇa: a qualification, a qualifying attribute  
 viśeṣanātā: attributiveness  
 viśeṣya: substantive  
 viśaya: object  
 viśayin: knowledge  
 viśaṁvādin: unsuccessful, belying one's expectation  
 vṛtti: (1) existence, abiding; (2) significative function  
 vega: impulse  
 vaiśiṣṭya: relation  
 vaidharṁya: divergence  
 vyakti: individual  
 vyatireka: method of difference  
 vyatireka-vyāpti: negative invariable concomitance  
 vyabhicāra: inconstancy, where the subject has the  
     reason, but not the thing to be inferred  
 vyāpaka: inclusive  
 vyāpāra: operation, intermediate cause  
 vyāpti: (1) invariable concomitance; (2) a general  
     proposition  
 vyāpya: concomitant, something that depends upon  
     something else (*vyāpaka*)  
 vyāpya-vṛtti: covering a whole area  
 vyāvṛtta: absent

- śakta: possessed of denotative function  
 śakti: (1) power; (2) denotative function  
 śakya: the thing denoted by a word, primary meaning  
 śabda: (1) sound; (2) word; (3) verbal testimony  
 śābda-bodha: verbal comprehension  
 śruti: revealed scriptures, the Vedas  
 saṅkara: cross-division  
 saṅyoga: conjunction; contact  
 saṁsarga: relation  
 saṁsargābhāva: general name for the three kinds of  
     non-existence other than mutual non-existence  
 saṁskāra: tendency  
 sat-pratipakṣa: counterbalanced reason  
 sannikarṣa: connection or contact between a sense-  
     organ and its object  
 sapakṣa: similar instance  
 samavāya: inherence  
 samavāyi-kāraṇa: inherent cause  
 samaveta: inherent  
 samānādhikaraṇa: having a common substratum, co-  
     existent  
 samūhālabhāna: collective cognition  
 savikalpa: determinate, consisting of a substantive, a  
     qualification and a relation between the two  
 saha-cāra: co-existence  
 sādharṁya: similarity, common feature  
 sādharāṇa: common, a kind of fallacy in which the  
     reason is too general  
 sādhyā: the thing to be inferred, the thing denoted by  
     the major term  
 sāmagrī: the totality of causes  
 sāmānya: see *jāti*  
 sāmānya-lakṣaṇa: based on a common feature

sāmsiddhika: natural

siddha: established, proved

siddhi: certainty about the thing to be inferred

siṣādhayiṣā: the desire to infer

sthāṇu: the stump of a tree

sthiti-sthāpaka: elasticity

sneha: oiliness

sphoṭa: transcendental word-essence

smṛti: (1) recollection; (2) sacred literature based on  
the Vedas

syandana: dripping, trickling

svarūpa-sambandha: the relation of selfsameness

svarūpa-yogyatā: potential causality

hetu: reason or ground for inference, the thing denoted  
by the middle term

hetvābhāsa: fallacy



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